Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysis

Loderer, Claudio; Lewellen, Wilbur; Martin, Kenneth (1987). Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 9(3), pp. 287-310. Elsevier 10.1016/0165-4101(87)90009-7

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The question of whether the design of the corporate executive pay package reflects an attempt to reduce agency costs between shareholders an managers is adressed. The components of senior executive pay are found to vary systematically across firms in a manner that cannot easily be explained by tax effects, and which would indicate that individual elements of pay are aimed at controlling for limited horizon and risk exposure problems. Managerial decisions and the structure of managerial pay therefore appear to be interrelated.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Financial Management

UniBE Contributor:

Loderer, Claudio

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

ISSN:

0165-4101

Publisher:

Elsevier

Language:

English

Submitter:

Karin Dolder

Date Deposited:

03 Feb 2014 20:42

Last Modified:

28 Dec 2014 11:16

Publisher DOI:

10.1016/0165-4101(87)90009-7

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.39592

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/39592

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