Monopsony Power, Pay Structure and Training

Mühlemann, Samuel; Ryan, Paul; Wolter, Stefan (2013). Monopsony Power, Pay Structure and Training. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 66(5), pp. 1095-1112. Cornell University

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Although interest in monopsonistic influences on labor market outcomes has revived in recent years, only a few empirical studies provide direct evidence on this topic. In this article, the authors analyze the effect of monopsony power on pay structure, using a direct measure of labor market thinness. The authors find evidence of monopsony power, as firms facing fewer local competitors offer lower wages to skilled labor and trainees, but not to unskilled labor. The findings have important implications for the economic theory of training, as most recent models assume monopsonistic pay-setting for skilled labor, but not for trainees.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)


03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Mühlemann, Samuel and Wolter, Stefan


300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics




Cornell University




Dino Collalti

Date Deposited:

05 Feb 2014 15:15

Last Modified:

12 Nov 2019 15:10


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