Weighted Majoritarian Rules for the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

Bochet, Olivier; Sidartha, Gordon; Saran, Rene (2013). Weighted Majoritarian Rules for the Location of Multiple Public Facilities. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 49(6), pp. 454-459. Elsevier 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.003

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We consider collective decision problems given by a profile of single-peaked preferences defined over the real line and a set of pure public facilities to be located on the line. In this context, Bochet and Gordon (2012) provide a large class of priority rules based on efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each such rule is described by a fixed priority ordering among interest groups. We show that any priority rule which treats agents symmetrically — anonymity — respects some form of coherence across collective decision problems — reinforcement — and only depends on peak information — peakonly — is a weighted majoritarian rule. Each such rule defines priorities based on the relative size of the interest groups and specific weights attached to locations. We give an explicit account of the richness of this class of rules.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Bochet, Olivier

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

ISSN:

0304-4068

Publisher:

Elsevier

Language:

English

Submitter:

Konstantin Büchel

Date Deposited:

05 Feb 2014 15:11

Last Modified:

26 Jun 2016 01:46

Publisher DOI:

10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.003

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.40282

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/40282

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