Egalitarianism under Earmark Constraints

Bochet, Olivier; Ikilic, Rahmi; Moulin, Herve (2013). Egalitarianism under Earmark Constraints. Journal of economic theory, 148(2), pp. 535-562. Elsevier 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.016

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Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm. Unlike in the one supplier model, in a Pareto optimal allocation agents who get more than their peak from underdemanded suppliers, coexist with agents who get less from overdemanded suppliers. Our Egalitarian solution is the Lorenz dominant Pareto optimal allocation. It treats agents with equal demands as equally as the connectivity constraints allow. Together, Strategyproofness, Pareto Optimality, and Equal Treatment of Equals, characterize our solution.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Bochet, Olivier

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

ISSN:

0022-0531

Publisher:

Elsevier

Language:

English

Submitter:

Konstantin Büchel

Date Deposited:

05 Feb 2014 15:26

Last Modified:

27 Dec 2018 14:09

Publisher DOI:

10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.016

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.40283

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/40283

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