Corporate bankruptcy and managers' self-serving behavior

Loderer, Claudio F.; Sheehan, Dennis P. (1989). Corporate bankruptcy and managers' self-serving behavior. Journal of Finance, 44(4), pp. 1059-1075. Wiley 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb02639.x

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We investigate whether insiders of bankrupt firms hold less stock or reduce their stockholdings compared to what we observed for insiders of similar firms that do not go bankrupt. We find little evidence of such time-series and cross-sectional differences in spite of the fact that the stock value of bankrupt firms falls by more than ninety percent in the five years preceding bankruptcy. One implication of our results is that the amount of stock owned and the magnitude of the trades undertaken by corporate insiders of both bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms appear to provide no information about firm value.

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