Loderer, Claudio; Lewellen, Wilbur; Rosenfeld, Ahron (1989). Mergers, executive risk reduction and stockholder wealth. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 24(4), pp. 459-472. Cambridge University Press 10.2307/2330979
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1989 Mergers, Executive Risk Reduction, and Stockholder Wealth.pdf - Accepted Version Available under License Publisher holds Copyright. Download (769kB) | Preview |
Among the possible consequences of agency problems between owners and managers is a tendency by managers to make investment decisions for their firms that are deliberately aimed at reducing firm risk, as a means to control managers' personal wealth risk. The literature has suggested that such behavior may occur to the detriment of shareholder wealth, and that mrgers may be a particular class of investment decisions for which the behavior would be observable. We test these hypotheses empirically, but find no evidence from our merger sample that risk reduction for the aqquiring firm is the typical outcome nor that, when it occurs, it is differentially costly for shareholders.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Financial Management |
UniBE Contributor: |
Loderer, Claudio, Rosenfeld, Ahron |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
ISSN: |
0022-1090 |
Publisher: |
Cambridge University Press |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Karin Dolder |
Date Deposited: |
24 Jan 2014 09:21 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 14:27 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.2307/2330979 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.39542 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/39542 |
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