Third party assessments in trust problems with conflict of interest: An experiment on the effects of promisesm

Winter, Fabian Moritz Swante; Kataria, Mitesh (2013). Third party assessments in trust problems with conflict of interest: An experiment on the effects of promisesm. Economics letters, 120(1), 53 - 56. Elsevier 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.028

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Is it possible to elicit reliable assessment from an assessor having a conflict of interest (e.g. a professor that writes a recommendation letter for a formal PhD student)? We propose an experimental test and show that compared to a not-incentivized assessment, a promise to give a truthful assessment reduces misreporting to the same extent as an incentivized assessment (i.e. when the assessor gains higher payoff if the assessment is correct).

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Institute of Sociology

UniBE Contributor:

Winter, Fabian Moritz Swante

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 390 Customs, etiquette & folklore

ISSN:

0165-1765

Publisher:

Elsevier

Language:

English

Submitter:

Fabian Moritz Swante Winter

Date Deposited:

21 May 2014 17:35

Last Modified:

11 Aug 2015 10:49

Publisher DOI:

10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.028

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.45101

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/45101

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