In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?

Teroni, Fabrice; Deonna, Julien (2014). In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations? In: Roeser, Sabine; Todd, Cain (eds.) Emotion and Value (pp. 15-31). Oxford: Oxford University Press 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686094.003.0002

[img] Text
InWhatSenseAreEmotionsEvaluations_DeonnaTeroni.pdf - Accepted Version
Restricted to registered users only
Available under License Publisher holds Copyright.

Download (266kB) | Request a copy

Abstract: In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue of their contents. We then outline an alternative – the attitudinal theory of emotions. It parts with current theorizing about the emotions in elucidating the fact that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but in terms of the attitude subjects take towards what they represent. We explore what sorts of attitudes emotions are and claim that they are felt bodily attitudes.

Item Type:

Book Section (Book Chapter)

Division/Institute:

06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy

UniBE Contributor:

Teroni, Fabrice

Subjects:

100 Philosophy

ISBN:

978-0-19-968609-4

Publisher:

Oxford University Press

Language:

English

Submitter:

Fabrice Teroni

Date Deposited:

15 Sep 2014 12:48

Last Modified:

28 Sep 2015 14:30

Publisher DOI:

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686094.003.0002

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.50110

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/50110

Actions (login required)

Edit item Edit item
Provide Feedback