The Political Sociology of Direct Democracy

Four Essays on political behavior and attitudes in the Swiss cantons

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Preface

This book comprises four studies on secondary or educative effects of direct democracy. Each chapter scrutinizes a specific form of political behavior or attitudes, and tests empirically whether and how it is affected by direct democratic institutions in the Swiss cantons. Together, the four articles amount to my inaugural dissertation at the University of Bern.

Being part of a cumulative dissertation, the following articles, by their very nature, entail one beneficial and one less expedient implication. On the one hand, they are within the scope of one common research question and, thus, in some parts closely related. Unfortunately, similarities between chapters cannot be entirely avoided. Readers should feel free to skip passages that seem redundant. On the other hand, the chapters fulfill certain requirements in order to qualify for a dissertation. Hence, each article has already undergone a thorough double-blind peer-review process at a prestigious journal in political science. Three articles have already been published or accepted for publication.

On a personal note, I have—just as about any author—happily accumulated indebtedness. First and foremost, my gratitude goes to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Markus Freitag. It is solely because of him that I was able to begin, work, and finish my dissertation. I would also like to thank dearly Prof. Dr. Uwe Wagschal for his willingness to serve as second supervisor. Moreover, I am highly indebted to my colleagues at the universities of Bern and Konstanz for their help and useful feedback. Finally, I am grateful to my family and friends for their support.

On a technical note, this document has been typeset using \LaTeX. For computation and graphical representation of statistical models, R and \texttt{STATA} were used.
1 Introduction

Direct democracy moves people. And one man, who was particularly moved by it, was Johann Adam Ritter. Born in the canton of Basel in 1809, the trained baker found himself at the early dawn of a direct democratic tradition in Switzerland. Soon he left the bakehouse in exchange for positions in the local administration (Bitterlin 1916). Thereby, the recurrent theme of Ritter’s political career, and probably the main driving force behind it, was his constant battle for democratic sovereignty of the people. The strong advocate of popular rights that he was, he actively rallied against any attempt of the government to curtail such rights. And so he did in 1845 when the cantonal government passed a law on arms regulation. The so called Freischarengesetz prohibited crossing cantonal borders bearing arms and required to be licensed in order to carry a weapon. Like many of his compatriots, Ritter must have seen this enactment as shameless and illegitimate infringement of civil rights. Besides the fact that policy-wise the debate apparently has not evolved much further in the past 170 years, it is striking how this political conflict developed in the context of direct democracy back then.

Luckily for J. A. Ritter and fellow opponents of curtailment of civil rights in general (or of arms regulation in particular) by the government, Basel was one of the first cantons in Switzerland to introduce a popular veto. Since 1832 the cantonal constitution allowed for rejecting laws if enough people, i.e. at least two-thirds of the electorate, submitted their written objection to the proposed law. Although these seemingly unfulfillable requirements were later slightly eased, it is hardly surprising that in those days most attempts of the people to veto laws were doomed to fail (Vatter 2002, 242).

But equipped with the popular right and encouraged by the hope of overruling government, Ritter, meanwhile a member of the cantonal parliament, embraced the veto and called upon the people to do the same. And a storm of protest rose indeed. With organizations and gun associations, the local newspaper, and other politicians from the radical democratic opposition fueling the debate, the people rallied and voiced their discontent with the proposed law. Under this pressure more and more members of government had caved and backed away from further gun regulation—even before the direct democratic process was completed. In the end, 46.5 % of eligible voters had signed the veto petition.
While the government’s reaction to the protests might have misled some opponents not to follow through with their participation, the considerable turnout was still not enough to overcome the almost unsurmountable quorum. But although the veto against the Freischarengesetz failed officially, the mobilization sufficed to avert gun regulation and lead government to abandon the law altogether (Blum 1977, 203).

This story of J. A. Ritter’s crusade against gun regulation exemplifies three remarkable aspects of direct democracy, which serve as points of departure and central themes of this book.

- **First, direct democracy has consequences that extend well beyond legal implications and policies.** Debates as well as research about direct democratic institutions focus still in large parts only on primary or instrumental effects, i.e. how the outcome of direct democratic processes affect policies (cf. Smith and Tolbert 2007). Notably, however, the dismissal of the Freischarengesetz was not an immediate result of direct democracy. Whether or not the law was eventually enacted aside, direct democracy in this case exhibited a different force. It was in fact the mere prospect of a successful veto that drew people to protests, discussions, participation, and to politics in general. This is precisely what reformers of the Progressive Era hoped for when arguing for the introduction of direct democratic rights. Such secondary or educative effects of direct democracy receive only recently increasing attention in the literature, and thus represent the subject of this book.

- **Second, direct democracy is therewith at the very heart of political sociology.** Political sociology denotes the mutual relationship between politics and society. This relation is of course embedded in the institutional context of direct democracy. Society in that sense provides crucial conditions for politics; and politics, vice versa, affect society in important ways. Obviously, the attempted gun regulation by the government and ensuing calls to protest by the opposition had an impact on society, just as well as preferences and attitudes of the people ultimately thwarted political action to tighten gun laws. As the example of J. A. Ritter and the veto against the Freischarengesetz illustrate, direct democracy highlights and underscores the mutual interplay between politics and society. It is hence convenient and intriguing to analyze issues of political sociology in the context of direct democratic institutions.

- **Third, direct democracy is neither inherently good nor necessarily dangerous.** While enthusiasts painting an overly positive image tend to advocate direct democracy without reservations, skeptics reiterate the dangers that direct legislation supposedly entails. Moreover, it is rather common for political issues in direct democratic
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processes to turn quickly into fundamental, often vigorous arguments about hopes and threats of direct democracy. Enthusiasts and skeptics notably align along cleavages of the issues at hand. When faced with tighter gun control legislation 170 years ago, gun owners in Basel suddenly discovered their appreciation for citizen law-making, whereas government politicians questioned the ability of the people to judge complex matters thoughtfully. Such arbitrary accounts of direct democratic participation still prevail today as both camps are as accurately as adversarial divided and only share their obstinacy and limited attention to systematic empirical evidence. Such fundamental divide inhibits advancing our insights and the overall discussion further. Therefore, an unbiased and dispassionate stance is ever more needed in order to gain a broader and yet more fine-grained picture of the effects of direct democracy.

To add to improving our understanding of direct democracy and its effects on individuals, this book presents four essays, which elaborate on different questions of the political sociology of direct democratic institutions. More precisely, each chapter analyzes a specific form of political behavior or attitudes in the context of direct democracy in Switzerland. The three aspects illustrated above by J. A. Ritter’s career shine through in each essay. The secondary or educative effects of direct democracy, the relation of politics and society within the theoretical context of political sociology, and the rigorous focus on empirical evidence will be the subtle narratives that guide through the following chapters. Before turning to the analyses though, the introductory chapter continues with several more general remarks. The next Section 1.1 presents the research question in more detail including its background and importance in terms of social and normative relevance. Section 1.2 presents the state of literature and Section 1.3 provides some brief notes on the theoretical background juxtaposing institutional and behavioral accounts. After describing the common research design in Section 1.4, Section 1.5 summarizes the main results, indicates the overall contribution and concludes with a general outlook on potential avenues for future studies.

1.1 Research Question

Progressive Era reformers and participatory democrats usually assert that popular rights to participate directly and immediately in the political decision-making process have an allure of their own stimulating, energizing and mobilizing citizens. But do institutions of direct democracy really influence political behavior and attitudes of individual citizens?
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And if so, how? In particular, the research questions of the four essays focus on two specific forms of behavior and attitudes each and investigate whether they vary significantly and substantially if the institutional context is more direct democratic.

• **Valve or Catalyst?** The first question regards protest behavior: Particularly in recent years, various countries witnessed widespread protests expressing discontent with decisions that were taken largely without civic involvement. But do direct democratic institutions really serve as valve integrating preferences into the political process through political opportunity structures and increased deliberation? Or do they in contrast serve as catalyst energizing citizens’ emotions and stimulating protests through educative effects?

• **Bias or Education?** The second question regards political equality of participation: Skeptics usually lament that social bias increases in direct democracy as turnout is low and issues are too complex and demanding. Proponents of direct democracy on the other hand invoke its educative effect, which would particularly apply to underprivileged citizens, thus mitigating political inequality. But does direct democracy really change the influence of socioeconomic status on participation?

• **Trust or Verify?** The third question regards political trust: While the educative claim would imply a positive relationship, the little existing evidence is ambiguous. A solution to this controversy can be developed along theoretical arguments. Do more permissive formal rules, on the one hand, indeed enhance political trust because they increase citizens’ perception of control and incentivize political authorities to act trustworthily? And does actual use of the direct democracy, on the other hand, initiate distrust as it signals that political authorities do not act in the public’s interest?

• **Allure or Alternative?** The fourth question regards party identification: The institutional setting of direct democracy is known to have substantial effects on political parties. Particularly in light of changing patterns of partisan alignment, it seems obvious that direct democratic institutions should also matter for individual attachment to parties. But do they strengthen political parties and promote the need for cues so that voters succumb to the allure of partisan attachment? Or do direct democratic institutions provide an alternative to the representational function of political parties thus rendering party identification less essential?
1 Introduction

1.1.1 General background

In more general ways, analyzing such secondary or educative effects of direct democracy on individual behavior and attitudes represents an empirical test of what proponents of direct democracy have claimed all along. When at the turn of the 20th century reformers of the Progressive Era in the USA fought for citizen law-making by introducing the initiative, they put in fact not only the argument forward of primary or instrumental effects, through which direct democracy would bring major changes to the political system. Therewith, direct legislation would improve the way democracy works and the results it produces. Progressives furthermore argued that the popular right to participate directly in the decision-making process offered an education in democratic citizenship. This latter argument was at least as popular and even many scholars who held a skeptical, if not negative, view of the instrumental effects agreed about the educative benefits of the initiative (Bryce 1910; Garner 1907; Sullivan 1893; Weyl 1912).

After the initiative had been introduced in several states and the Progressive Era had faded, the argument about secondary effects was eclipsed again by the concerns about primary implications of direct democracy in terms of actual legislative outcomes (e.g. Christmann 2010; Töller and Vollmer 2013; Wagschal 1997, 2007; Wagschal and Obinger 2000). The Progressives' notion, though, of citizens participating in the political process as a normatively positive and desirable purpose was embraced and carried on by political theorists who adhered to a participatory model of democracy. Empirically, however, the educative claim remained largely untested. So the turn of empirical falsification in political science, which was fostered both by the approach of behavioralism as well as the availability of survey data, disregarded this once prominent argument and focused instead on instrumental implications of direct democracy. This only changed rather recently. Recalling the educative claim of the Progressive Era and confronting it with actual data is inseparably linked to the work of Daniel A. Smith and Caroline J. Tolbert. Although other studies on this topic had been published before, their efforts triggered a surge in empirical analyses of the educative effects of direct democracy. As will become apparent by reviewing the literature below, there is ample room for improving and complementing existing studies. It is against this background that this book takes up the once prominent argument of secondary or educative effects and presents a comprehensive test of societal implication of direct democracy in the Swiss context. So it seeks not only to draw more attention again to the theoretical claim, but to augment the empirical knowledge, too.
1 Introduction

1.1.2 Social relevance

To state that participation and decision-making by means of direct democracy are *en vogue*, seems at the very least justified—if not like an understatement—in light of current debates in the public sphere (cf. Freitag and Wagshal 2007). It can be observed that on the one hand direct democratic procedures are increasingly applied and used throughout the World (Altman 2010; Butler and Ranney 1994; LeDuc 2003; Scarrow 2001; Wagshal 2011). To little surprise, intense campaigns and vigorous arguments about the feasibility and appropriateness of direct democracy in general usually accompany these procedures. In that respect not much has changed since the veto against the *Freischafergesetz* in 1845 and, as pointed out above, the quality of such debates calls for empirical underpinning in particular. Despite skeptical voices in the debates surrounding popular votes, the very introduction and extension of direct democratic rights on the other hand are at the same time being discussed in many European countries. In fact, they enjoy great enthusiasm both among politicians and citizens.

Demands for more direct democratic involvement are thereby formulated in various instances and for various reasons. For politicians in office it is tempting to resort to means of direct democracy when they are faced with a decision that is unpopular to many. Thus, they can enhance the legitimacy of the decision without taking the blame for its result. This was probably the case during the financial crisis when several EU-states pondered to hold referendums on measures of fiscal austerity. For the opposition as well as interest groups direct democracy offers an additional way not only to put issues on the agenda, but even to force a decision in favor of their supporters by circumventing government. It is for example not uncommon in ballot initiatives in Switzerland and the USA particularly regarding lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights, religious freedom, or regulations on foreigners. Citizens finally benefit from direct democracy because it ensures the government’s responsiveness. Political decisions in general are closer to the preferences of the median voter. And, if not, citizens push for the resolution they want by seizing popular rights to referendums and initiatives. Examples of the demand for direct democracy by citizens are manifold and often most visible in local and regional matters when there is an opposition against infrastructure projects or public regulations such as smoking bans.

So it seems everybody has a strong opinion about introducing and extending direct democratic rights. Hence, any debate about direct legislation inevitably leads to the pros and cons, the hopes and threats of direct legislation. The book enriches this controversy by complementing arguments about the mere primary effects on legislative outcomes and by directing the attention to the often overlooked secondary effects. If direct democracy
can indeed provide an education in democratic citizenship, it would serve as a strong argument for the public to demand more extensive popular rights. This idea appears particularly relevant since one main objection against direct democracy alleges it would only be feasible in a context that has already a long tradition and provides the appropriate political culture. According to the educative claim, however, direct democratic institutions entail precisely such cultural consequences that become manifest in favorable attitudes and behavior.\(^1\)

Obviously, all these arguments must rely on comprehensive evidence. Our judgment should be guided first and foremost by systematic analyses of empirical data. To that end, this book adds to our general understanding of direct democratic institutions. Contributing to a better, more comprehensive account of the individual effects of direct democracy is therefore relevant to everyone who wants to engage in the debate.

1.1.3 Normative relevance

Democracy, being the predominant model of political order of our time, is considered—in normative terms—genuinely positive, not only but particularly in the eyes of democratic theorists. At the very heart of it, democratic behavior and attitudes serve as necessities of democracy. Without participation of citizens, without favorable democratic attitudes, there can hardly be a stable and well-functioning democratic system. That is precisely why theorists take such an interest in institutional configurations that may enhance the quality of democracy. Depending on the theoretical tradition, however, the models of democracy formulate a different conception of involvement. As Teorell (2006) points out, the participatory model views political participation mainly as direct decision making. Accordingly, participatory democrats, such as Pateman (1970) and Barber (1984), advocate citizens' involvement and engagement laying greater emphasis on behavioral capacities. Subsequent differentiations of the participatory model focus also on deliberation and its discursive nature. In the deliberative model, involvement is rather conceptualized as political discussion and includes attitudinal capacities (Teorell 2006). In both traditions, however, theorists have reason to hope that direct democratic institutions can increase the normative quality of democracy.

Regarding political behavior, proponents of a participatory model of democracy believe that involvement and engagement is desirable and should be maximized (Pateman 1970).

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\(^1\) The foundation of this argument relates of course to the famous *Civic Culture* study by Almond and Verba (1963). Without going too much into detail, the basic rationale of their fit hypothesis is that democracies are stable if institutional structure and political culture are congruent. However, Almond and Verba are well aware that structure and culture mutually affect each other.
The more citizens participate actively, the better normatively. Not only would maximal participation imply political equality among all citizens (regardless of, for example, their monetary or educational conditions), active political involvement would moreover transform dependent, private individuals into free citizens (Barber 1984, 149). This mindset is not so unlike the one of the Progressive Era several decades earlier. In a sense, participatory democrats provide the normative, philosophical rationale of the Progressives’ political claim. And it stands in stark contrast to the realists’ (rather elitist) account of democracy, which can be found most pronounced in the readings of Schumpeter (1942).

With this normative requirement in mind, participatory democrats could be expected to be excited about the potential mobilizing effects of direct democracy. As a matter of fact, however, direct democratic institutions have not occupied—at least in the beginning—a central role in the participatory model of democracy (Schiller 2007, 56). Barber (1984) represents maybe the most notable exception as he combines normative arguments for direct democracy with specific suggestions of how to shape and implement it. So the conception of a participatory and strong democracy not only implies favorable consequences of direct democratic institutions, it also illustrates the normative relevance of analyzing the effects on political behavior.

Regarding political attitudes, a similar case can be made by drawing on differentiation of participatory democratic theory. These developments widen the analytical focus and consider dimensions beyond the general realm of political institutions. Particularly the model of deliberative (or discursive) democracy can be related to direct democratic decision-making—although, again, not many have done so (Schiller 2007, 57). Broadly speaking deliberative democracy argues for the integration of opposite positions and their arguments, thereby transforming several individual interests into one common interest (Dryzek 2000). Such a way of decision-making obviously necessitates appropriate political attitudes among citizens. Habermas (1992, 533) points to the possibility of achieving a more deliberative state through more direct democratic elements, which would increase public communication and liberate politics from the forces of political elites (cf. Wagschal 2007, 303). On this basis, Feld and Kirchgässner (2000, 289) label direct legislation explicitly as an institutionalized form of deliberation. In this respect, studying attitudinal consequences bears also substantial normative relevance. If direct democratic institutions indeed have the supposed positive effects on citizens’ attitudes, deliberative democrats would view them as normatively good and desirable.

Political theory itself is by its very definition not concerned with empirical testing. Rather it takes a normative stand how political order ought to be and argues why the democratic model is legitimate and desirable. Therefore, it must come as a disappoint-
ment to observe decreasing turnout rates and allegedly waning political involvement of citizens. What has been diagnosed as democratic malaise poses a serious challenge to the ideal of democracy. In fact, institutional designs that allow for more participations are explicitly suggested to both theorists and practitioners in order to alleviate the democratic malaise (Geissel and Newton 2012; Zittel and Fuchs 2007). If direct democratic institutions promise such a cure, it is indeed of utmost relevance to political theory to know about the actual behavioral and attitudinal consequences.

1.2 State of Research

While the social relevance of this book mostly comprises the topicality of citizen law-making, there lies also great scholarly relevance in the analysis of how direct democracy influences individual behavior and attitudes. As indicated above, empirical assessments of the educative claim once made by reformers of the Progressive Era are relatively scarce compared to analyses of instrumental effects. Reviewing the existing empirical literature one cannot help but notice at least five features. First, the literature is heavily centered on the USA. Second, it is primarily concerned with political behavior in the form of electoral participation. Third, the analytical framework of most studies seems somewhat simplistic disregarding more differentiated relationships. Fourth, the understanding of direct democracy seems arbitrary and inconsistent. And fifth, the issue of causality is often omitted. The contribution of the book in these regards will be elaborated further after presenting the state of research of secondary effects on behavior and then on attitudes of citizens in direct democracy.

1.2.1 Behavioral effects of direct democracy

The very first empirical test of the educative argument dates back to Everson (1981) who compares turnout in initiative and non-initiative states in the USA. Even though there is a modest turnout advantage in the former during the 18-year evaluation period, he attributes it to other factors (like political culture) and concludes no general effect of initiatives on turnout. In his book, Magleby (1984) paints an equally, if not more, pessimistic picture. Not only does he report no turnout increase through initiatives and referendums, he also asserts that less educated voters are more likely to drop-off from extensive ballots.\footnote{The argument, poorer and less educated voters were overstrained by the complexity of direct democratic decisions is taken up by Bowler and Donovan (1998) as well as later by Goldsmith (2005) and Selb (2008).} Cronin (1989) in contrast finds that hardly anyone is deterred by di-
rect democratic issues on the ballot. According to his specifically collected survey data, participating in popular votes is particularly appealing to unregistered voters. Butler and Ranney (1994) as well as Qvortrup (2002) summarize that recent experience neither supports the proposition that direct democracy increases turnout, nor validates the elitists’ denunciation thereof.

Whereas in this early stage analyses were still rather crude in analytical and methodological terms, a fresh wave of empirical studies has emerged since the beginning of this century. The renewed interest in the educative claim can to a large degree be attributed to two scholars: Caroline J. Tolbert and Daniel A. Smith. Their book bearing already the suggestive title “Educated by Initiative” recalls explicitly the argument put forward by Progressives and presents a comprehensive test of the educative effects of direct democracy on citizens in the American states (Smith and Tolbert 2004). As in some antecedent papers their results are by and large positive (Smith and Tolbert 2001; Tolbert, Grummel and Smith 2001; Tolbert, McNeal and Smith 2003). In contrast to previous studies, these analyses regard the frequency of initiatives and referendums in addition to the mere institutional provision of the process. And since they rely on more detailed individual survey data instead of turnout rates they are not only able to avoid ecological fallacies, but also to apply more sophisticated models capturing a longitudinal perspective. Subsequently, they intensify their research efforts and refine the methodological approach (Smith and Tolbert 2010; Tolbert and Bowen 2008; Tolbert, Bowen and Donovan 2009; Tolbert and Smith 2005, 2006). Donovan, Tolbert and Smith (2009) for instance show that the amount of contributions to direct democratic campaigns matters for political participation.

Although Smith and Tolbert are the most prominent and productive researchers in this field, they are not the only ones. Other authors, too, come to the conclusion that salient ballot measures boost turnout in midterm, but not in presidential elections (Schlozman and Yohai 2008; Smith 2001). The effect is found to be the stronger, the more salient a direct democratic issue is (Lacey 2005). And the relationship is not limited to the national level. Participation in municipal elections in California increases if direct democracy is frequently used (Hajnal and Lewis 2003). The mere prospect of direct democratic processes remains without significant effects (Cebula 2008). Altogether these results make for a more positive finding than in earlier studies: At least in some elections, participation is fueled by the frequent use of direct democratic processes.

The latest publications, featuring even more extensive data and more sophisticated methods, cannot refute these results, but tell a more detailed story. Analyzing georeferenced lists of registered voters Dyck and Seabrook (2010) argue that citizens are
mobilized actively by partisan campaigns in the short-term while they do not experience participatory favor in the long-term. In the same vein, Childers and Binder (2012) investigate the time span from 1870 to 2008 with a difference-in-difference design and find that neither adoption nor use of the initiative in the past increase participation significantly. Turnout is higher, however, with concurrent measures on the same ballot. The individual probability to participate is moreover dependent on the geographical proximity to the issue (Boehmke et al. 2012), as well as whether the person signed the petition previously (Parry, Smith and Henry 2012). Smith, Tolbert and Keller (2010) finally reassess and qualify their original claims using panel data for the 2008 election. They, too, conclude that the increase in participation is due to state-specific issues of ballot initiatives.

Remarkably, all cited studies so far only consider direct democracy in the USA. This might not be surprising—after all, it is where the empirical tradition in political science originated. In principle, arguments and findings should apply universally and independently from the specific context. Because of idiosyncrasies of each country, however, we cannot take their replicability for granted. So how do the expectations of Progressives fare in other contexts? In light of the present analyses, the Swiss case is of particular interest. Equivalent to the commendable role of Smith and Tolbert, studying educative effects in Switzerland is closely related to the work of Markus Freitag. His multivariate analyses of turnout rates in the Swiss cantons for instance show no significant relationship with institutional configurations of direct democracy (Freitag 2005, 2010). This is on the one hand in line with results from the USA. On the other hand, it rebuts earlier findings by Wernli (1998) who compares ten cantons and finds more participation in the direct democratic ones of East Switzerland than in more representative ones in the Roman part. Bühlmann and Freitag (2006) add that in multilevel analyses of individual data neither availability nor use of direct democracy is significantly associated with electoral participation. Regarding frequency of popular votes, more recent studies reveal a different effect though. Extensive use of direct democracy is associated in fact with less, not more participation (Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2007). The suspicion that constant exposure to direct democratic votes leads to voter fatigue has already been suggested by Bowler, Donovan and Happ (1992), Bühlmann, Freitag and Vatter (2003)

\[\text{Such opposite effects have implications for the conceptions of direct democracy, too. In this regard, Baranlay, Sciarini and Trechsel (2003) show that the frequency of popular votes is independent from permissive configurations of direct democratic institutions in the Swiss cantons. The result that in their models less permissive rules are associated with more participation is explained by the fact that more people are mobilized to vote if more signatures are to be collected.}\]
as well as Linder (2005). In particular the methodologically advanced and most rigorous test by Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen (2010) buttresses the results.

The ambiguous consequences of availability and frequency of direct democratic processes appear also in other studies of the Swiss political system. Investigating six cities Joye (1999) finds no relationship between direct democracy and participation. (Bühlmann 2006) analyzes a whole range of participation forms in 56 municipalities. Among various opportunities to vote, surprisingly only participating in national elections seems to be influenced by the use of direct democracy. Finally, Ladner and Fiechter (2012) conclude that availability has no, and use of direct democracy a slightly negative effect on turnout on the municipal level. In an internationally comparative perspective several studies juxtapose participation in Switzerland and other countries. Based on relatively low turnout rates in Switzerland and the USA compared to other, less direct democratic countries, Franklin (2002) speculates that voting in election becomes less important if direct democracy is available. Comparing European countries as well as California and Switzerland, Möckli (2007) asserts that frequent ballot measures can encourage lower turnout. On the municipal level, the situation is not much different. Altman (2012) examines Swiss cantons and American states longitudinally. Whereas frequency of all popular votes is not a sufficient explanation controlling for other factors, there is a negative and quadratic effect of those direct democratic processes that are institutionally mandated or initiated by political authorities (and not by citizens). As Switzerland and the USA are the only countries in the World that offer substantial popular rights and exhibit a long tradition of citizen law-making, it is hardly surprising that they dominate the case selection. Due to innovative data and new methods for causal inference, the few exceptions are not any less interesting. Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidborn (2010) exploit the basically randomized point in time that direct democracy was introduced in some Swedish municipalities at the beginning of the 20th century. The estimated causal effect is highly negative: Participation was substantially lower when municipalities became direct democratic. For Germany, Kroh and Schoen (2011) also investigate the causal effect on subnational level and suggest rather a self-selection process. Politically active municipalities also resort to direct democratic instruments, while the process itself contributes little to engagement of citizens.

*Another important contribution to the exploration of political behavior in Swiss direct democratic processes must be attributed, of course, to Kriesi (2005). Most of all he analyzes with comprehensive individual data who takes part in popular votes and the mobilizing context of the campaign. But strictly speaking he does not test the argument if direct democratic institutions lead to participation or abstention.*
It must be noted that by far most studies are only concerned with the immediate effect on electoral participation as only form of political behavior. This is ever more astonishing as it is well known that political behavior comprises more than one dimension (cf. Teorell, Torcal and Montero 2007). Although other, less conventional forms of participation are given much attention generally in political behavior research (Norris 2002, 2009), it is hard to find any study about educative effects on such forms. And that is despite evidence suggesting (by the way, positive) consequences for social capital and associational membership (Boehmke and Bowen 2010; Freitag 2006). By comparing social movements with different opportunity structures, Kriesi and Wisler (1996) give another indication that direct democracy adds to their repertoire of political participation. The aforementioned study by Bühlmann (2006) contains ten other forms in addition to electoral participation. Solely giving money to solving political problems is significantly associated with availability of direct democracy. Bühlmann takes also analytically more complex relationships of interactions between context and individual characteristics into consideration. Availability as well as use of direct democracy increase in this regard the positive effect of political efficacy and skills on serving in office. The relationship between skills and contacting political authorities on the contrary becomes weaker if direct democracy is used often. Such interaction effects are to a large extent ignored with the exception of Tolbert, Bowen and Donovan (2009) as well as Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen (2010). While the latter report no significant interactions in their models, the former show that the mobilizing effect of frequent ballot measures and higher campaign contributions is stronger for less than for highly educated citizens.

To sum up the existing research on the behavioral consequences of direct democracy, the result does not look too promising for the expectations of Progressives and participatory democrats. Given the overwhelming evidence of various contexts, it is fair to say that simply allowing people to participate directly and immediately via initiative and referendum does not in itself boost electoral participation. The existence of direct democratic institutions alone exerts no romantic or mystical or greater power on individuals. In the USA, citizens have to experience the actual process and a vigorous campaign to be drawn to the voting booth. Results from other countries seem even less encouraging. Particularly in Switzerland, frequent popular votes entail less participation. So in spite of the burgeoning pile of studies results are certainly not conclusive. This not only proves that investigating secondary effects of direct democracy is a vivid field of ongoing research. It also begs the question how other educative claims of the Progressive Era fare in the oldest and most extensive direct democratic system of Switzerland. Evidently, more empirical testing is needed.
1.2.2 Attitudinal effects of direct democracy

As for political attitudes, the picture of secondary effects is slightly blurrier. In general, the direct democracy literature devoted less attention to attitudinal than to behavioral consequences. Considering the major role they play in the argumentation of Progressives about educative effects, this might come somewhat as a surprise. After all, the contention direct legislation would educate people in democratic citizenship suggests in the first place a change in attitudes toward the political system; and only thereafter citizens would be able and willing to participate more. Mentioning attitudinal effects *en passant* certainly did not help to attract more tests of potential educative effects. But also two other explanations stand to reason why tests of behavioral effects have been more popular.

Whereas political behavior was by and large equated only with electoral participation, it is not readily clear which specific attitude the educative argument implies. Hence, most studies are split up between analyzing one of various political attitudes. And in contrast to behavior, measured in the beginning through turnout rates, attitudinal measures typically rely on social science survey data, which were not always as available as today. With that said, there is an appreciable and growing number of studies that address attitudinal effects. For the most part, knowledge of and interest in political matters as well as political efficacy are considered in that respect.\(^5\)

With regard to political knowledge, it is relatively well documented that direct democracy can have a positive impact. Making use of a rolling cross-section survey prior to a referendum Mendelsohn and Cutler (2000) are able to show that factual knowledge among poorly informed increases during a campaign. Similarly, heavy use of initiatives in American states is found to enhance knowledge only among voters (Smith 2002). For the period between 1978 and 2004 Schlozman and Yohai (2008) confirm a modest increase for voters only. Tolbert, McNeal and Smith (2003) as well as Smith and Tolbert (2004) analyze data of three American National Election Studies and report a positive effect only for 1996 (but not for 1998 or 2000), hinting that ballot initiatives may only contribute to a more informed electorate when closely tied to campaign issues as it was the case in 1996. Recent studies refine the relationship further. Focusing on the content of ballot measures, Biggers (2012) contends that only those, which are about social issues, enhance knowledge for voters as well as non-voters. Burnett (2013) looks at one specific ballot

\(^5\) There is also a vivid discussion about the supposedly positive effects of direct democracy on subjective well-being (Frey and Stutzer 2000; Stutzer and Frey 2000). This is refuted by more recent results (Dorn et al. 2008). Satisfaction with democracy, however, is shown to be modestly increased by direct democracy in Switzerland (Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter 2012), and Afghanistan respectively (Beath, Christia and Enikolopov 2012). Arguably, though, satisfaction with life or democracy does not apply in a narrower sense to the idea of being educated in democratic citizenship.
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measure and finds that even in the absence of a campaign voters still know something about the issue; nonetheless, a campaign is able to increase knowledge of those facts they choose to emphasize. Turning to evidence from other countries, Benz and Stutzer (2004, 2007) provide valuable findings for the European Union and specifically for Switzerland. In both cases, direct democracy is found to increase knowledge significantly. Citizens in the European Union are better informed if their country of residence has held a referendum; citizens in Switzerland are informed better if their canton offers permissive means of direct legislation.6

Such findings do not apply in the same way to political interest. Studying again a referendum in Canada, Mendelsohn and Cutler (2000) measure a relatively high level of interest, which does not, however, exhibit any increase during the campaign. Neither does news coverage of a direct democratic campaign affect political interest (Gilens, Glaser and Mendelberg 2001). According to the analyses of Smith and Tolbert (2004) in contrast, the number of initiatives per state raises individual interest in politics in 1996 and 1998 (but again not in 2000). Using panel data of a campaign, they later confirm this positive effect (Smith, Tolbert and Keller 2010). For Switzerland, evidence is scarce and ambiguous. On the one side, Baglioni (2007) compares respondents in the cantons of Vaud and Bern. He attributes higher interest in the latter to the more direct democratic structure of the canton. Ladner and Fiechter (2012) on the other side do not find any impact of direct democratic settings on political interest in Swiss municipalities.

Secondary effects on political efficacy are studied more intensively—at least for the USA. Results are contradictory, though. Several studies show that exposure to direct democracy in American states enhances political efficacy. This applies to internal as well as external efficacy (Bowler and Donovan 2002), to data over various years (Hero and Tolbert 2004; Smith and Tolbert 2004), to the course of a specific campaign (Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000), and to exposure in terms of news coverage (Gilens, Glaser and Mendelberg 2001). More recent studies, however, call this positive effect into question. Schlozman and Yohai (2008) analyze survey data for each election between 1978 and 2004 and find no significant relationship between initiatives and efficacy. Similarly, Dyck and Lascher Jr. (2009) present a more comprehensive investigation including a broader literature and multiple data sources. Their results consistently fail to indicate a positive effect. Once again there is only very little evidence outside the USA. Bernhard and Bühlmann (2011) examine individual data of selected municipalities in Switzerland that differ with respect to the legislative structure. Internal and external efficacy is found to

6 Another, yet qualitatively oriented analysis is offered by Anduiza et al. (2008) who assess that direct democratic practices contribute to the diffusion of political information in Spanish municipalities.
be significantly higher in municipalities with town hall assemblies than in those with local parliaments. Moreover, this effect interacts with the level of awareness and integration offsetting their positive impact on efficacy.

Summarizing the findings so far it proves difficult to draw a general conclusion. Direct democracy appears to be able to enhance political knowledge, whereas educative effects on interest and efficacy are ambiguous and turn up significant only in some instances. At the very least, there is no reason to assume a detrimental effect of direct democracy on political attitudes. But by far most of the literature on attitudinal effects of direct democracy is only concerned with these three particular concepts. Other, equally important kinds of political attitudes remain largely neglected, two of which are of particular relevance to direct democracy debate—and disregarding them seems simply unwarranted.

First, it is rather reasonable to hypothesize that trust, which citizens place in political institutions, should be affected by the rules and practices of direct democracy. In fact, there are strong theoretical arguments to suspect an educative effect (Hug 2004). Yet, merely a handful of studies investigate this relationship. Citrin (1996) and Hug (2005), analyzing data of the USA and Eastern Europe respectively, report no significant correlation between direct democracy and political trust. Much in contrast to the expectations of Progressives, Dyck (2009) argues that using ballot initiatives should initiate distrust. His view of a negative influence of direct democracy is supported by survey data of the USA. An empirical test of this argument in the Swiss context cannot be found. A second, entirely disregarded attitude represents identification with political parties. Actually, overly powerful parties were an essential concern in the Progressive Era and direct democracy was expected to weaken their influence. But in spite of abundant research on consequences for parties (e.g. Bowler and Donovan 2006; Ladner and Brändle 1999; Smith and Tolbert 2004), hitherto no study systematically investigates the relationship between direct democracy and partisan attachment. Only two studies on California show that racially charged ballot measures made Latinos more likely to identify with Democrats than with Republicans (Bowler, Nicholson and Segura 2006; Dyck, Johnson and Wasson 2012). These specific findings strongly suggest that direct democratic institutions can also shape the general extent of party identification.

1.2.3 Lacunae

The empirical analysis of educative claims by Progressives represents a comparatively young, ongoing and still growing field of research. Reviewing the literature on behavioral

\footnote{Despite what the titles of their chapters insinuate neither Smith and Tolbert (2004) nor Bühlmann (2007) analyze political trust the way it is commonly operationalized.}
and attitudinal consequences of direct democracy, it becomes clear that there is still the need to amend, extend, and augment existing studies. Lacunae remain in five major aspects, to which this book wishes to make a contribution and improve upon. First, the literature lays heavy emphasis on testing educative arguments in the context of the American states. Although more and more evidence from other countries surfaces, there is still a noticeable imbalance. In this respect, the book provides comprehensive results of how educative arguments fare in the context that is commonly regarded to be the oldest and most extensive direct democracy. Using data from the Swiss cantons, all chapters present empirical analyses that add to a more comprehensive understanding of secondary effects.

Second, only very few forms of behavior and attitudes are usually investigated. Our knowledge is mainly limited to secondary effects on electoral participation and attitudes like interest, information, and efficacy. Yet, many other forms are without doubt highly relevant and prominently discussed in political science. It seems obvious to ask whether and how they are affected by direct democracy. Consequently, several chapters of this book scrutinize forms of behavior and attitudes that so far have received little to no attention. Chapter 2 presents the very first analysis of secondary effects on protest behavior; so does Chapter 5 on attitudes toward parties. Chapter 4 supplements the little evidence of direct democracy and political trust with the first test of this relationship in the Swiss context.

Third, most research on secondary effects considers only the analytically simplest relationship of a direct influence. It might be just as well the case, however, that direct democratic institutions do not affect behavior or attitudes directly, but rather moderate the influence of other predictor variables. Hence, this book offers an alternative analytical framework by specifically modeling interaction effects. Chapter 3 tests whether the influence of socioeconomic status is conditional on the degree of direct democracy. Similarly, Chapter 5 takes the interaction between the formal rules of direct democracy and their actual application through popular votes into account.

Fourth, there is no common and consistent understanding in the literature of the concept of direct democracy. It seems somewhat arbitrary to operationalize it once as institutional availability and permissive formal rules, another time as frequency of popular votes, or according to salience as campaign contribution. After all, resulting hypotheses depend fundamentally on the specific conception of direct democracy. Thus, all chapters of this book share a common differentiation and consistent measurement of direct democracy. Moreover, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 explicitly state how the mech-
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Mechanisms of secondary effects theoretically differ depending on how direct democracy is conceptualized.

Fifth, causality poses a concern that is rarely challenged. Only very few studies actually test whether secondary effects really are caused by direct legislation. It could well be that direct democratic institutions in turn are endogenous to attitudes and behavior of citizens. Again, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 offer a solution going beyond theoretical and historical arguments. The causal relationships are estimated by instrumenting the independent variable. So taken together, the essays of this book address the five lacunae in the current literature and explicitly take them into account. Thereby, the book attempts to make a substantial contribution to the scientific endeavor of learning about secondary effects of direct democracy.

1.3 Theoretical Remarks

Before discussing the common research design of the empirical analyses, a brief note on the broader theoretical origins of the essays seems appropriate. Naturally, the question if and how institutions of direct democracy influence individual behavior and attitudes is inevitably tied to two distinct traditions in political science: institutionalism and political behavior research. On the one side of the relationship, institutions have always occupied a prominent position within the discipline. It was as a matter of fact one of the earliest endeavors dating back to ancient Greek philosophers to develop and discuss institutions that are just and legitimate. The analysis of institutions in that sense served as raison d'être of a new discipline (Peters 2005, 4). Subsequently, institutionalism centered around questions of how to describe and compare formal institutions, only to disappear in large parts from the political science agenda.

It was only due to the advances of new institutionalism, which can be attributed mainly to the work of March and Olsen, that institutions gained again increasing attention. But as Kaiser (2002) points out, new institutionalism entails more than simply the return of institutions as a subject. It was furthermore argued to widen the analytical focus in order to acknowledge that, first, institutions consist not only of formal rules, but also informal procedures, and second, they are able to structure choices and incentivize behavior of actors (March and Olsen 1984, 1996). Nonetheless, most analyses in the tradition of new institutionalism are rather concerned with the evolution, change or outcome of institutions. Explanandum in this respect is not so much behavior and attitudes of the broad citizenry than of specific political actors (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000). But this
perspective can still provide the theoretical underpinning of the idea that both formal and informal institutions crucially shape the context, in which individuals act.

This nuanced conception of institutions, encompassing both “rules-in-form” as well as “rules-in-use” (Sproule-Jones 1993), applies just as well to direct democracy. Of course popular rights to direct democratic participation are formally granted in the constitution. However, formal rules do not necessarily entail the actual procedure of a popular vote. Hence, the distinction between the formal institutional conception and the informal procedural conception must be kept in mind when theorizing about the consequences of direct democracy. Depending on its specific variant, new institutionalism ascribes in fact different weights to formal and procedural conceptions (Hall and Taylor 1996). According to Aspinwall and Schneider (2000), rational-choice institutionalism is mainly concerned with formal institutions, while informal institutions like shared experiences particularly matter in sociological (and to some extent in historical) institutionalism. Both, formal and informal institutions significantly alter the political sociological relationship between citizens and politics. Two models are prevalently used to describe this constellation (cf. Eder 2010, 45). On the one hand, the Principal-Agent Model proves to be convenient for asymmetric relationships in which power of decision is delegated (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In democratic systems, representatives (agents) succumbing to the moral hazard use the delegated power to their own advantage, while citizens (principals) try to control and sanction such deceiving actions (Miller 2005). Direct democratic institutions in that respect serve as additional means to ensure that representatives act in the public interest (Feld and Kirchgässner 2001; Freitag, Vatter and Müller 2003; Obinger and Wagschal 2001). On the other hand, the Veto Player Model uses game theory to explain, which decisions are possible given the number of actors in a political system whose approval is necessary to change the status quo (Tsebelis 2002, 2). Introducing popular rights means altering the number of veto players (Obinger and Wagschal 2001, 93). This results in winsets of policy positions closer to the preferences of the median voter (Obinger 1998; Wagschal 1997; Wagschal and Obinger 2000).

On the other side of the relationship, political scientists are greatly interested in how people behave and think politically. Particularly since the behavioralism approach gained immense popularity in the second half of the 20th century and survey data became increasingly available, the explanation of individual behavior and attitudes represents a chief concern. Generally, the sub-discipline of political behavior research encompasses analyzing both behavior and attitudes. More specifically, the former is traditionally discussed in the course of political participation, the latter in political culture. Several theoretical accounts have been suggested and the debates are lively and abundant with
empirical evidence. However, accounts in the tradition of behavioralism tend to remain on the individual-level, thereby largely disregarding an individual’s context. This has changed only when behavioralists, too, drew on context characteristics in order to explain variation in political behavior and attitudes. Based on the ideas of the Civic Voluntarism Model by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995), Teorell (2006, 800) persuasively argues to draw on resources as well as incentives. Both are needed to permit and motivate citizens to engage politically. But all in all, there is an almost uncountable number of variables supposedly explaining how individuals behave and think (Matsusaka and Palda 1999).

All these explanations adhere more or less to one of two mechanisms. In a more general way, attitudes and behavior are the result of choosing a decision among alternatives. Individuals are constantly faced with such choices, be it to vote or not, to demonstrate or not, to trust or not, to identify with parties or not, etc. What is the mechanism behind that choice? The first notion conceptualizes decisions as short-term results of a rational cost-benefit analysis. Individuals ascribe expected costs and utilities to each alternative according to their preferences, and choose the one with the highest payoff. The other notion refers to psychological dispositions. In contrast to the previous one, preferences are not seen as externally given, but as part of the decision process. Such early learned, long-term dispositions function as an internal gyroscope guiding individuals toward their choices (Jackman and Sniderman 2002, 210). Although this distinction is too rarely explicated clearly (cf. Freitag and Traummüller 2009, 787; Sniderman and Levendusky 2007, 437), the two mechanisms provide the theoretical link to establish a connection between the two conceptions of direct democracy and individual behavior and attitudes via the variants of new institutionalism.

The first conception of direct democracy particularly complies with the institutional understanding in the rational-choice variant of new institutionalism (Aspinwall and Schneidder 2000, 29). And rules-in-form alter the cost-benefit ratio by offering additional opportunities for involvement. For individuals they provide a resource that can be used to influence political decisions. In the words of Teorell (2006), no formal rules of direct democracy would imply a paucity of resources. But just because resources are available it does not automatically mean they are put to use. Popular rights are a necessary condition for direct democratic involvement, not a sufficient one. With regard to the educative claim by Progressives there is, therefore, little reason to expect that individuals inevitably behave in a more engaged and involved fashion when granted popular rights. They could be if they wanted to, but they don’t have to. However, if individuals do not make use of popular rights it indicates that in their opinion there is no need to engage. So the formal conception of direct democracy might have an educative effect on
individuals in so far that they behave not so much more actively, but might have more favorable attitudes toward politics.

The second conception of direct democracy complies in contrast with the institutional understanding in the sociological variant of new institutionalism (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, 29). And rules-in-use represent shared experiences that shape a disposition toward political engagement. What on an aggregate level appears as cultural tradition, can motivate an individual’s behavior and attitudes, who is socialized into such a context. To quote again the reasoning of Teorell (2006), frequent direct democratic processes constitute a crucial incentive motivating individuals to engage politically. Regarding the educative claim by Progressives, the expectation is somewhat contrary. Although participation is supposed to increase, this indicates rather the belief that direct democratic involvement is in fact required. So the procedural conception of direct democracy might have an educative effect on individuals in so far that they behave indeed more actively, but also have more critical attitudes toward politics.

Identifying its theoretical origins makes clear that the research question is embedded in two distinct traditions, both of which can and should contribute to the theoretical argumentation. It is evidently necessary to consider contextual characteristics as well as individual accounts in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the political sociology of direct democracy. By the same token, the analysis of how direct democratic institutions influence individual behavior and attitudes can advance the conjunction of both traditions. We can, in general, neither presume to explain individual behavior and attitudes without any regard to contextual influences, nor can we analyze institutional consequences while disregarding the bulk of individual-level theory. The more recent literature actually takes such a perspective into account. Jackman and Sniderman (2002) or Sniderman and Levendusky (2007) for instance argue for an institutional theory of political choice extending political behavior research by an external mechanism, through which institutions structure alternative choices. Similarly, Frey and Stutzer (2005) suggest that in their assessment of choices individuals include also procedural utility from institutions irrespective of the outcome. Efforts like these should in any case not only encourage us to think and develop further a holistic theoretical reasoning about institutions and individuals, but also remind us to adapt and apply them specifically to the respective research question at hand.
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1.4 Research Design

This section describes the research design of the empirical analyses in this book. Since each analysis tests a distinct relationship, they apply slightly different designs, each of which is explained in more detail in the respective chapter. But being within the overall investigation of educative effects of direct democracy, the designs also share four important features. Namely, all analyses select the Swiss cantons as cases, operationalize the independent variable in the same way, apply a quantitative approach, and make use of similar data sets.

First, the Swiss cantons serve as most suitable testing grounds for studying secondary effects of direct democracy. Popular rights to participate directly are immanent to the political system of Switzerland. As mentioned in the beginning, it was historically also the very first system to introduce direct democratic instruments. In analytical terms, this seems convenient as the independent variable is more stable and long-term, and therefore more likely to affect the dependent variables of individual behavior and attitudes, than vice versa (Davis 1985). So in the Swiss case, the analysis might be less prone to endogeneity concerns. Especially on the subnational level, cantonal constitutions offer means for direct legislation that are substantial, yet vary from canton to canton. Although strictly speaking no counterfactual case exists, i.e. no canton has no direct democratic instruments at all, there is not only great variation of the specific institutional configurations, rendering some cantonal democracies extremely direct and others clearly representative. It also enables us to observe actual direct democratic procedures taking place in all cantons. Thus, the 26 cantons of Switzerland represent a sufficiently high number of cases for quantitative comparison of both formal rules as well as actual procedures of direct democracy (Stegmueller 2013). And since all cases remain within Switzerland, we can compare direct democracies while holding many characteristics of the national context constant (Freitag 2005). This is precisely what makes subnational investigations so useful (Lijphart 1975; Snyder 2001).

Second, two distinct measures of the independent variable are employed in the following chapters. By now it has become clear that analyses of direct democracy often differentiate between formal rights to direct legislation granted by the constitution on the one hand, and actual exercise of direct democratic processes on the other. Recalling the state of research with regard to the USA, the former operationalization equates to whether states have an initiative process or not, whereas the latter usually equates to the frequency of initiatives on the ballot. With regard to the Swiss cantons the corresponding measures are slightly more intricate. As aforementioned, cantonal constitutions all contain some sort
of popular rights, such as constitutional and legislative initiatives as well as legislative and fiscal referendums. But their configurations vary considerably. Particularly the requirements to successfully seize popular rights differ from permissive rules in direct democratic cantons to quite inhibiting rules in more representative cantons. In order to arrive at a measure Stutzer (1999) codes and combines the following formal requirements into an index of institutional openness: number of signatures needed, respective time spans to collect them, financial threshold of the fiscal referendums, and existence of mandatory (as opposed to optional) referendums. Of course, permissive formal rules do not necessarily imply that direct democratic processes frequently occur. Although neither formal rules nor use thereof are entirely independent, they are in fact not highly correlated with one another in the Swiss case (Barankay, Sciarini and Trechsel 2003; Stadelmann-Steffen and Freitag 2011). The second measure thus consists of the yearly number of popular votes on initiatives and referendums averaged over a given time span.

Third, all analyses pursue a comparative and quantitative approach. Following the empirical tradition of existing studies, the research design employs statistical methods in order to test the educative claims. The approach is comparative in that it systematically compares direct democracies, which differ in terms of the independent variable, and examines whether behavior and attitudes of citizens vary accordingly. And it is quantitative in that it draws on large data sets and operationalizes the variables numerically. In order to estimate the potential effect of direct democratic institutions on behavior, the analyses resort to regression techniques. Multiple regression allows us to calculate correlations between independent and dependent variables while holding controlling variables constant. This is important because mere bivariate correlations are susceptible to bias and spuriousness. Concerning respondents, political behavior and attitudes can be expected to be related systematically to certain individual characteristics. Without accounting for such alternative factors, the influence of direct democracy would probably be overestimated thus yielding biased results. Concerning cantons, the number of observations is not large enough to rule out random cantonal idiosyncrasies, which could be the real cause for differences in citizens’ behavior and attitudes. To avoid such spurious relationships the regression models include cantonal control variables as well. However, individual respondents are furthermore nested in cantonal settings. Technically speaking, the data structure is hierarchical. It is reasonable to assume that individuals in the same cantonal context are more similar with regard to political behavior and attitudes than individuals from different contexts. This can pose severe statistical problems resulting in incorrect standard errors and Type I errors (Steenbergen and Jones 2002).
fore, multilevel modeling with random-intercept models is applied to accommodate the hierarchical data structure (Gelman and Hill 2007).

Fourth, the models draw on similar data sets. To measure dependent as well as individual control variables the analyses rely on survey data of the Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects). Being part of the network of Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), Selects are the primary and preferred source for data on political behavior and attitudes of Swiss citizens. They are carried out shortly after each national election via computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI), include a considerably large number of respondents even in small cantons, ask consistently the same, standardized questions, sample only persons who are eligible to vote in Switzerland, and in general provide a very high quality of data. Regarding independent variables, data on the formal rules of direct democracy in the cantons come from Fischer (2009) and Schaub and Dlabac (2012) who present updated versions of the index of institutional permissiveness by Stutzer (1999). As for the actual use, data on the frequency of popular votes on initiatives and referendums are again offered by Schaub and Dlabac (2012). For contextual control variables data from official statistics on the cantons are used that can be found at the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (www.bfs.admin.ch) or the Database on Swiss Cantons and Cities (www.badac.ch). All in all, the analyses do not only make use of the best available data, and thereby increase validity and reliability of their estimates. Testing the specific research question with the same data also ensures consistency and comparability of the results with respect to the overall investigation of the political sociology of direct democracy.

1.5 Results and Contribution

Does direct democracy in the Swiss cantons matter for political behavior and attitudes of citizens? In short, it does. The analyses in the following chapters show coherently that direct democratic institutions have indeed a significant and substantial effect on the way how citizens behave and think politically. However, the picture is much more nuanced. Results concerning the four respective research questions can be summarized as follows:

• The first question relates direct democracy to protest behavior: Do direct democratic institutions supplement or undermine the attendance of demonstrations? The analysis gives clear support to the latter hypothesis. Both the permissiveness of formal rules as well as the frequency of popular votes are associated with a significantly lower probability that an individual attends demonstrations. Results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables and exclusion of single
cantonss. This finding implies that low institutional barriers and frequent use of
direct democracy are able to civilize political conflict.

- The second question relates direct democracy to political equality: Do direct demo-
cratic institutions increase or decrease social bias in the electorate? Cross-level
interactions between individual socioeconomic status and direct democracy show
no significant difference. In other words, socioeconomic background does not matter
any differently in the most direct democratic canton than in the most representa-
tive one. Moreover, electorates of national elections and popular votes do not differ
significantly in terms of socioeconomic status. This finding may serve both as relief
for skeptics and as disappointment for proponents of direct democracy.

- The third question relates direct democracy to political trust: Do direct demo-
cratic institutions enhance trust in authorities or initiate distrust? The results clearly
corroborate the theoretical arguments. Trust in political authorities is significantly
higher if formal rules are permissive, and lower if popular votes on initiatives and
optional referendums are frequent. Further analyses reveal that it is direct demo-
cracy that affects trust rather than vice versa. This finding also signifies the need to
acknowledge different mechanisms of formal and procedural conceptions of direct
democratic institutions.

- The fourth question relates direct democracy to party identification: Do direct
democratic institutions allure voters to identify with parties or do they facilitate
dealignment among voters? The results show that permissive formal rules signifi-
cantly reduce the probability of individual party identification. Apparently, citizens
are less reliant on political parties if popular rights are readily available. However,
this negative effect becomes in fact weaker, not stronger, if popular votes take place
frequently. The moderation suggests that at some point individuals do resort to
cues of partisan attachment. This finding could imply that in a potentially detri-
mental environment frequent use of direct democracy offers parties the opportunity
to seek new partisans.

How can these results be summarized against a more general backdrop? With regard
to the contribution of this book the findings once again emphasize the main points
explicated above. Direct democracy does have consequences that extend well beyond the
legal level and policy outcomes. The book provides comprehensive empirical evidence in
support of secondary effects of direct democratic institutions. Each chapter presents a
so far untested relationship that has not been analyzed at all, or to an insufficient and
Inconclusive end. But not only does it enrich our knowledge and complement existing research focusing on the USA. It also shows how convenient and intriguing it is to analyze direct democracy in the context of political sociology, as it highlights the mutual interplay between politics and society. Moreover, the picture that the empirical data paint is less plain than what proponents or skeptics promise it to be. Neither the positive educative claims by enthusiasts, nor the skeptics' warnings of perils and dangers of direct democracy are consistently validated. Evidently the effects of direct democratic institutions are more complex than to advocate or dismiss them along one general argument. As a matter of fact, such complex understanding is likely to advance the discourse both in the public sphere and in the scientific literature further. As we rebut clichés about direct democratic involvement, we base the discourse on empirical judgment and allow it to be guided by unagitated reason. And we acknowledge that direct democracy can be in fact a valuable addition to existing institutionalized forms of political participation. For what it is worth, this book indicates at the very least little to no reason to expect detrimental consequences of direct democratic institutions.

Finally, let us use these findings to conclude with a brief outlook on potential avenues for future studies. Although this book provides a considerable contribution in both theoretical and empirical terms, there is certainly still ample room for improving and extending our knowledge on secondary effects of direct democracy. In this respect the theoretical background only touches upon what ought to become a thorough theoretical understanding of how different conceptions of institutions affect individual behavior and attitudes. Additional work is needed integrating institutional and behavioral perspectives in order to arrive at a comprehensive theory that invigorates the assumed causality. Similarly, other sophisticated methods promise more detailed and accurate findings. Studies in the future can elaborate on the causal interplay by applying longitudinal designs or innovative methods to study causal inference quantitatively (cf. Angrist and Pischke 2008; Legewie 2012). Just as this book discusses direct democracy also as moderating variable, subsequent analyses can equally test potential mediation effects using for instance structural equation modeling. It seems in general auspicious to conceive direct democracy as latent construct and to specify a separate measurement model with formative indicators for the institutional and reflective indicators for the procedural conception. Compared to a simple additive index such model would maximize reliability and internal validity of the estimates.

Although the analyses in this book tackle novel relationships, many forms of political behavior and attitudes remain of course yet to be studied in the context of direct democratic institutions. Since the results clearly illustrate secondary effects beyond the usual
investigation of mere electoral participation, it seems only reasonable to broaden the focus even further and suggest that other forms are also affected by direct democracy. Studies in the future should thus add to a comprehensive research program covering all forms of political behavior and attitudes, including e.g. party activity, consumer participation, contacting politicians, as well as opinion polarization, ideological orientation, political values, etc. But not only the *explanandum* can be extended to other forms of behavior and attitudes. With popular rights spreading all around the world, other countries and contexts, too, are eligible to serve as testing grounds. Retesting the relationships with other data would on the one side strengthen the external validity of secondary effects, and could uncover interesting context specific mechanisms on the other. A common objection to the introduction of direct democratic institutions in other countries maintains that they work properly only in the idiosyncratic political culture of countries like Switzerland where citizens have decades of experience with direct legislation. It is the very point of this book to consider direct democracy in the entire mutual context of political sociology: Institutions obviously rely on the society to function; but they are also very much able to influence behavior and attitudes of citizens, eventually creating a favorable political environment for direct democratic involvement.
Abstract

This paper presents the first investigation of whether direct democracy supplements or undermines the attendance of demonstrations as a form of protest behavior. A first approach assumes that direct democracy is associated with fewer protests, as they function as a valve that integrates voters’ opinions, preferences, and emotions into the political process. A competing hypothesis proposes a positive relationship between direct democracy and this unconventional form of political participation due to educative effects. Drawing on individual data from recent Swiss Electoral Studies, we apply multilevel analysis and estimate a hierarchical model of the effect of the presence as well as the use of direct democratic institutions on individual protest behavior. Our empirical findings suggest that the political opportunity of direct democracy is associated with a lower individual probability to attend demonstrations.

* This chapter is identical to a manuscript, which I co-authored with Markus Freitag. It was published as Fatke and Freitag (2013). First and foremost, my gratitude goes to my co-author Markus Freitag. Also, I’d like to thank Uwe Krahmenpohl, PerOla Öberg, Katrin Uba, Adrian Vatter for valuable feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript as well as the editors and anonymous reviewers of Political Behavior for their comments and suggestions.
2 Direct Democracy and Protest Behavior

2.1 Introduction

Public protests and direct political participation by means of direct democratic institutions are two clearly related phenomena: Whenever there is increased protest behavior, the call for more participation through direct democracy quickly follows. Recent protests throughout Europe illustrate such reactions. Particularly in Germany, ordinary citizens took to the streets in great numbers, protesting for instance against the infrastructure project “Stuttgart 21” or the nuclear waste transport “Castor.” Similar developments can be found in Great Britain, where protesters against retrenchments of higher education made the headlines, and in France, where protests against pension reform were widespread (even by French standards). In these instances it appears that the absence of institutions of direct democracy led to alternative forms of participation such as protests and demonstrations. Taking a “political process” or “political opportunity structure” perspective, direct democracy as a participatory decision-making institution enhances the openness of a political system, helps integrate citizens’ preferences and attitudes into the political process, and thus acts as a valve for potential protest (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986). Moreover, direct democracy fosters a deliberative environment and provides a political discourse that discourages confrontational strategies such as protests (Feld and Kirchgässner 2000; Mutz 2006).

The reverse effect, however, is just as apparent: Whenever there are popular votes, protests and demonstrations occur either in campaigns during the run-up to the vote or as reactions to it. Several recent controversial initiatives illustrate this effect: In Switzerland popular initiatives on the deportation of criminal foreigners and on the ban on constructing minarets; in Germany (local) initiatives on school reform and smoking bans in restaurants; and in California Proposition 8 on the same-sex marriage ban and Proposition 19 on legalizing cannabis. All of these direct democratic processes were accompanied by protests and demonstrations. From a progressive perspective, this corresponds to the educative effect of direct democracy that empowers citizens to get involved in the political process, enhance their ability to form, express and enforce their preferences, and thus act as catalyst for potential protest (Smith and Tolbert 2004).

Our paper evaluates the effect of direct democratic institutions on protest behavior, putting both competing hypotheses to an empirical test. Given the strong presence of protests in the recent public debate and the vigorous call for more direct participation, it is astonishing that this relationship has yet to be investigated scientifically. To date, no study exists that systematically links direct democratic institutions with individual protest behavior. This is even more surprising when one considers that the political
Direct Democracy and Protest Behavior

opportunity structure approach was formulated in order to explain protest behavior in the first place (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986). Ever since the literature has investigated political opportunity structures for protests, it commonly holds that the openness of a political system is a crucial determinant for protests (Meyer 2004). Direct democratic institutions, however, are only mentioned indirectly and not explicitly taken into account.1

To fill this gap, we test the relationship between direct democracy and protest behavior at the individual level in the Swiss cantons. As most industrialized countries do not or insignificantly apply direct democratic instruments, international comparisons of the effects of direct democracy on protest behavior are difficult. However, the Swiss cantons present a suitable alternative. These 26 sub-national units provide an excellent opportunity to test the impact of direct democracy—one of Switzerland’s unique institutional arrangements. While some cantons witness extensive use of direct democratic rights, reflecting a participatory political culture, others are much more strongly oriented toward a purely representative democracy (Vatter 2002). In methodological terms, Switzerland, with its more than two-dozen cantonal units, offers many clear advantages: “Because the Swiss cantons are entities within the same national political system, there are many characteristics which they have in common, and which may therefore be treated as constants” (Lijphart 2002, 13). In this sense, the Swiss cantons are particularly well-equipped to meet the demands of a most similar systems research design (Freitag 2006; Vatter 2002; Vatter and Freitag 2007). Given that a real experimental situation cannot be achieved in the context of our research question, the analysis of the Swiss cantons can be seen as the best alternative available (e.g. Lijphart 1975; Teune and Przeworski 1970, 31 et seq.; Snyder 2001).2 Moreover, the 26 cantons represent a sufficient number of contextual units for quantitative analysis (Jones 1998; Steenbergen and Jones 2002).

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1 Kitschelt (1986, 68), for example, interprets referendums by anti-nuclear groups as a reason why protest took on an assimilative form in the USA (as opposed to confrontational strategies in the closed systems of France and West Germany). Kriesi and Wieser (1996) show that direct democracy in Switzerland induces movements to use its instruments, thus moderating their action repertoire. We are of course aware of the fact that a sub-national analysis of Switzerland cannot completely overcome the problems of analyzing the causal effect direct democracy has on protest behavior. While internationally there are not any countries with a similarly high level of direct democracy as in Switzerland, within Switzerland we do not have the fully counterfactual outcome, i.e. no direct democracy at all (cf. Rubin 1974). Focusing on institutional configurations of direct democratic instruments, some cantons exhibit very few opportunities of direct democratic participation and come, compared to other cantons, very close to the counterfactual. Individuals in these cantons can therefore serve as our—non-randomly assigned—control group (Achen 1986; Campbell and Stanley 1963). Moreover, following King, Keohane and Verba (1995, 477) it is important for the evaluation of causal explanations in political science to test a given hypothesis in different contexts and confront the respective findings. Because previous research on direct democracy’s impact has largely focused on the USA, adding empirical data for the Swiss case can therefore be seen as a further step toward causal inference.

2
The paper proceeds as follows: First, an overview of direct democracy in the Swiss cantons is presented and the extent of individual attendance of demonstrations is reviewed. Second, we discuss the theoretical considerations and hypotheses regarding the relationship between direct democracy and protest behavior. Following the presentation of the contextual and theoretical background, we introduce the methodology and influencing variables and subject the various hypotheses to the scrutiny of systematic statistical evaluation. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the findings.

2.2 Direct Democracy and Protests in the Swiss Cantons

Switzerland has a long tradition of direct democratic participation and a correspondingly wide array of direct democratic institutions on federal, cantonal, and local levels. With regard to cantonal direct democracy, four different institutions can be distinguished: the constitutional initiative; the legislative initiative; the legislative referendum (in optional and mandatory form); and the fiscal referendum (also in optional and mandatory form). In each canton each of these institutions comes with different requirements that make it easier or more difficult to influence political decisions according to the preferences of each citizen. These requirements consist of the number of signatures needed, the respective times periods allotted to launch initiatives and optional referendums, as well as the financial threshold for fiscal referendums. Reviewing and comparing the requirements of each canton, several authors suggest an index of direct democracy that combines all requirements into a single measure of institutional openness (Stutzer 1999; Stutzer and Frey 2000; Trechsel and Serdült 1999). Fischer (2009) extends (and slightly amends) previous efforts to recent years and to all cantons (including the three so called Landsgemeinden). On the other hand, a high presence of direct democratic institutions does not necessarily imply an equally high use of them. Although neither presence nor use can be viewed as entirely independent (Eder, Vatter and Freitag 2009), they are not highly correlated with one another in the Swiss case (Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter 2012). In fact, political elites in Switzerland are assumed to be more responsive to citizens’ demands because they anticipate the use of referendums and initiatives in those cantons which allow for a great deal of direct democratic involvement. It could well be that both dimensions differ in terms of their effects on protest behavior. Both the presence of direct democratic institutions and the frequency of the use of initiatives and referendums are therefore taken into account. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the presence and use of direct democracy in the Swiss cantons for the years 1999-2003; Appendix 2.2 provides descriptive statistics of the index and of the average of direct democratic votes. With
respect to institutional design and use of direct democratic instruments, the data illustrates that the Swiss cantons exhibit marked variance in terms of formal legal access to popular rights and their respective exercise.

Protest as “a conceptually distinct set of behaviors” (Eisinger 1973, 13) aimed at political action can take on many different forms. In its broadest sense, protest encompasses various unconventional modes of political participation—as opposed to conventional modes like voting, campaigning, or contacting representatives. The distinction between conventional participation and protest has been made starting at the very early stages of research on political action. Many studies conceptualize protest as the willingness of citizens to engage in dissent, such as demonstrations, unofficial strikes, boycotts, petitions, occupation of buildings, and political violence (Andrain and Apter 1995; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Marsh 1977; Opp and Kittel 2010).

Noticing recent changes in action repertoires, Norris (2009, 639 et seq.), however, points out that “demonstrations have become mainstream and widespread. [...] Today, collective action through demonstrations has become a generally accepted way to express political grievances, voice opposition, and challenge authorities.” In this vein, following recent studies on protest behavior that employ the terms “protests” and “demonstrations” interchangeably (Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst 2005, 2006; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001), we refer to the attendance of demonstrations as protest behavior. As Table 2.1 shows, considerable variation exists between the cantons regarding the percentage of respondents per canton who attended a demonstration between 1999 and 2003. In some cases, variances of about 30 percentage points can be observed between the cantonal democracies. Because individuals in the Swiss cantons vary substantially in terms of their propensity to attend a demonstration, the question surfaces as to why these differences exist.

2.3 Theory and Hypotheses regarding the Influence of Direct Democracy on Protest Behavior

This article evaluates whether direct democracy increases or decreases individual protest behavior. Viewed analytically, this inquiry forces us to take hierarchical structures into

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3 Norris (2009, 639 et seq.), for instance, challenges these labels and suggests a new distinction “between citizen-oriented action, relating mainly to elections and parties, and cause-oriented repertoires, which focus attention upon specific issues and policy concerns, exemplified by consumer politics, [...] petitioning, demonstrations, and protests.”

4 Eisinger (1973, 13), however, draws a clear distinction between political protest and more “costly” forms such as political violence.

5 It has to be noted that our data from the 2003 Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects) does not include any other items of the various forms of protest behavior mentioned above.
## Table 2.1: Direct democracy and protest in the Swiss cantons, 1999–2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canton</th>
<th>Direct Democracy Index 1999–2003</th>
<th>Direct Democratic votes 1999–2003</th>
<th>Participated in demonstrations (%)</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ticino</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuchâtel</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaud</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fribourg</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bern</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Gallen</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zurich</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valais</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jura</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thurgovia</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel-Town</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucerne</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nidwalden</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zug</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obwalden</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grisons</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwyz</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uri</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schaffhausen</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appenzell O.R.</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solothurn</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appenzell I.R.</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argovia</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel-Country</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glarus</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average 4.16 3.78 16 5891

*Note:* Swiss cantons ordered according to direct democracy score for the years 1999–2003; yearly calculations by Fischer (2009). Direct democratic votes (popular initiatives and referendums) averaged per year for the years 1999–2003. Percentage of participants in demonstrations indicate percentage of respondents who answered “yes” to the questions in the Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects 2003) questionnaire: *In addition to elections and popular votes, there are also other political activities. I read some of them to you. Please tell me if you participated in each of these activities in the past five years. Attended a demonstration.* Average referring to total number of respondents, i.e., not weighted per canton.
account, as the assumption is posited that a macro-level condition (direct democracy) is related to micro-level behavior (the decision to attend demonstrations).

Theoretically, interactions with one’s social surroundings can shape individual choices; however, an individual’s behavior can also be traced back solely to the observation of one’s environment. A specific incentive offered by the individual’s economic and socio-political surroundings can influence the individual to act in a particular manner (e.g. Huckfeldt, Plutzer and Sprague 1993; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987). From the perspective of neo-institutionalism, political institutions have the ability to mold individual preferences and stimulate or limit behavioral options by means of certain incentive mechanisms (Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon 2009; Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010; Hall and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995; Offe 2006). In general terms, neo-institutionalism regards institutions not only as dependent but also as independent variables (Mayntz and Scharpf 1993, 43). While “classical institutionalism is merely concerned with the description of political institutions and their interrelationships,” in neo-institutionalism, “institutions are interpreted as structural incentives for political actions,” thus shaping individual action (Kaiser 1997, 421).

How do these incentive mechanisms apply to the behavior of political participation in particular? Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995, 15) invert the question of participation and “ask instead why individuals do not take part in politics.” Their answer is threefold: “because they can’t; because they don’t want to; or because nobody asked.” In this vein, we argue that institutional arrangements (namely, direct democratic institutions) offer various channels of political participation by providing resources (people can participate), enabling engagement (people want to participate), or facilitating opportunities (people are asked to participate). While the insights of neo-institutionalism and civic voluntarism provide the basic logic of institutional influence on political participation, they do not tell us the direction in which the influence of direct democracy effectively works. With respect

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6 Institutions are of course the result of citizens’ collective action and may therefore be endogenous to individual behavior over the long-run (Foweraker and Landman 1997). We argue, however, that institutional arrangements can still be seen as exogenous framework conditions that cannot be changed by an individual in the short and medium-run; instead, they influence individual preferences and behavior patterns (cf. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1200).

7 This institutional approach is one of three accounts of protest behavior. Another approach centers around people’s economic situations. If an individual personally experiences economic grievances, he or she is likely to protest. In particular, relative deprivation is seen as the driving force for protest (Gurr 1970). Additionally, a cultural approach can be identified that challenges the rational cost-benefit analysis of the economic view (Chong 1991). In that sense protest is a culturally inherited form of participation, and cultural differences account for differences in political participation such as protests (Hofstede 1991). In particular, the cultural resource of social (or interpersonal) trust is found to be associated with protest behavior (Benson and Rochon 2004; Valencia, Cohen and Hermosilla 2010; Winters 2008).
to the influence of direct democracy on individual participation in demonstrations, two competing hypotheses can be formulated.

The first approach assumes that a culture of extensive direct democracy stimulates citizens' propensity to participate in demonstrations (catalyst hypothesis). In this view, not every individual is capable of expressing his or her preferences in the political process through unconventional participation. Without knowing anything or caring about politics, without contact with like-minded people, there is no reason why an individual should or could join protests. In fact, to engage in protests individuals must meet several requirements: For example, they need to have clear policy preferences—therefore they must have sufficient political knowledge as well as interest—they should be politically efficacious, trust in fellow protesters, and possess the ability to organize. All of these skills are empirically linked to direct democratic institutions, which have, in particular, been shown to exert an educative effect on their citizens (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004; Smith and Tolbert 2004; Tolbert and Smith 2005). Indeed, direct democratic institutions are able to “stimulate participation by energizing citizens with a sense of civic duty and political efficacy” (Smith and Tolbert 2004, 33). Simply because an individual in a direct democracy is more frequently and immediately exposed to political decisions than in a representative democracy, he or she is more likely to be exposed to news media reporting on the decision, and is thus more likely to learn about politics (Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000; Tolbert, McNeal and Smith 2003). The individual is also more likely to be part of political discussions and to get to know like-minded people, and consequently is more likely to feel efficacious in the political process (Bowler and Donovan 2002; Bühlmann 2007; a contrary is however found by Dyck and Lascher Jr. (2009)). Ultimately, the individual is more likely to get involved and express preferences through protests. This empowering effect of direct democracy on the expression of preferences becomes particularly evident in the run-up to votes. Since decisions can be voted on by every individual (instead of representatives), lobbying efforts are directed at the general public, which is done best and most visibly through demonstrations. Again, the same

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8 This line of reasoning is in accordance with the views of the so-called “Progressive Era reformers” (Smith and Tolbert 2004, 3). Here, direct democratic processes have an educative effect on the people (Bryce 1910; Garner 1907; Weyl 1912). More recent studies of the USA provide empirical evidence for positive effects on social participation (Boehmke and Bowen 2010; Smith and Tolbert 2004; Tolbert and Bowen 2008; Tolbert, McNeal and Smith 2003) and conventional political participation through voting (Tolbert and Bowen 2008; Tolbert, Grummel and Smith 2001; Tolbert and Smith 2005; and more recently and specifically Dyck and Seabrook 2010). Furthermore, mobilization effects on independent voters to cast their ballot (Donovan, Tolbert and Smith 2009) and positive effects on political trust (Smith and Tolbert 2004), as well as social trust (Dyck 2012), political knowledge (Schlozman and Yohai 2008; Tolbert, McNeal and Smith 2003), and political support (Bühlmann 2007) can be shown.
argument can be formulated by the civic voluntarism rationale (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). People need resources, engagement, and to be recruited in order to be able to join protests. In that sense the educative mechanism provides first “skills to use time and money effectively”; second “interest in politics,” “concern with public issues,” a “belief that activity can make [little or no] difference,” and “knowledge about the political process”; and third “networks [of recruitment] through which citizens are mobilized to politics” (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, 16). Put differently, in direct democracies people can protest, they want to protest, and they are asked to protest. From these assessments, we formulate the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1** The higher the degree of direct democracy, the more likely it is that an individual will participate in demonstrations.

The antithesis to these essentially positive conjectures would then suggest a negative relationship between direct democracy and protest behavior (value hypothesis). According to this approach direct democratic institutions are conceived as components of a particular *structure of political opportunities* (Eisinger 1973; Meyer 2004). Referring to Kitschelt (1986, 58), “political opportunity structures are comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others.”

In this view, individuals possess policy preferences that they wish to see implemented. Therefore, they consider their repertoire of means to participate in the political process and to influence political decisions according to their preferences. Participatory institutions, such as direct democracy, channel the relationship between individuals and government, providing an environment that makes protests less likely. First and foremost, direct democracy as a participatory decision-making institution enriches the range of conventional political participation. If many opportunities for participation are offered, the political system is considered to be open to the input of preferences. Direct democracy therefore, represents political opportunity structures for conventional participation. Individuals will then use these institutions to influence political decisions (e.g. by popular initiatives or referendums) rather than embracing unconventional forms such as demonstrations: “In a highly open system, on the other hand, where government is not only responsive but anticipates needs and meets them, [...], protest will be unnecessary. In an open system, groups have easy access to decision makers without resort to the drama of protest.” (Eisinger 1973, 28). In the same vein, Kitschelt (1986, 66)

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9 Eisinger (1973, 27 et seq.) hypothesizes in fact a curve-linear relationship between openness of government and protest. In extremely closed systems, protest would be neither a viable nor a
argues: “when political systems are open and weak, they invite assimilative strategies; movements attempt to work through established institutions because political opportunity structures offer multiple points of access. In contrast, when political systems are closed and have considerable capacities to ward off threats to the implementation of policies, movements are likely to adopt confrontational, disruptive strategies orchestrated outside established policy channels.” In this regard, in direct democracies individuals can participate—in addition to elections—in other conventional forms through popular initiatives and referendums because they are asked to vote; hence, they don’t want to participate in unconventional forms such as demonstrations. On the other hand, without direct democratic institutions people can’t participate conventionally, and thus will want to do so unconventionally.\footnote{While only a special one, the most evident case would be when individuals protest against insufficient opportunities of participation or against representatives and their decisions. In direct democracies, on the other hand, such protest is not found (Opp 1996, 230).}

In addition to this valve mechanism, direct democracy also fosters a more deliberative culture (Feld and Kirchgaessner 2000). Kriesi and Wisler (1996, 37 et seq.) state in this respect that “availability of direct-democratic institutions contributes to the ‘civilization’ of political conflict.” In this sense, it is not only actual use of direct democratic institutions that renders protest behavior unnecessary, but also the particular political environment of direct democracy. For instance, political elites in direct democracies are assumed to be more responsive to citizens’ demands because they anticipate the use of referendums and initiatives. The mere presence of the institutions therefore provides an incentive for political elites to act responsively and make decisions closer to the median voter (Hug and Tsebelis 2002). Or as Mutz (2006, 3) points out, direct democracy may help develop a more deliberative, tolerant, and respectful environment while participation and political activism decline. Here, the presence of direct democratic institutions creates a deliberative atmosphere that discourages confrontational strategies such as protests. Taken together, the discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2** The higher the degree of direct democracy, the more likely it is that an individual will abstain from participating in demonstrations.

2.4 Data, Methodological Approach, and Variables

In the following section, we test the derived hypotheses empirically. The dependent variable is the reported individual participation in demonstrations (cf. Table 2.1). These
Direct Democracy and Protest Behavior

data were obtained from the 2003 Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects), specifically from responses to the following question: “In addition to elections and popular votes, there are also other political activities. I read some of them to you. Please tell me if you participated in each of these activities in the past five years. Attended a demonstration.” Being part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) network, the Selects study was conducted through computer assisted telephone interviews (CAI) immediately after the Swiss National Election in October 2003. The response rate was 73.3% (Selb and Lachat 2004, 34). The final sample consists of 5,891 individuals in the 26 Swiss cantons.

We test the competing hypotheses about the effect of direct democracy on protest behavior in the context of the Swiss sub-national entities. In analytical terms, the Swiss cantons meet the requirements of a most-similar cases design: They exhibit a substantial degree of similarity with respect to consolidated structural elements and they differ considerably regarding the configuration of direct democratic institutions, as Table 2.1 shows (Fischer 2009; Stutzer 1999; Stutzer and Frey 2000; Trechsel and Serdült 1999). It is therefore potentially less difficult to create ceteris paribus conditions for a systematic comparison of cantonal systems than for a cross-national comparison, since the cantons have many characteristics in common that can be treated as constants (Freitag 2005; Lijphart 2002; Vatter and Freitag 2007).

As indicated by the research question, we are dealing with hierarchical data structures, i.e. individuals nested within institutional contexts that are thought to exert an influence on them. We therefore apply random-intercept models, implying that individual behavior can vary between cantons (Jones 1998; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Additionally, such a multilevel model allows for the modeling of macro-level characteristics (in the present case, the direct democratic context) that account for the variance at the macro-level (the variance between cantons). As the dependent variable is dichotomous, individual participation in demonstrations is transformed to a logit structure.

For the purpose of explaining individual participation in demonstrations, we integrate contextual as well as individual characteristics into the analysis. We use the values of the contextual factors measured prior to or throughout, but not after, the reported participation in demonstrations to assure that the potential cause precedes the effect.\footnote{Moreover, one can argue logically that it is the more stable (“sticky”) contextual condition, which causally affects the more volatile (“loose”) individual behavior, and not vice versa (Davis 1985).}

In order to measure the presence of direct democracy, we use an index developed by Fischer (2009) as our explanatory variable (cf. Table 2.1, Appendix 2.1 and Appendix 2.2). First suggested by Stutzer (1999), this index combines degrees of openness for each of the four direct democratic institutions: the constitutional initiative, the legislative...
initiative, the legislative referendum, and the fiscal referendum. Values between one and six reflect the legal requirements for each institution in terms of required signatures, time period to collect signatures, in the case of the legislative referendum, whether it is optional or mandatory, and for fiscal referendums, the financial threshold. The resulting four sub-indices are averaged into one index. In other words, some cantons require many signatures, offer only a short time period in which to collect them, do not have a mandatory (only an optional) legislative referendum, and a high financial threshold. Such cantons thus exhibit high legal requirements and score low (i.e. close to one) on the index of direct democracy. Cantons with low legal requirements score high (i.e. close to six). From the discussion above, it follows that direct democracy also includes another dimension different from the mere institutional presence. We measure the use of direct democracy by averaging the number of all cantonal initiatives and referendums per year (Année politique Suisse). We test both instances of direct democracy separately to ensure a comprehensive account of direct democracy and to strengthen our empirical investigation.

However, as other theoretical arguments claim, there are several alternative explanations as to why people protest that vary systematically across and within cantons. We analyze the effect of direct democratic institutions while holding other factors constant, thereby ruling out spurious relationships. As mentioned above, in addition to our institutional perspective, there are important individual characteristics that contribute to protest behavior. We base our selection of variables on the prominent models in the protest literature. Protest participation can be explained by a number of different theories: by grievance theory (Gurr 1970), by a specific set of political values (Inglehart 1990), or more comprehensively, by the aforementioned civic-voluntarism model (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). From the relevant literature we derive individual variables that are commonly associated with increased protest behavior (e.g. Benson and Rochon 2004; Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst 2005). In general, men, younger people, and people with higher education are assumed to protest more. The same applies to more trusting persons and persons with more post-materialistic values as well as a left-leaning ideology. We also consider people who favor a green party, are members in a labor union, or are employed in the agricultural sector as more likely to protest because they represent

12 Coding for thresholds and corresponding index points is described in detail by Stutzer and Frey (2000).
13 We are grateful to our anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
14 For an overview see for example Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon (2009) or Opp (1996).
15 Level of education is highly correlated with personal income, but the latter contains more missing values. To avoid multicollinearity and to keep as many observations as possible, we use the level of education in our analysis.
the most prominent protest groups in Switzerland. To sum up, the variables sex, age, education, trust in others, post-materialism, ideology, green party attachment, union member, and agricultural profession are generated from the same 2003 Selects data set and included in the analysis.

Similarly, we account for alternative explanations on the contextual level. It could be the case that the variation in protest behavior is only due to systematic differences in protest related factors between cantons. Therefore, we selected control variables identified in the relevant literature as potentially influential to protest behavior on a contextual level (e.g. Winters 2008). In this sense, people living in more affluent and urban cantons are thought to have more opportunities to protest and are thus more likely to do so. Furthermore, protest should be more likely where social movements have been strong and successful. Historically in Switzerland, traditional social movements are strongly tied to labor issues and unions (Hutter and Giugni 2009). New social movements are strongly tied to environmental issues and the success of green parties (Kriesi 1982; Zwicky 1984, 105). Moreover, when considering major protest events (with more than 1,000 participants) we find a highly uneven distribution: by far most protest events take place in Bern, Zurich, and Geneva. Since the costs of participation decrease as the distance between the protester’s home and the protest decreases, we include the distance to these cities as a control variable. Finally, people in the German-speaking part of Switzerland are thought to be more likely to protest than people in the Latin language areas. These language regions have shown to be important factors in Swiss politics, as they coincide with different concepts of democracy (Freitag and Stadelmann-Steen 2010, 477). Moreover, language regions are not only correlated with the extent of direct democracy, but residents also generally differ in terms of political culture and, in particular, with regard to their perceptions of representative and direct democracy. Whereas the German-speaking cantons mainly display an extensive degree of direct democracy, French and Italian-speaking cantons offer only restrictive access to direct democratic instruments and are more oriented toward a representative model of democracy (Stadelmann-Steffen and Freitag 2011, 535). Altogether, the contextual variables primary national income (i.e. income of all households) per capita, urbanization, share of union members, strength of green parties,

\[ r = 11.4; \text{St. Err.} = 3.3 \] of direct democracy on the number of major protest events in the Swiss Cantons \( (n = 26) \), even after introducing our (contextual) control variables \( (R^2 = 0.58) \). In other words, the extent of direct democracy is related to fewer protest events in the Swiss cantons.

In this respect, Ladner (2007) finds both a greater number and increased importance of local parliaments in French and Italian-speaking cantons than in German-speaking cantons. Knüsel (1994) argues that language regions are influenced by their respective neighboring countries: The representative model of democracy in Italy and France delegates responsibility and power away...
2 Direct Democracy and Protest Behavior

Table 2.2: Random effects of protest behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Empty model</th>
<th>Individual model (1)</th>
<th>Direct democracy model Presence (2)</th>
<th>Direct democracy model Use (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Context variance</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intraclass-correlation</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$-2 \times$ log likelihood</td>
<td>5070.69</td>
<td>3806.8</td>
<td>3793.86</td>
<td>3803.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

distance to major protest city, and share of German-speaking population are generated from official statistics and included as controls. More detailed information about the variables (their operationalizations and data sources) can be found in Appendix 2.1; Appendix 2.2 presents descriptive statistics of all variables.

2.5 Empirical Findings

In this section we present a two-stage procedure to examine the relationship between the direct democratic context and an individual’s participation in demonstrations. Some preliminary analyses demonstrate that individual participation in demonstrations systematically varies between the cantons, even when controlling for individual variables (Table 2.2). Apparently, there are contextual differences that affect protest behavior, which confirms that it is not only theoretically, but also methodologically appropriate to model a contextual effect of direct democracy on individual protest behavior. Moreover, the introduction of the (contextual) direct democracy variables greatly reduces contextual variance. The independent variables of the presence and use of direct democracy therefore explains a substantial part of protest variance between cantons. In particular, the presence of direct democracy (2) is able to reduce context variance as well as intraclass correlation almost to zero. Now that we have established that direct democracy does exert an influence on protest behavior, we must now inquire into the direction of the effect and whether it holds under controlling factors. To answer these questions we turn to results of the above specified random-intercept logit model. In the next analytical step we present the basic model containing the degree of direct democracy and individual controls. We then add the controlling contextual variables to expand the model (Table 2.3). The main results can be described as follows:

from the individual to the unitary state. In German-speaking cantons, on the other hand, citizens embody the idea of a “small” state and are thus left with more power and responsibility.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Individual model</th>
<th>(2) Direct democracy models</th>
<th>(3) Full models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.70**</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>-1.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.04****</td>
<td>-0.04****</td>
<td>-0.04****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.06****</td>
<td>0.06****</td>
<td>0.05****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialism</td>
<td>0.33****</td>
<td>0.34****</td>
<td>0.33****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green party attachment</td>
<td>0.48**</td>
<td>0.47**</td>
<td>0.48**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right placement</td>
<td>-0.25****</td>
<td>-0.25****</td>
<td>-0.25****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union member</td>
<td>0.89****</td>
<td>0.88****</td>
<td>0.89****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in others</td>
<td>0.06****</td>
<td>0.06****</td>
<td>0.06****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural profession</td>
<td>0.68****</td>
<td>0.69****</td>
<td>0.68****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Random-intercept logit models of protest behavior (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct democracy presence</td>
<td>−0.27***</td>
<td>−0.30***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct democracy use</td>
<td>−0.08*</td>
<td>−0.12***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share German speaking</td>
<td>0.43*</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>−0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National income</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share union members</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green party strength</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to major protest city</td>
<td>−0.00</td>
<td>−0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context variance</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−2× loglikelihood</td>
<td>3806.80</td>
<td>3793.86</td>
<td>3803.44</td>
<td>3784.42</td>
<td>3779.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/n</td>
<td>5,169/26</td>
<td>5,169/26</td>
<td>5,169/26</td>
<td>5,169/26</td>
<td>5,169/26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

### Notes
- *** p<0.01
- ** p<0.05
- * p<0.1
• First and foremost, with regard to our main hypotheses, the estimations seem to confirm the negative effect of direct democracy on protest behavior. In other words, we can observe a trade-off between cantonal direct democratic culture and individual participation in demonstrations: The higher the degree of direct democracy, the greater the likelihood that an individual will abstain from participating in demonstrations. Most notably, this is true for both dimensions of direct democracy: its presence as well as its use. We find no support for a positive, educative effect of direct democracy in Switzerland; rather, a strong direct democratic culture is associated with decreased participation in demonstrations, all other things held constant. In both estimations, controlling for individual and contextual factors, this effect is highly significant. Again, institutional presence and the use of direct democracy are able to explain a fair amount of the variance of protest behavior. Results in Table 2.3, however, are difficult to interpret in terms of effect size. For that reason we calculate predicted probabilities to engage in protest given the degree of direct democracy. Figure 2.1 shows the relationship and corresponding confidence intervals, with controlling covariates fixed at their means. Under these conditions, the probability of attending a demonstration decreases from 18.5% in the canton with the fewest direct democratic institutions to 6.5% in the canton with the most direct democracy (Graph on the left). This is a reduction of roughly 65%. Interestingly, size of the effect is the same going from the canton with the least use (18.1%) to the canton with the highest use (6.6%) of direct democracy (Graph on the right.). That means direct democracy in Switzerland reduces the probability of protesting by nearly two-thirds.

• Second, most of the individual control variables are significant and perform in the theoretically hypothesized direction. A higher likelihood to protest is associated with younger age, higher education, more post-materialist values, attachment to a green party, left ideology, union members, greater trust in others, and agricultural professions. These relationships remain significant after introducing contextual control variables.\(^{18}\)

• Third, with regard to the contextual controls, results of the use and the presence of direct democracy are somewhat ambiguous. In the slightly improved Model 4, a canton’s percentage of labor union members in the work force has a significant

\(^{18}\) In analyses not documented here, we tested further individual variables that could be connected to protest behavior, namely variables for political trust and political knowledge. These variables are not significant in our models, do not change the model estimates, and are therefore excluded. These results are available from the authors upon request.
2 Direct Democracy and Protest Behavior

Figure 2.1: Predicted probability of attending demonstrations. Control variables are set to their means.

Effect. Like the respective individual control for union membership, individuals in cantons with a high share of union members are more likely to protest. Marginally significant, the share of the German-speaking population is also positively associated with a higher likelihood of protesting. Significant in both Models 4 and 5 is the effect of the strength of Green parties: Individuals are more likely to protest where Green parties are stronger. Although the distance from the cantonal capital to the closest major protest event, urbanization, and national income are not significant, these variables represent important controls and are therefore left in the models.\(^\text{19}\)

Of course, the results of the full Models 4 and 5 require further testing. As we are dealing with a very small number of cases, level-two units (here, cantons) can quickly exert a large influence on the estimation of the parameters. Regression diagnostics were developed to measure various ways in which a regression relation might be largely dependent on one or two observations. Particularly in small samples, there is the danger that the results achieved might be dominated by a few observations, thereby casting doubt on the reliability of a regression estimate and the conclusions made thereupon. Therefore, we re-estimated our models multiple times, each time by excluding a single

\(^{19}\) We also tested further contextual indicators of our individual variables, namely variables for age distribution and education pattern per canton. Again, these variables are not significant in our models, do not change the model estimates, and are therefore excluded. Moreover, further analyses of potential cross-level interactions between direct democratic settings and individual accounts of protest behavior (not presented here) do not show significant effects, and thus do not support the educative reasoning. These results are available from the authors upon request.
Figure 2.2: Effect of direct democracy on protest excluding single cantons

canton (and its respondents). Although this kind of manual jackknifing represents a
strict test for influential cases (excluding in some cases several hundred observations),
the direct democracy variable remains significant in all 26 separate models. Figure 2.2
illustrates the direct democracy coefficients in the 26 separate models to the exclusion
of a single canton. Even without the most influential canton Bern (and the capital of
Switzerland), we find that confidence intervals do not include zero. Furthermore, we
also applied a jackknife estimation of standard errors, which also resulted in significant
coefficients for direct democracy. Based on these results, we are fairly confident about
the present findings.\footnote{Although our empirical results clearly favor the hypothesized negative relationship, they do not
clarify the mechanism: is the decline in protest behavior due to the deliberative environment of
direct democracy or is it because citizens use direct democratic votes as a valve? As evidence for
the valve effect, the degree of direct democracy should also be positively correlated with individual
participation in popular votes. In further analyses of the same models (not documented here),
the direct democracy variable indeed exerts a highly significant and positive effect on individual
participation in popular votes. These results are available from the authors upon request. With
this in mind, our results seem to support the argument that direct democratic institutions indeed
act as valve. As we detail below, however, more empirical investigation is needed to scrutinize the
underlying causal mechanism.}
2 Direct Democracy and Protest Behavior

2.6 Conclusion

This paper began with the observation of two seemingly contradictory trends in current events. On the one hand, increased protest activity is accompanied by a call for more direct democratic participation. On the other hand, direct democratic decisions are every once in a while accompanied by protests. Given these observations, we tested the direction of the effect of direct democratic institutions on protest behavior. Do they act as valve, integrating preferences and emotions into the political process and thus rendering protests unnecessary? Or do they catalyze preferences and emotions by empowering citizens to engage and thus stimulate protests in the first place? Surprisingly, no systematic empirical evaluation of this relationship had been undertaken. In fact, theoretically, strong cases for both arguments can be made. Our contribution juxtaposes both arguments and further develops their theoretical foundations. To arrive at an answer, however, we model the relationship and test it empirically in the context of the Swiss cantons. Here the result is clear: Direct democratic institutions significantly reduce protest behavior. The effect is not only significant when controlling for individual and contextual effects, but is also substantial in its size. Direct democratic institutions seem to be able to act as political opportunity structures. They provide people with institutional means of participation and decision-making. Consequently, citizens do not feel the need to protest their causes. Viewed the other way around, if direct democratic institutions are absent, people lack the opportunity to participate conventionally, and thus see no other option than to engage in protests.

Regarding the varieties of neo-institutionalism (historical, sociological, and rational-choice perspectives), which differ in how they define institutions in detail, the methodologies they use, and on how institutions shape actors’ preferences (e.g. Hall and Taylor 1996; Sørensen and Torfing 2007), our data do not however allow us to differentiate between the different schools of thought in our analysis. Nevertheless, according to some prominent Swiss scholars, there is at the very least some evidence that in Switzerland, direct democracy is indeed a deeply rooted trait that is culturally inherited by the cantons and their citizens. These scholars emphasize the extent to which individuals turn to established routines or familiar patterns of behavior to attain their purposes (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Linder 2005; Vatter 2002). This account reinforces the abovementioned findings about language regions, democratic institutions, and democratic culture by Ladner (2007) and Knüsel (1994). Apparently, there is a fundamental relationship between the type of democracy and the appreciation of direct democracy in a canton. While in more direct democratic, German-speaking cantons people tend to think that
2 Direct Democracy and Protest Behavior

popular votes have a greater influence on politics than elections, in the French and Italian-speaking cantons, which are much more oriented toward a purely representative model of democracy, people do not support this view.\footnote{With regard to other cantonal idiosyncrasies, it could also be that it is not direct democracy per se that reduces protests, but rather that direct democratic cantons are more likely to pass laws that make protests unnecessary—for example by recognizing minority rights. In order to rule out such indirect effects we correlate the direct democracy measure with data on cantonal recognition of religious minorities by Christmann (2010, 21). We find an insignificant and low (0.2) correlation, indicating that direct democratic cantons are not more likely to pass laws that effectively reduce or suppress protests.}

Overall, our analysis of the effects of direct democracy on protest behavior contributes to and enriches the global dialogue on the introduction of direct democratic procedures (Scarrow 2001). From a normative point of view, it could be concluded from our results that extending direct democratic institutions is desirable. Lowering institutional barriers for direct democratic action is a means to reduce protests and demonstrations and to foster a deliberative discourse. In this regard, we confirm Kriesi and Wisler’s (1996, 37 et seq.) statement that direct democracy is able to civilize political conflict. We must, however, underscore that our results are only suggestive and explorative. Although they are a step in the right direction, we need more investigations that empirically scrutinize the causal mechanism between direct democracy and protest behavior in order to provide a more confident base if we indeed wish to speak of a causal relationship. Complementary to our quantitative analysis, qualitative studies are needed to confirm the causal mechanism that our cross-sectional design merely assumed and tested. This certainly is a limitation of our study that we would like to address in future research.

Additionally, the general problem of how to approach the arguments presented in a comparative perspective remains. Although the Swiss cantons differ in terms of local democracy, Switzerland in general has a long tradition in direct democratic practice. Together with its unique parliamentary model, it has developed a consensus oriented spirit that allows for a very deliberate exercise of direct democracy. This is probably necessary to make actual use of it as opportunity structure. We therefore need to acknowledge the socializing potential of direct democracy. Put differently, socialization in direct democracies allows citizens to perceive direct democratic institutions as political opportunity structures in the first place. In a completely different context, however, the introduction of direct democratic instruments could—at least initially—still lead to catalyzing effects. For this reason, we need to further investigate the “mutual” relationship of direct democratic institutions and deliberative democratic culture (Foweraker and Landman 1997), as well as study the effect of direct democratic institutions on protest behavior in other contexts. In the same vein, international comparison of this effect would be rec-
ommended. At present, an empirical analysis of this kind at the national level appears nearly impossible, as there are but a scant handful of comparable cases. Against this background, the tendency in western democracies to redesign institutions in ways that give citizens more opportunities to exercise direct control over political decision-making may provide new prospects for future research (Uba and Ugglå 2011). Our contribution may serve as starting point with a clear message: Where there is direct democracy, there is less protest.
Abstract

This paper analyzes the moderating effect of direct democracy on the relationship of socioeconomic status and political participation. A skeptical position holds that direct democracy increases social bias in the electorate as issues are too complex and demanding. Participatory democrats in contrast invoke an educative effect of direct democratic institutions, thus decreasing social bias of the electorate. To test both arguments we use data from the Swiss cantons and estimate cross-level interactions of socioeconomic and direct democracy variables on political participation. First differences between effects in the least and most direct democratic cantons are not statistically significant. This result may be seen as relief for skeptics as well as disappointment for proponents of direct democracy.

* This chapter is identical to a manuscript, which is currently under review. I’d like to thank Markus Freitag, Paul C. Bauer and Richard Traummüller for their help and feedback as well as participants at various conferences for their comments and suggestions: DVPW Jahrestagung 2012 (Tübingen), ECPR Graduate Conference 2012 (Bremen), Doktoranden-Tagung 2012 (Frankfurt), IPW-Kolloquium 2012 (Bern).
3 Direct Democracy and Political Equality

3.1 Introduction

This paper investigates how socioeconomic status matters for political participation in direct democracies. Does, in other words, direct democracy increase social bias in the electorate? Or are direct democratic institutions indeed able to mobilize particularly underprivileged citizens and thereby mitigate political inequality?

The introduction and extension of direct democratic instruments currently enjoy growing interest and enthusiasm in both public and scientific debate. In addition to policy-oriented analyses, more and more positive indirect consequences for citizens are revealed: Direct democracy is supposed to increase participation (Childers and Binder 2012; Tolbert, Bowen and Donovan 2009), political knowledge (Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000), efficacy (Bowler and Donovan 2002), social engagement (Boehmke and Bowen 2010), and, in fact, happiness (Frey and Stutzer 2000). Not surprisingly direct democratic institutions are expected to be a promising remedy against the democratic and political malaise (Geissel and Newton 2012; Smith and Tolbert 2004). More recently, though, these positive findings are vigorously contested and in part refuted (Dyck 2009; Dyck and Lascher Jr. 2009; Haider-Markel, Querze and Lindaman 2007; Schlozman and Yohai 2008). But despite this fertile controversy between proponents’ favor and goodwill toward direct democratic involvement and skeptics’ concerns and reservations, one major issue, though widely shared, remains only surmised and yet untested (Magleby 1984; Merkel 2010): Is participation in direct democracy biased by socioeconomic status? If overrepresentation of well-educated citizen with high-income and prestigious occupation is systematically higher in the electorate of popular votes, direct democracy jeopardizes political equality and justice.

The finding that socioeconomic status (SES) represents a crucial determinant of political participation and how it is mitigated by context is the underlying theme of the seminal work on “Participation and Political Equality” Verba, Nie and Kim (1978). In fact, the effect of SES on participation has proven to be a very consistent and powerful explanation of participation in empirical terms and appears “with monotonous regularity” (Nagel 1987, 59). As citizen in direct democracies decide directly upon issues and without the mitigation of a representative system, political equality of the electorate is even much more impending (Merkel 2010). Needless to say, that if direct democracy indeed increases the effect of SES this would be at odds with the very idea of democracy being rule by the people. It would imply serious deficiencies for the legitimacy of direct

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1 Survey data used in this analysis are publicly available at [www.fors.unil.ch](http://www.fors.unil.ch). Data on direct democracy is provided by Schaub and Dlabac (2012)
3 Direct Democracy and Political Equality

democracy. The democratic process would be more direct, but at the cost of being less
democratic. Proponents of direct democracy, however, invoke an “educative effect” on
citizens (Smith 2002; Smith and Tolbert 2004). If, in that sense, direct democratic insti-
tutions educated particularly citizens with lower SES we should observe participatory
effects for citizens who are unlikely to participate according to the SES model. In other
words, direct democracy should mitigate social bias in the electorate.

Whether direct democracy increases or decreases the effect of SES on political participa-
tion needs to be judged on empirical grounds. But while the general educative effect of
direct democracy on participation is well-studied (Childers and Binder 2012; Dyck and
Seabrook 2010; Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010; Smith and Tolbert 2004), evidence
on the moderating effect is scarce at most. To be sure, SES is usually found to matter
for participation in popular votes, too (Hamilton 1970; Laycock 2012). Mottier (1993,
134) as well as Lijphart (1997, 3) report a substantial participation gap of 25 % and
37 % respectively between the least and most highly educated citizens. Analyzing data
of more than 200 popular votes in Switzerland Kriesi (2005, 133) concludes that “the
least competent and least interested typically participate least in direct-democratic deci-
sions.” Still, these results do not solve whether the bias in terms of SES in the electorate
is actually greater or smaller in the context of direct democracy. Only two studies take
this comparison into account: On the one side and in the first empirical analysis of this
kind, Magleby (1984) finds that less educated and lower-income voters are more likely
to “drop off” in ballot proposition voting. When they turn out on Election Day and
vote for parties and candidates, they are still less likely to vote on propositions, and
the social bias increases further down the ballot. In an addition to their study, Tolbert,
Bowen and Donovan (2009, 178) on the other side analyze the interaction of education
and initiative spending and report that the mobilizing effect of salient direct democracy
contests particularly applies to lower educated citizen. Yet, there is virtually no study
that addresses these controversial positions and analyses the moderating effect of direct
democracy systematically, i.e. if and how the influence of SES changes when the context
of direct democracy changes.

We attempt to close that gap by testing both arguments with data from the Swiss
cantons. Switzerland is not only considered to be the most direct democratic country in

\footnotesize
\begin{enumerate}
\item In contrast, the moderating effect of other electoral rules and institutions on the relationship of SES
and participation is being studied (Rigby and Melanie 2011). It is thus even more surprising that
direct democracy has been largely overlooked as potential moderator of SES.
\item As a matter of fact, Kriesi (2005) sees this mechanism of self-selection positively as it reduces the
possibility of unreasonable decision, thus alleviating the fears of skeptics.
\item Recently, Goldsmith (2005) makes use of these results and arguments.
\end{enumerate}
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the World (Schmitter and Trechsel 2004), the variation among the cantons regarding the degree of direct democracy allows for meaningful comparison. We estimate multi-level models with cross-level interactions and compute first differences of the effect of SES between the least and most direct democratic canton (cf. King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000). Answering this question not only contributes to the general understanding and discussion of the input side of direct democracy, but gives a more fine-grained picture of the educative effects of institutions. Still, we do not study outcomes or policies of direct democracy and whether they are generally unfair toward people with lower SES. Nevertheless, we will come back to this point in the conclusion.

The paper continues in the following way: First, we further discuss the theoretical background of political participation, its normative implications, as well as the role of SES and hypothesize about the moderating effect of direct democracy. In Section 3.3, we describe our research design and present the results of our analysis in Section 3.4. Moreover, Section 3.5 provides a series of robustness tests and additional analyses in order to strengthen our findings. Section 3.6 concludes with some summarizing remarks.

3.2 Theory and Hypotheses

Political participation defined as “action by ordinary citizens directed toward influencing some political outcome” (Teorell, Torcal and Montero 2007, 336), is obviously at the very heart of democracy (Verba and Nie 1972, 3). In that sense, rule by the people is neither possible nor thinkable without the people participating. It is therefore not all too surprising that many are afraid of widespread decline of participation. As Norris (2002, 3) notes, “conventional wisdom suggests that in the late twentieth century many postindustrial societies experienced a tidal wave of citizen withdrawal from the traditional channels of political participation.” But investigating political participation is, of course, at the very heart of political science. And political scientists have challenged conventional wisdom both from a normative as well as empirical point of view.

In normative terms, proponents of a participatory model of democracy would indeed agree that maximizing participation is desirable not only to ensure the legitimacy of the political system, but also to allocate benefits to match needs of the populace appropriately (cf. Pateman 1970). Moreover and with particular interest to proponents of direct democracy, Mill (1873) for instance claims that active participation in the democratic process lets citizen grow and learn civic virtues. Almond and Verba (1963) though, define a more limited role of participation in their civic culture concept, which is explicitly distinct from the participatory culture. In a realist conception of democracy, maximal
participation is even seen as potentially dangerous as trenchantly pointed out by the phrase “the electoral mass is incapable of action other than a stampede” (Schumpeter 1942, 283). From an empirical point of view, political scientists have suggested that declining participation in modern societies does not necessarily imply political disaffection and waning legitimacy. Normalization theory rather suggests that citizens in stable democracies abstain in growing numbers because they are relatively satisfied with process and outcome even without their participation (Armingeon 1994). Norris (2002) provides persuasive evidence that confounds conventional wisdom of civic decline. So if participants consist of a representative sample of the populace as a whole and non-participation is the result of a voluntary and conscious decision, then low turnout and abstaining from voting are not necessarily problematic. But if social bias translates into political inequality and the political process systematically favors socially privileged citizens over citizens with lower SES by selectively preventing the latter from participating, we should be concerned about the legitimacy of the democratic system and its promise being rule by the people. “On the presumption that those who are excluded from participation will be unable to protect their own interests and, thus, will receive less favorable treatment from the government, any system that denies equal participatory rights violates a fundamental principle of democracy” (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, 10). Obviously, this bias would become even more problematic in direct democracies where “the government” consists of the electorate itself and non-participants face potentially unfavorable decisions without mediation of representatives.

The finding that individual political participation is indeed determined by education, income, and occupation has been one of the earliest, and is since then one of the most consistent and best documented in empirical political research (Milbrath 1965).6 Appearing “with monotonous regularity” in many studies, countries, and points in time (Nagel 1987, 59), the SES model has been confirmed so often that it earned itself the prefix standard model of participation. But as powerful the SES model is empirically, as weak it is theoretically in explaining participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995,

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5 Admittedly, turnout rate and equal representation are in so far linked as full turnout automatically implies full representation. Below that level, however, the relationship between level of turnout and SES bias poses an empirical question (cf. Hill and Leighley 1992).

6 Of course, several theories exist that explain political participation with both individual and contextual factors, e.g. social capital (Putnam 1993), political orientation and values (Inglehart 1977), political opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1986), and, quite recently, biological explanations (Fowler, Baker and Dawes 2008). Probably the most comprehensive in this regard, the Civic-Voluntarism model by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995, 16) rests on three factors: resources, political engagement, and networks of recruitment. In particular, resources seem empirically powerful (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995). Although it includes (among others) income and educational attainment, the resource dimension is overall less stratified than mere socioeconomic status.
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As a matter of fact, SES is not thought to cause participation immediately, but to form orientations and attitudes, which are in turn requisites to acts of participation (Milbrath 1965, 110). The basic rationale is that citizens of higher SES exhibit certain attitudes and behavior making them more likely to participate. They comprise of, for instance, greater political interest, knowledge, awareness and efficacy, greater exposure to political communication and to interaction with fellow citizens, and greater resources and civic skills (cf. Almond and Verba 1963, 380; Verba and Nie 1972, 126; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978). Such skills and orientation are crucial necessities to master the act of political participation. This implies that the more demanding participatory acts are the more important SES becomes.

Thereby, the SES model is closely tied to theories of stratification from sociology which assert the inherent nexus between social, political, and ruling class (Bendix and Lipset 1966). Together they share the idea that modern societies are divided by class and status hierarchies, and that these hierarchies dominate the political process (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995, 272). Despite advancements of other models in theoretically explaining participation, the SES model causes, therefore, still the greatest peril for political equality. With this normative challenge in mind, the discussion about introducing and extending direct democratic instruments becomes even more exciting. And it is against this background that the question arises how this bias fares in direct democracies. Do direct democratic institutions further skew participation and thus, as skeptics fear, stratify the electorate in terms of SES? Or do they mitigate social bias and thus, as proponents hope, promote political equality? We will consider both arguments in turn.

3.2.1 The fear of skeptics of direct democracy

On the one side, skeptics of direct democratic participation fear that the influence of SES becomes stronger in popular votes (Magleby 1984; Merkel 2010). This apprehension is mainly based on one theoretical and one empirical argument. The theoretical argument results from the fact that popular votes are often characterized by more complex matters. Citizens in purely representative systems merely decide which party or candidate to vote into office and have various heuristics and cues at hand (cf. Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954). Developing party or candidate preferences and voting accordingly is relatively simple. In direct democracies, however, matters of popular votes can range from complicated fiscal policy or infrastructure projects to moral politics or European integration. Here, preferences and decisions are not so obvious. In fact, it takes consid-

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7 However, some evidence exists that voters use party positions in popular votes as heuristics for their own decision (Bowler and Donovan 2002; Kang 2002).
erable resources to understand such complex issues and develop a preference for the most beneficial decision. Thus, participation in popular votes is much more demanding than in elections. It follows from the aforementioned argumentation of the SES model that the importance of SES should increase in the context of direct democracy. When faced with direct democratic choices, higher-SES citizens are still capable of mastering the participatory act, while lower-SES citizens are more likely to feel overstrained by the complexity (Walker 1966, 436). This can also be underscored by rational-choice theory. Higher-SES citizen don’t have to invest much more as they are already capable enough to participate. Yet they have potentially more to gain from participating as the result translates directly into policy without mediation of a representative entity. The cost-benefit ratio for lower-SES citizens is affected just to the opposite. They have to invest much more effort to develop clear preferences. Yet they are still uncertain about the benefits of the popular vote and have potentially more to lose than in a representative context. Furthermore, the empirical argument of skeptics results from the fact that turnout in popular votes is typically low. Trivially, SES has no influence at all if turnout is at 100 %. SES can only matter if a reasonable number of citizens abstain. Still it is not an inevitability that low turnout implies a social bias of the electorate (Hill and Leighley 1992). However, most research points to the fact that SES particularly matters in low-turnout elections (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). With turnout rates typically between 30 % and 50 %, it seems not surprising when Linder (2010, 113) states that “if participation is low […] the choir of Swiss direct democracy sings in upper- or middle-class tones.” Both arguments lead to the skeptics’ hypothesis:

H_1 The more direct democratic a context, the higher the effect of SES on political participation.

3.2.2 The hopes of proponents of direct democracy

Proponents of direct democracy, on the other side, invoke the educative potential of participation (Smith 2002). In their opinion, “direct forms of democracy could stimulate participation by energizing citizens with a sense of civic duty and political efficacy” (Smith and Tolbert 2004, 33). Particularly skills and orientation that lower-SES citizen lack according to the SES model can be learned through direct democratic institutions: “Direct democracy also offered the promise of a type of education not available in a book or a classroom—an education in democratic citizenship” (Dyck 2009, 540). The argumentation of proponents has also a theoretical as well as empirical side to it. In theoretical

Selb (2008) shows that the longer the ballot, the more difficult it is for voters to transfer their preferences into choices on the ballot.
terms, new institutionalism can provide a perspective in which institutions exert an educative effect on citizens (Hall and Taylor 1996). By shaping preferences and providing incentives, institutions can influence attitudinal and behavioral patterns of individuals (Sniderman and Levendusky 2007). Progressive Era reformers were among the first to ascribe such secondary effects to direct democratic institutions (cf. Smith and Tolbert 2004, 9). Endowed with the possibility and responsibility of direct law-making, citizens internalize the civic duty to participate in politics. In that process, they experience their efficacy and become active citizens. Besides, citizens in direct democracies are constantly and immediately exposed to political campaigns. Thus, they can hardly avoid the political information presented in ads, the media, or official brochures sent to them. With political topics frequently (and not only during election season) on the agenda, politics is also more common as subject of conversations with family, friends, and co-workers. Thereby, direct democratic campaigns can indeed foster political information and interest (Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000). And political advertising and information mobilize citizen to participation (Freedman, Franz and Goldstein 2004). So if participation, according to the SES model, is skewed then the enhancing effect of direct democracy on participation must also be skewed. In other words, “the lower educated have the most to gain from salient direct democracy contests in their states” (Tolbert, Bowen and Donovan 2009, 178). Empirically, the positive relationship of direct democracy and turnout is well-researched. Most studies find that direct democracy can indeed increase participation (Donovan, Tolbert and Smith 2009; Dyck and Seabrook 2010; Lacey 2005; Lassen 2005; Smith 2002; Smith and Tolbert 2004; Smith and Tolbert 2007; Tolbert, Bowen and Donovan 2009; with the exceptions of Everson 1981; Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010). So if turnout in direct democracies is higher, and higher-SES citizen participate anyway according to the SES model, it must be the lower-SES citizens who are mobilized. Hence, the influence of SES decreases. This leads to the proponents’ hypothesis:

**H2** The more direct democratic a context, the lower the effect of SES on political participation.

Finally, there could be, of course, no significant difference of SES influence between direct and non-direct democratic contexts. As this would neither support the hope of proponents, nor speak to the fears of skeptics of direct democracy, we explicate **H0** claiming no significant moderating effect of direct democracy.
3 Direct Democracy and Political Equality

Figure 3.1: Conceptual illustration of the analytical framework

3.3 Research Design

In the following we describe our methodological and analytical approach, as well as data sources and operationalization of variables. In order to test whether direct democracy increases or diminishes the effect of SES variables on political participation, we analyze individual data from the Swiss cantons. Since individuals are nested in cantonal settings we account for the hierarchical data structure (and the fact that individuals within contexts are assumed to be more similar than between contexts) by estimating multi-level models (Gelman and Hill 2007). Analytically speaking, we analyze the relationship between independent variables of SES and the dependent variable of political participation, which is moderated by an intervening variable of direct democracy. This implies including a multiplicative interaction term between SES and direct democracy. Figure 3.1 illustrates the conceptual relationship. Of particular interest for the hypotheses is the significance of the cross-level interactions. Following Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) the analysis of multiplicative interaction terms can be tricky with regard to statistical significance and is hence done best through graphical presentation. Unlike Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), we do not however care so much whether (or when) the effect of SES is significant conditional on the extent of direct democracy. But we are rather interested whether effects of SES differ significantly conditional on the extent of direct democracy. In order to test this, we estimate first differences based on repeated simulations of our models and compare SES effects in the least and most direct democratic context (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000). Following such informal Bayesian approach, the simulation procedure draws repeatedly and randomly coefficient vectors and resid-
3 Direct Democracy and Political Equality

ual standard deviations. This results in distributions of simulated parameters, which are particularly useful to convey uncertainty of estimates in interaction models (Gelman and Hill 2007, 142). For these reasons, we focus our analysis on the graphical display of marginal effects and first differences instead of interpreting coefficients and standard errors of the models.

For our analysis we use individual survey data from the latest Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects) 2011. The Selects studies are part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) network. They are conducted through computer assisted telephone interviews (CA TI) after each Swiss National Elections. The data set consists of 4,391 respondents in 26 cantons. In our analysis, the Selects survey serves as data set for the independent variables of SES, the dependent variable of political participation, and individual control variables. Appendix 3.2 lists all variables, their operationalization and data sources. Regarding operationalization, we use three independent variables widely and most commonly associated with SES: educational attainment, income, and occupational prestige measured through the Standard Index of Occupational Prestige Scale by Treiman (1977). Although they are usually highly correlated, we employ the SES variables separately (instead of forming an index for instance) to be able to detect distinct effects. That way we get a more fine-grained picture of each variable, whereas a single index could obscure single effects. All three variables are standardized following the recommendation by (Gelman and Hill 2007, 96). This produces results on a more coherent scale and allows better comparison between independent variables. The dependent variable of political participation is measured as the reported participation rate (ranging from 0 to 10) in federal popular votes. These popular votes on the national level are independent from and unrelated with cantonal direct democracy. This unique feature makes Switzerland such a valuable case as it allows us to analyze at the same time educative effects of direct democratic institutions (in cantons), which is precisely

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9 Specifically, the residual standard deviation \( \sigma \) is simulated by randomly drawing \( X \) in \( \hat{\sigma} \sqrt{(n - k)/X} \) from the \( \chi^2 \) distribution with \( n - k \) degrees of freedom. The coefficient vector \( \beta \) is then simulated from a multivariate normal distribution with mean \( \hat{\beta} \) and variance matrix \( \sigma^2 V_\beta \) (Gelman and Hill 2007, 143).

10 The survey draws primarily on a nationally representative sample. In small cantons, numbers of observations are additionally raised to about 100, in the selected cantons Zurich, Ticino, and Geneva to about 600 (Lutz 2012, 81).

11 Information on summary statistics of variables is available in Appendix 3.3.

12 The wording of the question reads: “In addition to elections, we have also popular votes on issues. Assume there are 10 federal popular votes in a given year. In how many of these 10 do you normally participate?”
what proponents of direct democracy are so fond of, and (federal) direct democratic
participation, which is precisely what skeptics of direct democracy are so critical of.\footnote{Appendix 3.1 gives an overview of participation rates in federal popular votes per canton. Ranging between 39\% in Glarus and 63\% in Schaffhausen, levels of participation are comparable to national turnout in the last federal election (48.5\%) as well as turnout in (local) popular votes in other European. Besides, level of turnout and variation between cantons seem ideal to investigate potential bias of participation regarding SES due to cantonal contexts of direct democracy.}

Direct democratic institutions in cantons serve as a moderating variable. Just as studies of the USA differentiate between presence and use of initiatives (e.g. Boehmke and Bowen 2010; Dyck 2009), we, too, take formal and procedural conceptions of direct democracy into account. Swiss citizens have both initiatives and referendums at their disposal. Institutional configurations of these instruments, however, vary substantially from canton to canton. While in some cantons barriers to evoke initiatives and referendums are low suggesting permissive formal rules of direct democracy, in others the requirements are so high that the political system is much more oriented toward representation (Vatter 2002). To measure formal rules of direct democracy, we calculate an index suggested by Stutzer (1999).\footnote{This index combines degrees of openness for each of the four direct democratic institutions: the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, the legislative referendum, and the fiscal referendum. Values between one and six reflect the legal requirements for each institution in terms of required signatures, time period to collect signatures, in the case of the legislative referendum, whether it is optional or mandatory, and for fiscal referendums, the financial threshold. The resulting four sub-indices are averaged into one index. For coding schemes and thresholds see Stutzer (1999).} For actual use of direct democracy, we draw on the yearly average of all cantonal popular votes (on initiatives and referendums) from 2006 to 2009. We use the logarithm because the distribution is highly skewed and, in substantial terms, because we assume ceiling effects when the number of popular votes gets large. Data for both operationalizations come from a data set by Schaub and Dlabac (2012).\footnote{Cantonal values for direct democracy are available in Appendix 3.1.} Although not entirely independent, formal rules and actual use of direct democracy are not highly correlated in the Swiss case (Barankay, Sciarini and Trechsel 2003). Moreover, in both conceptions of direct democracy the subnational entities exhibit substantial variation that ranges from almost purely direct democratic to almost purely representative. At the same time they are still within the same national political system; hence, “there are many characteristics which they have in common, and which may therefore be treated as constants” (Lijphart 2002, 14). In sum, this emphasizes the benefits of the Swiss case for investigating consequences of direct democracy. Moreover it can also be considered a convenient place to study consequences of SES. Unlike other European countries Switzerland still exhibits substantial socioeconomic inequalities between classes (Linder 2010, 34).
In our models we control for gender and age of respondents, both of which affect participation in popular votes in Switzerland (Mottier 1993). Recently and in contrast to the procedure of including a long list of variables, it has been pointed out in the literature that only control variables previous to and thus unaffected by the treatment can be used meaningfully (Morton and Williams 2010, 122). There is another reason why we opt to start our analysis with such parsimonious models. Complicating the models is likely to reduce the variance explained by the cross-level interaction term and makes it, thus, less likely to find significant differences of SES effects. In other words, we give proponents and skeptics a better chance to prove their hypothesis right. If we do not observe significant differences even in the parsimonious models, we can confidently reject both hypotheses.

Nevertheless we follow up on our results, of course, with some robustness tests and additional analyses. First, we estimate random-slope models allowing the effect to vary across the groups of the independent SES variable. Second, we include further control variables that are found to be significant on the individual (cf. Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010) and contextual level (cf. Freitag 2005) in Switzerland: political interest and satisfaction with economy, marital status, as well as compulsory voting in the canton Schaffhausen (dummy), and population density. Third, we replicate our models with a previous data set for the year 2007. And fourth, we also consider political participation in elections as dependent variable. Most studies on the educative effect actually test how direct democracy influences participation in elections since it is usually not possible to disentangle the direct democratic context from direct democratic participation. Although this hypothesis might seem more stretched than in the case of participation in popular votes, we test this potential spill-over and estimate the cross-level effect for participation in elections (implying logit models). Accounting for potential flaws of the dependent variable we, finally, conduct one more test. If SES indeed affects participation differently in direct democratic and representative settings, we should observe a different composition of the electorates with regard to SES. Therefore, we compare on the one hand percentages of participants among groups with higher- and lower-SES, and between popular votes and representative elections on the other. The electorate of the latter comprises again of respondents in the Selects survey who reported voting in the last federal election. But to analyze the electorate of the former, we have to make use of another survey data set (since the item in the Selects data does not allow clearly distinguishing

\[16\] Since 1904, cantonal laws in Schaffhausen charge non-voters merely a symbolic fine. Nevertheless, participation is on average slightly higher than in other cantons. The adoption of compulsory is not related to direct democratic rules or practices.
voters from non-voters). Therefore, we pool data from the VoxIt surveys during the same legislative term, which are carried out after each federal popular vote.\footnote{Unfortunately, there is no indicator of occupational prestige in the VoxIt surveys. Hence, we only compare educational attainment and income, and recode the Selects data to the VoxIt categories.} If the ratio of higher- and lower-SES citizens between the electorates does not differ, we can reasonably conclude that direct democracy does not affect the influence of SES.

### 3.4 Results

In this section we present the findings of our analysis on the moderating effect of direct democracy. We discuss first and briefly the models and coefficients in general, second the marginal effects, and third, first differences between least and most direct democratic cantons. The interactions between three independent SES variables and two moderating variables of direct democracy imply six different models. Table 3.1 shows the results of the multi-level models. As can be seen the models are fairly similar. Information criterions and context variances are within the same range. Models 1 through 3 with formal rules as direct democracy variable seem to reduce context variance slightly further than with actual use. Models 2, 3 and 5, 6 fare slightly better based on information criteria than models 1 and 4 with education as SES variable. Regarding control variables, age has in all models a positive and significant effect; sex has no significant effect. Main effects of each SES variable are positive and significant (when direct democracy equals zero); while main effects of the two direct democracy variables are negatively signed without reaching significance (when SES equals zero, i.e. the mean of the unstandardized variable), except in model 2. Interaction terms are positive and not significant either.

As Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), however, convincingly demonstrate it is neither possible to interpret coefficients when the main effect is not zero nor to judge significance plainly based on standard errors. Therefore, we compute marginal effects. Figure 3.2 illustrates plots for all six interaction terms. The interpretation then is straightforward. The ordinate of the function represents the joint effect on political participation given the extent of the moderating variable. Since lines and corresponding intervals in all plots are above zero SES apparently matters significantly for participation irrespective the degree of direct democracy. This applies to education, income, and occupational prestige as well as to both conceptions of direct democracy. In other words, citizen with higher SES participate more in popular votes no matter how direct democratic their canton.

Our research question though is still a different one. We are in fact interested in the change of the effect, i.e. do SES effects differ given the degree of direct democracy? Pos-
### Table 3.1: Multi-level models of participation rate in popular votes (0-10)

<table>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.015*</td>
<td>5.833*</td>
<td>5.840*</td>
<td>5.877*</td>
<td>5.608*</td>
<td>5.681*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.271)</td>
<td>(0.304)</td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
<td>(0.233)</td>
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<td>(0.271)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.045*</td>
<td>0.043*</td>
<td>0.038*</td>
<td>0.045*</td>
<td>0.042*</td>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
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<td>-0.127</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
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<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SES: Education</td>
<td>0.544*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.572*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
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<td>(0.109)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SES: Income</td>
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<td>0.412*</td>
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<td>0.463*</td>
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<td>DD: Formal rules</td>
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<td>-0.060</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD: Actual use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction SES*DD</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
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<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.040</td>
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<td>21,256</td>
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<td>18,134</td>
<td>21,307</td>
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<td>3,617</td>
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<td>Number of groups</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses  * p<0.1
Figure 3.2: Marginal effect-plots of participation conditional on direct democracy (basic models). Dashed lines illustrate 95% confidence intervals; blue lines illustrate 100 (out of 1,000) simulations of the interaction term based on model calculations.

Positive slopes of the marginal effect in Figure 3.2 indicate that the effect of SES increases when the context is more direct democratic. But it is hard to judge at first sight whether this increase is significant. After all, the width of confidence intervals (dashed lines) and the variation of the simulations (blue lines) seem to allow also for constant or decreasing marginal effects. So to test our hypotheses, we calculate first differences. They are precisely the differences between the effects in the most and the least direct democratic cantons. To convey the uncertainty associated with our estimates, we make use of simulations of our models as described in the previous Section. By deducting the vector containing 1,000 simulated coefficient estimates at the minimum value of direct democracy from the vector at the maximum value, we get again a vector of the difference. If the distribution of this vector contains zero, there is no significant difference between SES effects given the degree of direct democracy. Figure 3.3 illustrates this procedure in the left graph by displaying the distributions (including means, 95% intervals and outliers) of the simulated coefficient estimates for the lowest and highest direct democracy scores respectively. The resulting first differences with 95% intervals are displayed in the right graph of Figure 3.3. It is obvious that the difference includes 0 and is thus not significant.
3 Direct Democracy and Political Equality

Figure 3.3: First differences of simulated coefficient estimates between most and least direct democratic cantons. Distributions are illustrated by mean (circle), 95% interval (lines), and outliers (small dots).

in any of the models. Neither the skeptics’ nor the proponents’ hypothesis find support. Direct democracy does not increase the influence of SES on participation. And direct democracy does not mitigate it by stimulating lower-SES citizen.

3.5 Robustness and Additional Analyses

As indicated above, the models thus far are almost audaciously parsimonious. We do have reason to believe that potential differences are more likely to be found in parsimonious models as more variance of the dependent variable is left to be explained by the interaction term. In other words, skeptics and proponents are given better odds to find evidence. To be sure, however, we check the robustness of our findings and conduct additional analyses. Due to space constraints, we limit the presentation to the first differences plots, which are of primary interest. First, we allow the effect to vary not only across direct democratic contexts, but across SES groups as well by modeling random-slope models. Second, we control for further individual and contextual variables that are assumed to affect political participation, namely political interest, satisfaction with the economy, marital status, as
Figure 3.4: First difference-plots for models with random-slope and control variables. Distributions are illustrated by mean (circle), 95% interval (lines), and outliers (small dots). For graph on the left, Prestige and Income of Actual use are not based on model simulations, but normal distribution with estimated parameters.

well as compulsory voting, and population density.\textsuperscript{18} Figure 3.4 shows the resulting first differences.

Again, it is clear that no significant differences exist between SES effects in the most and least direct democratic cantons even after allowing for random-slopes or controlling for other variables. In fact, it seems as if any (insignificant) differences in the previous models decrease even further. Not only tend intervals to be even wider, but means, particularly for the formal dimension of direct democracy, become virtually zero. This would justify our argument for parsimonious models. But more importantly it strengthens the finding that the influence of SES does not change. We are aware though that our cross-sectional analysis only considers one specific point in time. Third, we therefore replicate the analysis with the data set from the previous election 2007. The left graph in Figure 3.5 shows that there is no significant difference to be found, either, based on this additional data. While the interaction between formal rules and income almost reaches significance, this is probably a data-driven result given the overall pattern.

\textsuperscript{18} Sometimes the cultural context is discussed as influential factor for political participation (cf. Freitag and Stadelmann-Steen 2010). Accordingly, we also considered controlling for the share of Catholics in a canton and for the German and Roman-language regions. But including these variables together with other controls renders simulation of the models impossible (possibly due to multicorrelation). Using the two cultural variables instead of our control variables generates virtually the same results, however.
One valid objection to our analysis might be that we are focusing on participation in direct democratic votes (although on the federal level) instead of voting behavior in elections. As a matter of fact, most of the proponents’ arguments and evidence apply to stimulating participation in elections. Fourth, we therefore analyze participation in the previous parliamentary election as dependent variable. The right part of Figure 3.5 illustrates this relationship. The result is quite similar. There is still no significant difference to be observed (even though the first difference for formal rules and education only just includes zero). Interestingly, in the case of elections the patterns slightly differ with formal rules tending to increase and actual use tending to decrease the effect of SES.

Unfortunately, the measure of participation in popular votes is not entirely unproblematic for two reasons in particular. First, resembling a civic duty to participate, the question might be prone to social desirability, which (even worse) could again depend on SES (Bowler and Donovan 2012). Using a specific data set including personality variables, Heidelberger (2013, 12) shows, however, that answering this question is not related to susceptibility to social desirability, thus alleviating such concerns. Second, since respondents have to recall their participation rate it is conceivable that they confound participating in both cantonal and federal popular votes. To account for this potential flaw, we finally compare the electorate of popular votes using pooled VoxIt data to the electorate of federal elections. If the influence of SES is indeed no different in direct than in representative democracy then electorates of popular votes and elections should be
indistinguishable in terms of SES. Table 3.2 compares the shares of voters in the lowest and the highest SES category. It confirms both findings from the previous analysis. On the one side, SES does matter for participation in elections as well as in popular votes. Citizens with high income and high education participate in large numbers, while citizens with low income and little education mostly refrain from participating. On the other side, however, this bias is neither better nor worse in popular votes than in representative elections. Differences of this bias are only marginal as indicated by the difference and the value of representational bias. In fact, popular votes are actually even less biased in terms of income. To sum up, considering all the evidence of our analyses, we are fairly confident to reject both hypotheses $H_1$ and $H_2$.

3.6 Conclusion

This paper juxtaposes two positions in the recently heated debate on direct democracy. On the one side, skeptics fear that due to the complexity of issues, citizens with high SES are more inclined to participate in direct democracies, thus increasing political inequality. On the other side, proponents invoke the educative effect of participatory institutions, which should particularly stimulate citizens with low SES to participate, thus decreasing social bias of the electorate. Thereby, this study constitutes the first systematical comparison between direct and representative democracy in terms of SES influence on participation. So does SES matter more or less in direct democracy? To test both arguments empirically, we computed cross-level interactions of SES and direct democracy variables and estimated their marginal effect on political participation. We used data from the Swiss cantons that provide a unique case for analyzing direct democratic contexts. Results of our series of analyses are unambiguous. There is no evidence that SES affects participation in direct democracies significantly more or less than in representative systems. This finding may serve both as relief for skeptics as well as disappointment for enthusiasts of direct democracy.

To conclude, we seize this finding to discuss, first, opportunities for future studies adding to our analysis, and second, implications of our results for legitimacy and political equality of direct democracy in general. We were eager to check robustness and replicability of our results by thoroughly testing additional specifications and data. Thus, we are fairly confident about our findings. Nevertheless, at least two caveat may be warranted and provide starting points for further investigation. On the one hand, we are aware that our analysis is confined to one country, Switzerland. While this sub-national design has many merits (as discussed above), it makes us cautious about transferring
the findings to other contexts. Ever since Almond and Verba (1963) pointed out the
important fit between political culture and political system, we should bear in mind
that direct democratic institutions, too, require some sort of direct democratic culture.
Hence, introducing direct democracy in a completely different context might lead, at
least initially, to different results. In this regard, we would like to invite more studies
replicating our analysis in other countries or internationally, thereby fostering external
validity of our findings. On the other hand, our cross-sectional design does not allow us
to assess causality. However, the arguments do not rely so much on causal claims. And
more importantly, there is no reason to believe that the adoption of direct democratic
institutions would be endogenous to (or affected by) the state of SES in a canton (Linder
2010, 32). It would be nevertheless interesting to apply different designs in order to
better assess the causal effect of direct democracy. Qualitative analyses and longitudinal
or experimental research designs could use our findings as point of departure and further
the understanding of the underlying causal link.

A second concluding remark concerns implications for legitimacy. Even though the
influence of SES is not worse compared to representative democracy, the analysis shows
that SES does matter. Citizens with higher education, income, and occupational prestige
are more likely to participate in direct democratic votes than others. What does this im-
ply for input and output legitimacy of direct democratic institutions? In terms of input
legitimacy, political inequality poses serious shortcomings as commonly discussed in the
context of representative democracy (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978).
Yet, institutional responses to alleviate political inequality are less common. Recently
in fact, some scholars warn against simply pursing higher rates of participation with-
out considering consistency and sophistication of preferences (Selb and Lachat 2009).
Though, again similar to Kriesi’s (2005) argument that only the most capable partici-
3 Direct Democracy and Political Equality

participate in direct democracy, it emphasizes the need of widespread education of civic skills. Political equality in direct democracies cannot be achieved solely by increasing turnout, but it has to be ensured that all citizens are indeed able to form their preferences in a consistent and informed manner. Actually, Lutz (2007) is able to demonstrate that little information held by voters biases the outcome of popular votes more than turnout. In light of the significant influence of SES, the question regarding output legitimacy of direct democratic institutions arises, too. Does direct democracy produce outcomes that are unfair toward some citizens? Obviously, since voters can decide directly upon issues (without mitigation of a representative system), the peril becomes more aggravated that they choose policies that favor only them at the cost of non-voters. With our analysis of what affects participation, we cannot provide evidence on this question. There is, however, some research analyzing outcomes of direct democratic processes. On the one side, Matsusaka (2004) for instance finds that policy changes by initiatives in the USA are always favored by the majority of voters and non-voters alike. Vatter (2011) reports direct democracy in Switzerland to be able to protect minority rights against curtailment. These findings are complemented with anecdotal evidence from Swiss popular votes, which rather unusually turn out against political have-nots. Apparently, political have who vote in direct democracy are able to take preferences of political have-nots into account. On the other side, other studies show that direct democracy can indeed yield harmful outcomes for minorities (Haider-Markel, Querze and Lindaman 2007; Moore and Ravishankar 2012). Considering these mixed results, there is obviously a need for further systematical research on the question how lower-SES citizens and non-voters fare in direct democracies.
Abstract

This study investigates the relationship between direct democracy and political trust. We suggest a solution to the controversy in research centering on positive versus negative effects of direct democracy by analytically differentiating between the availability of direct democratic rights and the actual use of those rights. Theoretically, greater availability of direct democratic rights may enhance political trust by increasing citizens' perception that political authorities can be controlled as well as by incentivizing political authorities to act trustworthy. In contrast, the actual use of the corresponding direct democratic instruments may initiate distrust as it signals to citizens that political authorities do not act in the public’s interest. We test both hypotheses for the very first time with sub-national data of Switzerland. The empirical results seem to support our theoretical arguments.

* This chapter is identical to a manuscript, which I co-authored with Paul C. Bauer. It was accepted for publication and is forthcoming as Bauer and Fatke (Forthcoming). First and foremost, my gratitude goes to my co-author Paul C. Bauer. Also, I'd like to thank Markus Freitag, Adrian Vatter and Marc Bühlmann for valuable feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript as well as the editors and anonymous reviewers of the Swiss Political Science Review for their comments and suggestions.
4 Direct Democracy and Political Trust

4.1 Introduction

Can direct democracy enhance citizens’ trust in political authorities or does it indeed initiate distrust (Dyck 2009)? The concept of political trust has been the subject of numerous studies and its supposed decline is an evergreen in the public debate (Levi and Stoker 2000). Moreover, trust is regarded as an essential resource for the functioning of democratic systems as it “provides leaders more leeway to govern effectively and institutions a larger store of support regardless of the performance of those running the government” (Hetherington 1998, 803).\(^1\) Or put more metaphorically, “political trust functions as the glue that keeps the system together and as the oil that lubricates the policy machine” (van der Meer and Dekker 2011, 95). In recent years scholars as well as commentators were quick to diagnose a lack of trust in political authorities (cf. Norris 2011), be it due to the financial crisis, political scandals, lack of accountability, or a political system that fails to give citizens a voice.

In this respect, participatory democrats and proponents of direct democracy invoke that citizens can be “educated” by direct democratic institutions (Smith and Tolbert 2004), in a sense that people in direct democracies participate more in politics (Dyck and Seabrook 2010; Tolbert and Bowen 2008; Tolbert, Grummel and Smith 2001; Tolbert and Smith 2005), are more socially engaged (Boehmke and Bowen 2010; Tolbert, McNeal and Smith 2003), protest less (Fatke and Freitag 2013), show more interest and knowledge in politics, and are more supportive and efficacious (Bowler and Donovan 2002; Bühllmann 2007; Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000; Schlozman and Yohai 2008; Tolbert, McNeal and Smith 2003; also contrary Dyck and Lascher Jr. 2009). This suggests that increasing people’s influence in politics promises to be a cure against the current crisis of democracy (Cain, Dalton and Scarrow 2003). But can direct democracy really “repair the frayed ties” between citizens and political authorities (Citrin 1996, 268)?

Recently, researchers lay greater focus on the impact of context for political trust (Zmerli and Hooghe 2011). In view of the relevance of the relationship between direct democracy and political trust, it is thus even more surprising how little research has been carried through so far that actually tests the influence of direct democracy on political trust. Indeed, to our knowledge only three empirical studies can be found:\(^2\) Hug (2005) presents a macro-analysis of 15 post-communist countries and finds no significant relationship; Citrin (1996) and Dyck (2009) analyze data from the United States whereas Citrin finds no difference in aggregate trust between initiative and non-initiative states.

\(^1\) Cf. Sztompka (1999, 156) and a recent study by Marien and Hooghe (2011) for further arguments.
\(^2\) Despite the title of their book chapter, Smith and Tolbert (2004) analyze rather external political efficacy.
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Dyck in fact reports a negative influence of direct democracy on political trust. Hence, he contradicts the optimistic expectations of participatory democrats. In general, empirical studies so far have been limited to the USA (and some Eastern European countries).

Therefore, we want to shed further light on the relationship and suggest an answer to the controversy between direct democratic promises and the negative (or, at least, ambiguous) empirical evidence. First, we argue that controversial scholarly positions might to some extent be based on different conceptions of direct democracy. A first conception focuses on the institutional barriers to the use of direct democratic instruments. A second conception focuses on the actual use of direct democratic instruments. For both of these conceptions of direct democracy we expect different effects on political trust.

Second, we investigate this relationship for the very first time in a country considered to be the most direct democratic country in the World, Switzerland. With both a long tradition and a wide array (and variation) of direct democratic instruments, the Swiss cantons provide ideal grounds for our empirical analyses.

The article is organized as follows: We start by presenting the two concepts that are of interest here, direct democracy and political trust in the Swiss context. Next, we outline and explain the mechanism between those two concepts, in other words why one should expect direct democracy to increase or decrease political trust. Subsequently, we elaborate on the operationalization of concepts, discuss potential confounding factors and present our methodological approach. Afterwards, we present our empirical results as well as robustness checks and some further analyses. Finally, our findings will be summarized and discussed in the conclusion.

4.2 Direct Democracy and Political Trust

Direct democracy and political trust are widely-studied concepts in political science. In its most basic sense, trust is a relational concept in that it exists between a truster and a trustee, and the former makes herself vulnerable to the latter since the trustee has the capacity to do her harm or betray her. Trust is seldom unconditional in that it is “given to specific individuals or institutions over specific domains” (Levi and Stoker 2000, 476). Trust judgments generally reflect beliefs about the trustworthiness of the trustee. Trustworthiness can be generally equated with a trustee’s commitment to act in the truster’s interest (Levi and Stoker 2000, 476; cf. also Hardin 2002). Political trust, a sub-concept of trust, can be conceived as a judgment made by an individual with regard to a specific political actor or institution, for example governments, parties and administrations (Levi and Stoker 2000). In sum, political trust then can be understood
as an individual's expectation that a political actor will act in her interest. Generally, it is important to differentiate different targets of political trust. For instance, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 15 et seq.) investigated attitudes toward different political institutions and lamented that explanations of (the crisis of) confidence in the political system display a major deficiency, namely the inattention to components of the political system. Empirically, trust levels differ considerably across sub-national entities and for different political institutions (Freitag 2001). Thus, differentiating between institutions as well as sub-national entities seems essential. Since we compare cantons, trust in cantonal authorities is the variable of interest in our analysis.

Direct democracy, our explanatory variable, is an inherent feature of the Swiss political system. In fact, Switzerland with its long tradition of direct democratic participation is often considered to be the most direct democratic state in the World (Schmitter and Trechsel 2004). Swiss citizens have a wide array of direct democratic instruments at their disposal to decide directly on issues through popular votes. On the cantonal level, these instruments consist of the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, the legislative referendum (in optional and mandatory form), and the fiscal referendum (also in optional and mandatory form). The specific configurations of these direct democratic rights, however, vary substantially from canton to canton. Institutional barriers to a direct democratic process are the number of signatures needed, the respective time span allotted to launch initiatives and optional referendums, as well as the financial threshold for fiscal referendums. Whereas in some cantons these barriers are low, facilitating the exercise of direct democratic rights, in other cantons the requirements are so high that direct democratic processes are hardly possible.

3 Regarding the origins of political trust, Mishler and Rose (2001) refer to two large theoretical traditions. On the one hand, cultural theories hypothesize that trust in political authorities is exogenous with regard to political variables. Accordingly, these theories assume that political trust is generated outside of the political sphere. People have beliefs that are based on cultural norms which they have learned during early-life socialization (Mishler and Rose 2001). For instance, scholars like Putnam (1993) and Inglehart (1997) argue that political trust is an extension of interpersonal trust that is projected onto political authorities. On the other hand, institutional theories hypothesize that political trust is politically endogenous and a consequence of the performance of political authorities (Mishler and Rose 2001). This is, obviously, much in line with the reasoning of neo-institutionalism. Citizens evaluate performance more or less rationally. Political authorities that do not perform well generate distrust; political authorities that perform well generate trust.

4 Well known is also the debate about the meaning of the decline of trust in government in the United States. Miller (1974) and Citrin (1974) argued whether this decline mirrored a rejection of the political system and the institution “government” per se or rather a rejection of the incumbent government. This debate emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between regime and the authorities, but failed to acknowledge the different “vital objects of support” in modern political systems namely political institutions (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 16).
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However, extensive direct democratic rights do not necessarily imply that the corresponding instruments are frequently used by citizens. Although neither institutional barriers nor use of direct democratic instruments can be viewed as entirely independent (Eder, Vatter and Freitag 2009), they are not highly correlated with one another in the Swiss case (Barankay, Sciarini and Trechsel 2003; Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter 2012). When investigating the relationship between direct democracy and political trust, it is crucial to take this distinction into account. Reflecting the nuanced conception of institutions as both “rules-in-form” as well as “rules-in-use” (Sproule-Jones 1993), we also differentiate between the formal institutional rights and the actual use of direct democratic instruments in our analysis. Especially, with regard to their impact on citizens’ attitudes and evaluations, the theoretical arguments differ fundamentally as we will outline below.

4.3 Theory and Hypotheses

Whether direct democracy has a positive or negative (or, for that matter, no) effect on trust is, of course, ultimately an empirical question. Nevertheless, differences in theoretical predictions and ambiguous empirical evidence may be due to different conceptions of direct democracy. As noted earlier it is important to make a distinction between the availability of direct democratic rights and the actual use of the corresponding direct democratic instruments. It seems worthwhile considering these conceptions separately and discussing in what way these conceptions are related to political trust. Moreover, we take the above mentioned distinction between the individual truster and the trustee (the cantonal authorities) into account when arguing how individual political trust is affected by direct democracy.\(^5\)

4.3.1 Availability of direct democratic rights and political trust

How does the institutional availability of direct democratic rights affect the trust relation between citizens and political authorities? As noted previously, direct democratic instruments may enhance citizens’ control of and influence on political authorities. Departing

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\(^5\) In doing so, we depart from a neo-institutional perspective, which focuses explicitly on the relation between institutions and individuals (Huckfeldt, Plutzer and Sprague 1993). In that sense, institutions offer and alter incentive structures that in turn affect individual behavior and preferences (Kaiser 1997, 421; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995, 43). Put differently, individuals form their preferences within a contextual framework of institutions that incentivize behavior (Hall 1986; Immergut 1998; Offe 2006). Hence, direct democratic institutions adopt the role of explanatory variables affecting individuals.
from a veto player perspective Hug and Tsebelis (2002) analyze multi-dimensional models and show that the availability of direct democratic instruments enhances the agenda-setting power of the median voter. Elaborating further on this argument, Hug (2004) investigates policy consequences of direct democracy and argues that policies are closer to the median voter’s preferences than without direct democratic instruments present. This, as Hug (2005) claims, should also manifest itself in higher levels of political trust because policies in direct democracies are more in line with the voters’ wishes. Similarly, Citrin (1996, 286) hypothesizes that initiatives and referenda impel governments to revise their policies so as to take account of majority opinion and that doing so ultimately raises the public’s trust in established institutions.

Hence, extensive direct democratic rights enhance a citizen’s role as a veto player in the political process. Whereas political authorities in purely representative democracies are not that closely tied to their citizens as they can only be voted out of office at the end of the legislative turn, by contrast in direct democracies citizens can keep their agents on a much shorter leash. More precisely, availability of direct democratic rights should affect both truster and trustee in the trust relation. Directly, the truster perceives that she has a better capability to control the trustee. Put differently, extensive direct democratic rights give citizens the perception of ability to ensure the trustee’s commitment to act in the interest of the truster. With such instruments at hand, citizens as principal in the democratic process are aware that they can make sure that their agent acts the way they want him to. The result is a more favorable trust judgment.  

Second, there is an indirect effect via the trustee. The trustee may anticipate the possibility of control and corrections by the truster and accordingly behaves more trustworthy. Hence, extensive direct democratic rights do not only affect the truster directly, they also provide an incentive for the trustee to behave more trustworthy and to act in the interest of the truster. As a result political authorities should be more responsive when direct democratic rights are available in the sense that they anticipate citizens’ preferences and take them into account in their policy-making and political decisions (Papadopoulos 2001). Increased trustworthiness by the trustee should, in turn, positively influence the trust judgment by the truster. Just as van der Meer and Dekker

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6 Underscoring this connection, Bühlmann (2007, 244) concludes in his study that already the mere presence of direct democratic rights (and not their actual use) has an effect on political support. Moreover, Bernhard and Bühlmann (2011) find that direct democratic rights increase political efficacy and Scheidegger and Staerké (2011) find that the perceived political powerlessness is related to political trust.

7 Akin to this logic it is argued that direct democratic rights result in less mismanagement, less corruption and less abuse of power (Citrin 1996). Moreover, Kirchgässner, Feld and Savioz (1999) find that there is less public spending, less public debt, and higher GDP in direct democracies. Similarly, Freitag and Vatter (2000) show a positive effect of direct democracy on economic perfor-
(2011) link trustworthy behavior of the state to the subjective evaluation by trusting citizens, it seems reasonable that a successful trust relation as such facilitates a virtuous circle of trustworthiness and trust development. All in all this leads us to hypothesize: The more extensive direct democratic rights in a canton, the higher political trust should be (H1).

4.3.2 Actual use of direct democratic rights and political trust

As we outlined before, the positive effect of direct democratic rights does not necessarily apply to the actual use of these rights. Above we argued that the mere possibility to sanction the trustee via direct democratic instruments can enable a trust relationship between citizens and political authorities. These sanctioning instruments of the principal hang over the agent like the metaphorical “Sword of Damocles.” However, just with any trust relation, the trust relation between citizens and political authorities suffers if the truster observes the necessity of her sanctions. Hence, frequent use of direct democratic instruments should have the opposite effect than the mere availability thereof.

Again, the actual use should affect both the truster directly, as well as indirectly via the trustee. First, the direct effect on the truster is precisely that citizens, who frequently observe sanctioning of political authorities through the application of direct democratic instruments gain the belief that their agents do not act how they are supposed to since direct democratic processes are obviously necessary to correct their actions. In short, political authorities that need correction cannot be trusted. To this point Citrin (1996, 286) notes that the application of direct democratic instruments decreases the authority of elected officials. Perceiving the necessity of sanctions despite the very existence of such a “Sword of Damocles” intensifies the disappointment by citizens as the trust they have put in to their political authorities by voting them into office is betrayed (Dyck 2009, 544).

Second, frequent use of direct democratic instruments affects the trustee, too. If political authorities are constantly sanctioned and corrected they do not feel the same obligation to honor the trust of being voted into office. They might simply follow their own agenda rather than acting trustworthily toward their citizens. Moreover, the implementation of direct legislation is generally beyond the influence of citizens. Political authorities can therefore “steal” initiatives at the implementation stage (Gerber et al. 2013). Generally, such positive effects of direct democracy are crucial for the citizens’ perception of government performance, which in turn could positively affect political trust.

Even if political authorities are more responsive as a result of these institutions this might have a negative effect. Acknowledging higher responsiveness through direct democracy, “citizens become more aware that without their input, elected representatives shirk” (Dyck 2009, 546).
4 Direct Democracy and Political Trust

2001). Obviously, citizens perceiving this dilution lose trust as a consequence. As repercussion on the citizens, untrustworthy behavior by political authorities inhibits any successful trust relation with the citizenry. Instead, a setting of frequent votes on initiatives and referendums widens the scope and intensity of political conflict between citizens and political authorities (Dyck 2009, 545). In sum, we hypothesize that there is a negative effect of the actual use of direct democratic instruments: The more extensive the actual use of direct democratic instruments in a canton, the lower political trust should be (H2).

4.4 Research Design

Before turning to the empirical investigation, we briefly outline how the concepts are measured and present other individual as well as contextual factors that should be controlled for. Appendix 4.1 summarizes the operationalization of all variables, Appendix 4.2 provides descriptive statistics.

Political trust in cantonal authorities is measured with the following question: “I will read the names of some important institutions and organizations to you. Please tell me each time, how much trust you have in this institution, if ‘0’ means ‘no trust’ and ‘10’ means ‘complete trust’.” Respondents can then choose how much trust they have in “cantonal authorities” on an 11-point scale. We measure the availability of direct democratic rights with an index calculated by Fischer (2009). First suggested by Stutzer (1999), this index considers availability and barriers for each of the four direct democratic instruments in the Swiss cantons: the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, the legislative referendum, and the fiscal referendum. Values between one and six reflect the legal requirements for each instrument in terms of required signatures, time period to collect signatures, in the case of the legislative referendum, whether it is optional or mandatory, and for fiscal referendums, the financial threshold. The resulting four sub-indices are averaged into one index.9

The second conception, the actual use of direct democratic instruments, is measured by averaging the number of all cantonal initiatives and optional referendums per year from 2002 to 2006 (Année politique Suisse). The number of mandatory referendums is deliberately excluded from the measure as it does not fit to our theoretical argument: An institutionally required and automatically triggered referendum can hardly be perceived

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9 Some cantons require many signatures, offer only a short time period in which to collect them, do not have a mandatory (only an optional) legislative referendum, and a high financial threshold. Such cantons thus exhibit high legal requirements and score low (i.e. close to one) on the index of direct democracy. Cantons with low legal requirements score high (i.e. close to six). Coding for thresholds and corresponding index points is described in detail by Stutzer and Frey (2000).
4 Direct Democracy and Political Trust

Table 4.1: Overview of direct democracy scores as well as cantonal means of trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canton</th>
<th>Number of Obs.</th>
<th>Direct democracy: Availability of rights 2003</th>
<th>Direct democracy: Actual use 2002-2006</th>
<th>Trust toward political authorities</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<td>2.73</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.58</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6.56</td>
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<td>3.52</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>6.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.58</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>6.69</td>
</tr>
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<td>3.71</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Schaffhausen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uri</td>
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<td>7.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solothurn</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argovia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appenzell I.R.</td>
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<td>5.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basel-Country</td>
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<td>5.48</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glarus</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean 176 4.14 1.38 6.67
Std. dev. 161 1.13 1.26 0.52

by citizens as necessity to sanction political authorities. We test both operationalizations of direct democracy separately to ensure a comprehensive account of direct democracy and to strengthen our empirical investigation. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the direct democracy scores as well as aggregate measures of political trust in 25 cantons.¹⁰

¹⁰ The Selects survey did not collect data for the canton Nidwalden because the number of candidates did not exceed the number of seats, i.e. the only candidate who presented himself was automatically elected in this canton (Lutz 2008, 52).
Moreover, our analysis accounts for several alternative factors that are commonly referred to in the literature (e.g. Rahn and Rudolph 2005) by including them as control variables. On the individual level several factors should influence political trust (cf. Bühlmann 2007). Presumably, political trust varies systematically with gender, age and level of education. Women are supposed to be more critical toward political authorities as they are less well represented. Elderly citizens have more experience with political authorities and thus should display a higher level of trust (Richardson, Houston and Hadjiharalambous 2001). Besides, it is assumed that education enables citizens to better understand and to take part in politics and thereby gather experience, which in turn facilitates the development of political trust and diffuse support (Milbrath 1965; Richardson, Houston and Hadjiharalambous 2001; Scheidegger and Staerklé 2011). Moreover, we assume that Catholics display higher levels of trust. In contrast to Protestantism that emphasizes individualism and self-reliance, Catholicism is more at ease with the reliance on authorities (Bühlmann 2007; Elazar 1966). Furthermore, Scheidegger and Staerklé (2011) show that a feeling of being materially at risk is connected to trust. Following a similar logic we include unemployment status as a variable in our models. Finally, the perception whether the state of economy has worsened is included as a further individual-level control. Therefore, we model age, sex, level of education, catholic denomination, unemployment status and perception of the economic development as individual control variables.

Just as we include these variables on the individual level, we also need to account for systematic differences between contextual units. Obviously, cantons in our sample display certain idiosyncrasies that may be related to both direct democratic institutions and political trust. In order to avoid systematically biased or spurious relationships we add two further contextual controls to our analysis. To some extent these should be objective performance measures of political authorities. National income might be regarded as a broad indicator of performance, which has shown to be a determinant of political trust levels in cross-country studies (Mishler and Rose 2001). In addition we include a measure of the financial state of cantons that takes into account several indicators of how well a canton manages its financial state. As argued above, more extensive direct democratic settings should be paralleled by less mismanagement and less public debt (Citrin 1996; Kirchgässner, Feld and Savioz 1999). Individual data used in the analysis comes from the Swiss Electoral Studies which is part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project. The 2007 survey used in our analysis included 4,392 telephone interviews.
4 Direct Democracy and Political Trust

in 25 cantons (except the canton Nidwalden). Contextual data was taken from official statistics.

From a comparative perspective it seems advantageous to use the context of Swiss sub-national entities to investigate our research question. Compared to country-level analyses, Swiss cantons exhibit a substantial degree of similarity with respect to several institutional and societal aspects. In other words, the cantons have many characteristics in common that can be treated as constants, while they differ regarding the configuration of the here investigated concepts. Finally, the individuals investigated here are nested within institutional contexts that are thought to exert an influence on them. To estimate these contextual effects we apply varying-intercept models (Gelman and Hill 2007; Steenbergen and Jones 2002).

4.5 Empirical Results

We estimate several models to investigate the effect of direct democracy on political trust. Preliminary analyses reveal that trust in cantonal authorities systematically varies between cantons (e.g. 0-Model context variance is 0.23). Thus, there seems to be contextual differences that affect political trust making it methodologically appropriate to model contextual effects such as that of direct democracy.

The empirical results of six models are displayed in Table 4.2. Model 1 includes only individual control variables. In Model 2 and 3 the variables of direct democratic rights and actual use of direct democratic instruments are added. Model 4 and 5 test the robustness of the effect by adding contextual controls. In Model 6, finally, both direct democracy and all control variables are included, thus representing the strongest test of the theoretical argument.

The main results can be described as follows: First of all, most of the individual control variables in Model 1 are significant and affect political trust in the expected direction. Namely, age, education and catholic denomination have a positive effect and a negative economic evaluation is associated with lower political trust. This suggests that the estimated model is in principle useful for the explanation of political trust. More importantly, however, Model 2 and 3 show the effect of direct democracy: While the availability of direct democratic rights measured by Fischer's (2009) index of institutional barriers have a positive effect on political trust, the number of popular votes on initiatives

---

11 2,005 of these interviews were from a national representative sample and a further 2,387 interviews were conducted in order to ensure at least 100 respondents in small cantons. Additionally, in three cantons (Ticino, Geneva, and Zurich), the number of interviews was increased to a total of 600 per canton.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.328)</td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
<td>(0.621)</td>
<td>(0.663)</td>
<td>(0.603)</td>
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<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.007***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
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<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.054</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.027***</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic (Dummy)</td>
<td>0.198***</td>
<td>0.199***</td>
<td>0.190***</td>
<td>0.202***</td>
<td>0.202***</td>
<td>0.200***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy worse (Dummy)</td>
<td>-0.461***</td>
<td>-0.450***</td>
<td>-0.462***</td>
<td>-0.449***</td>
<td>-0.456***</td>
<td>-0.450***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed (Dummy)</td>
<td>-0.355</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.355</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.356</td>
<td>-0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.263)</td>
<td>(0.263)</td>
<td>(0.263)</td>
<td>(0.263)</td>
<td>(0.263)</td>
<td>(0.263)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct democracy:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of rights</td>
<td>0.272***</td>
<td>0.264***</td>
<td>0.264***</td>
<td>0.189**</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
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<td>Direct democracy:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial state</td>
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<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
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<td>National income</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.403</td>
<td>3.731**</td>
<td>1.953</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.394)</td>
<td>(1.572)</td>
<td>(1.618)</td>
</tr>
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<td>4,225</td>
<td>4,225</td>
<td>4,225</td>
<td>4,225</td>
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<td>Number of groups</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>(-2\times\log\text{likelihood})</td>
<td>17,659</td>
<td>17,647</td>
<td>17,656</td>
<td>17,646</td>
<td>17,649</td>
<td>17,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context variance</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
and optional referendums has a negative effect. Both effects are statistically significant and are able to reduce context variance to 11.3% and 17.5% respectively. Moreover, the direct democracy variables remain significant in Models 4 and 5 even after controlling for contextual characteristics of cantons. They also pass the last test in Model 6 with both direct democracy variables included. These results are in line with both our hypotheses about the diverging effects of direct democracy: More extensive direct democratic rights lead to higher political trust. More extensive use of these rights, however, leads to lower political trust.  

To evaluate the substantive size of the effect, we plot predictive margins of political trust for all levels of our direct democracy variables for Model 4 and 5. Figure 4.1 shows a change in political trust of roughly one point (on the 11-point scale). On the left side, political trust increases from 6 to 7 going from the cantons with the least to the cantons with the highest availability of direct democratic rights. On the right side, we observe the corresponding decrease from the least to the most direct democratic canton in terms of actual use. At first, the difference of one point might not seem great but considering how many (individual as well as contextual) factors are crucial for the development of political trust in general, the effect size of direct democracy is substantial and quite remarkable.

Sometimes urbanization and size of canton are found to affect the number of popular votes and are also possibly connected to political trust (Trockel 2000). In analyses not documented here, we, thus, added further control variables to our models: a dummy indicating whether an individual lives in a rural or urban area, the size of the canton in km$^2$ and the number of inhabitants. These variables are, however, not significant in our models, do not change the model estimates substantially, and are therefore excluded. Results are available from the authors upon request. This finding is also in line with Eder (2010, 144) and Vatter (2002, 328), who find no significant effect of urbanization on the number of initiatives and referendums when controlling for other factors.
4 Direct Democracy and Political Trust

Furthermore, observed means of cantonal trust (as indicated by circles) can be found in most (about 19) cases within the confidence intervals of predictive margins. Only means in about six cantons with more extreme values for direct democracy and fewer respondents differ from predicted levels of trust. The relationship remains nonetheless the same: A fitted OLS regression line (not shown in the plot) between direct democracy and aggregated means of political trust closely resembles the predictive line in the plot.

4.6 Robustness and Further Analyses

The empirical results certainly require further testing. Three issues in particular arise. A first issue concerns outliers. As we are dealing with a limited number of level-two units (here, cantons), the danger exists that results are dominated by a few observations, thereby casting doubt on the reliability of estimates as well as conclusions. Therefore, we re-estimate our Models 4 and 5 (Table 4.2) several times, each time excluding one canton (and its respondents). Although this kind of manual jackknifing represents a strict test for influential cases (excluding in some cases several hundred observations), the coefficients of the direct democracy variables remain statistically significant in all 25 separate models. Figure 4.2 illustrates the direct democracy coefficients in the 25 separate models excluding single cantons. Based on these results, we can conclude that the significant relationship is not due to single outlying cases.

Figure 4.2: Effect of direct democracy on political trust excluding single cantons

(a) Based on Model 4

(b) Based on Model 5
Table 4.3: Instrumental variable regression: Actual use instrumented with population density

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>(0.593)</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.007***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.025***</td>
<td>0.021***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic (Dummy)</td>
<td>0.251***</td>
<td>0.219***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy worse (Dummy)</td>
<td>−0.522***</td>
<td>−0.587****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed (Dummy)</td>
<td>−0.421**</td>
<td>−0.443***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban or rural area (Dummy)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct democracy: Actual Use</td>
<td>−0.306***</td>
<td>−0.310*</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
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<td>Financial state</td>
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<td>0.027</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National income</td>
<td>4.914***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.401)</td>
<td>(1.732)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of canton</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td>−0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>4,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors (clustered by Canton) in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A second issue concerns causality. It has long been argued that institutions are endoge-
nous to collective action by individuals (Foweraker and Landman 1997). With regard
to the formal institutional conception, though, direct democratic rights represent an in-
herent feature of the Swiss democratic system, which has been stable for decades (Geser
1999). Direct democratic rights that have been formally present during the socialization
processes of several generations leave their imprint on attitudes rather than the other
way round. Therefore, in our view, it seems only plausible to argue that the long-term
contextual condition of the formal institutional conception of direct democratic rights
causally affects volatile individual attitudes, and not vice versa (Davis 1985). However,
with regard to the actual use of direct democratic instruments this argument is less ap-
plicable. On the one hand, it could well be that low levels of political trust are the cause
of more frequent use of direct democratic instruments. On the other hand, one may
argue that direct legislation in Switzerland is primarily initiated by unions, parties, local
action groups or other organizations and not by the broad citizenry. In other words, the
vast majority of people does not initiate direct democratic processes actively, but rather
experience processes passively after their initiation.

The models we estimated up to this point do not allow for solving this “causal” puzzle empirically; rather, they merely reveal a negative association between the use of
direct democracy and political trust. One approach to estimate causal effects with cross-
sectional data is to resort to instrumental variables. In general, it is difficult to find
 proper instruments that satisfy the necessary assumptions (cf. Bound, Jaeger and Baker
1995; Sovey and Green 2011). An instrument should be related to the independent variable of interest, and second, should not be related to the dependent variable other than through the independent variable (Legewie 2012, 137).

While reasons to initiate direct democratic processes are manifold, whether these result
in actual popular votes hinges on the capability to collect enough signatures. And meeting
this requirement is obviously easier where many people are around to sign petitions. As
stated by Verbrugge and Taylor (1980, 138): “[h]igh density provides more opportunities
for informal contact and assistance because people are more accessible.” Hence, we
argue that population density influences the frequency of popular votes and instrument
the actual use of direct democracy with the population density of a canton. Regarding
the first assumption, population density is indeed highly \( r = 0.63 \) and significantly
\( p < 0.01 \) correlated with the use of direct democratic instruments. In what regards the
second assumption we assume that population density affects political trust solely via
the use of direct democracy conditional on different control variables. Accordingly, we
estimate two-stage least squares regression models with robust standard errors clustered
by cantons and accounting for all control variables mentioned before. As can be seen from both models in Table 4.3, the now instrumented effect of direct democratic use is still negative, of substantive size and statistically significant. Even when controlling for additional variables such as urbanization and size of canton, which could potentially mediate an indirect effect of population density on political trust, the estimates do not change.\footnote{For instance, population density could have other indirect effects on political trust via other variables such as economic development, etc. However, we are fairly confident that we control these indirect effects for the most part. Hence, that part of the instrument should be left over that really has no direct or indirect relationship with trust.} Bearing the limitations of our instrument and potential selection bias in mind, we carefully interpret this result as indication that there really is an effect running from the use of direct democracy to political trust.

Thirdly, often in cross-cantonal comparative research on Switzerland, the significance of language regions is raised. Differences between German-speaking and Roman parts have shown to be important factors in Swiss politics and relevant for many societal aspects (Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010, 477). In fact, language regions roughly coincide with the prevalence of direct democratic rights as can be seen in Table 4.1: While direct democratic rights are more extensive in the German-speaking part, cantons in the

### Table 4.4: Random-intercept models controlling for language region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models control for individual and contextual variables of Model 4 and 5 in Table 2</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct democracy:</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct democracy:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German language canton (Dummy)</td>
<td>0.522*</td>
<td>0.611***</td>
<td>0.526**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.268)</td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.553***</td>
<td>5.513***</td>
<td>5.366***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.733)</td>
<td>(0.637)</td>
<td>(0.702)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>4,225</td>
<td>4,225</td>
<td>4,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$-2 \times \log \text{likelihood}$</td>
<td>17,643</td>
<td>17,640</td>
<td>17,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context variance</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Roman part are more oriented toward a representative model of democracy (Kriesi 1998; Ladner 2002). We, therefore, test our model again accounting for language regions by including a dummy variable. Table 4.4 shows that trust levels indeed differ significantly between language regions. The negative effect of actual use of direct democracy on political trust does not change under this additional control. The effect of formal direct democratic rights is not significant anymore when controlling for language regions. This is hardly surprising since the extent of direct democratic rights and language regions run along the same boarder and are highly correlated. In other words, language regions might work as proxy for formal rights of direct democracy (and vice versa).

How should we interpret this finding? On the one hand one might argue that the cultural traditions of the language regions are crucial for the development of trust (Mishler and Rose 2001; cf. Footnote 3). In that respect, direct democratic rights are shaped within the cultural tradition that embodies a favorable, trustworthy view of political authorities. It remains, however, unclear how political trust should be affected by the cultural context if not precisely by institutions such as direct democracy, which are spe-

---

Footnote 3: We also re-estimate the instrumental regression in Table 4.3 with a dummy variable for language regions as in Table 4.4. The results (not documented here) remain the same. While decreasing in size (to −0.133), the coefficient of actual use of direct democracy is negative and significantly different from zero.
4 Direct Democracy and Political Trust

cific to the respective context. In an attempt to disentangle the effects of language regions and formal direct democratic rights, we further test whether political trust differs significantly between language groups within the three bilingual cantons Bern, Fribourg, and Valais. From the box plots in Figure 4.3 it is clear that this is not the case. Evidently, there is no significant difference of political trust between language groups in the same direct democratic context. Although this result is obviously not sufficient to dismiss cultural explanations of political trust in the Swiss case, it supports the role of institutions such as direct democracy as factors (among others) influencing political trust.

4.7 Conclusion

Little systematic research has explicitly addressed the question of how direct democracy and political trust are related to each other. However, if political trust is to be considered a major asset for societies and if its decline is as urgent as claimed, it becomes absolutely necessary to investigate the impact of institutions that might eventually increase this resource. Although contextual factors receive more and more attention in political trust research (Zmerli and Hooghe 2011), only very little empirical evidence exists regarding the question whether direct democracy represents such an arrangement and fulfills the promise of participatory democrats or in contrast initiates distrust (Dyck 2009). And so far no study has examined this relationship in Switzerland. In this study we make a first step to fill this gap.

In contrast to previous studies, we emphasize the necessity of a clear theoretical distinction between two conceptions of direct democracy, namely the formal strength of direct democratic rights and the actual use of those rights. Taking this distinction into account we develop arguments that suggest positive effects of extensive direct democratic rights and negative effects of actual use of direct democratic instruments on political trust. Our empirical analysis of the Swiss cantons seems to support this reasoning: Holding alternative variables constant political trust is higher in cantons with extensive direct democratic rights and lower in cantons with frequent use of these rights. This may serve as explanation for the ambiguity of previous results (Citrin 1996; Dyck 2009; Hug 2005).

These results, however, have to be taken with a pinch of salt. First, we need to acknowledge the role of cultural traditions in the Swiss language regions. While the negative effect of use of direct democratic instruments is not affected, the positive effect of the availability of direct democratic rights vanishes when controlling for language regions. Since extensive of direct democratic rights is closely related to the language regions in Switzerland, we cannot ultimately judge empirically whether cultural or insti-
tutional influences prevail in the development of political trust. From a neo-institutional perspective the latter seems obviously preferable. This institutional perspective does not deny the importance of early-life cultural influences (Mishler and Rose 2001, 31). If in fact political authorities have performed well and consistently over long periods of time (e.g. due to extensive direct democratic rights) cultural socialization as well as evaluation of this performance assumably result in similar levels of political trust (Mishler and Rose 2001, 32). Nevertheless, more studies are needed that scrutinize the relationship in different institutional and cultural settings.

Second, theoretically it seems plausible that the relationship between the actual use of direct democracy and political trust may run in both ways. In this study we made a first step trying to get a better estimate resorting to an instrumental variable approach. However, we strongly recommend that future studies further scrutinize this potentially reciprocal relationship. One possible venue could be the analysis of panel data, given that there are measures for both variables at different points in time. Another approach would be more qualitatively oriented analyses of the causal mechanism.

Finally, our study represents the most recent attempt so far to analyze the relationship of direct democracy and political trust and provides evidence from an exemplary empirical case, namely Switzerland. Thereby, our contribution of the effects of direct democracy on political trust contributes to the on-going dialogue about the introduction of direct democratic procedures around the world (Butler and Ranney 1994; Scarrow 2001). With all limitations in mind, we carefully conclude from our results that from a normative point of view extending direct democratic rights is a desirable step. Lowering institutional barriers for direct democratic instruments provides citizens with participatory means to keep their authorities on a short leash and ultimately seems to raise political trust.
5 Direct Democracy and Party Identification*

Abstract

This paper presents the first investigation of whether and how party identification is influenced by direct democratic institutions. The concept of party identification is of central interest to political science. Despite declining partisan attachment and increasing dealignment among voters, little systematic evidence exists as to which factors influence individual party identification. Our paper contributes to improving on this lacuna by considering the educative effects of direct democratic institutions. Theoretically, two competing hypotheses are plausible. On the one hand, direct democracy might strengthen political parties and promote the need for cues so that voters succumb to the allure of partisan attachment. On the other hand, direct democracy might provide an alternative to the representational function of political parties thus rendering party identification less essential. Drawing on data from the Swiss cantons, we estimate multilevel models. Our analyses, though giving support to the alternative-hypothesis, yield some surprising findings. Additionally, we follow up our results with an instrumental variable approach.

* This chapter is identical to a manuscript, which was accepted for publication and is forthcoming as Fatke (Forthcoming). First and foremost, my gratitude goes to Markus Freitag who suggested this topic and provided valuable comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. Also, I'd like to thank Aaron Venetz and Rolf Wirz for gathering and providing data as well as the editor and anonymous reviewers of *Party Politics* for their comments and suggestions.
5 Direct Democracy and Party Identification

5.1 Introduction

This paper investigates whether and how party identification is influenced by direct democratic institutions. The concept of party identification is often praised as the most important discovery in explaining electoral behavior (Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002; Weisberg and Greene 2003). Representing "the holy grail of electoral research" (Dalton 2009, 628), it is shown to be one of the most consistent and influential factors of electoral behavior ever since the early findings by Campbell et al. (1960). But emerging evidence that party identification has been suffering a steady decline in recent decades, obviously begs the questions what is responsible for increased levels of dealignment among voters (Dalton 2007; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Despite the great importance of the concept, there is in fact very little knowledge as to what influences and shapes party identification. Be it by coincident or not, at about the same time the dissemination of direct democratic institutions and procedures, too, notably grows throughout the world (Butler and Ranney 1994; Matsusaka 2005; Scarrow 2001; Schmitter and Trechsel 2004).

But how could direct democracy affect individual party identification? After all, the very establishment of direct democratic institutions was meant not least to weaken overly powerful political parties and was subsequently advocated by reformers of the Progressive Era in the USA (Bowler and Donovan 2006, 651; Smith and Tolbert 2004, 112). With regard to party politics, however, the influence of direct democracy remains an intensely, yet inconclusively discussed topic with evidence in support of negative as well as positive effects (Bowler and Donovan 2006; Budge 1996; Cain and Miller 2001; Haskell 2001; Kobach 1993; Ladner and Brändle 1999; Matsusaka 2005; Scarrow 1999; Smith and Tolbert 2001). As for individual attachment, the social capital literature shows that direct democratic institutions indeed foster ties and attachment to interest groups and social organizations (Boehmke and Bowen 2010; Freitag 2006). But despite all obvious indications there is, hitherto, no study systematically investigating the relationship between direct democracy and party identification.\footnote{In recent studies on party identification in California Bowler, Nicholson and Segura (2006) as well as Dyck, Johnson and Wasson (2012) find that racially charged ballot measures made Latinos more likely to identify with Democrats than with Republicans. These policy- and party-specific findings, again, strongly suggest that direct democratic institution can also shape the general extent of party identification.}

In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap. By answering the question how direct democracy influences party identification, we wish not only to contribute to the understanding of socio-political consequences of direct democratic institutions but also to gain a more fine-grained picture of the institutional foundations of party identification and dealign-
5 Direct Democracy and Party Identification

How do cantonal institutions of direct democracy affect party identification? Do they allure individuals to parties or do they present an alternative to party identification? In contrast to well-studied consequences for political parties, this is the first paper to systematically study effects on individual attachment to parties. But if direct democracy does indeed affect political parties, it seems rather evident to expect also effects for individuals identifying with them. Following the similar argumentation by Bohmke and Bowen (2010) about direct democracy and interest group membership, we hypothesize an indirect effect via political parties as well as a direct effect of direct democratic institutions.
5 Direct Democracy and Party Identification

on individuals.\(^2\) Below, we detail both indirect and direct theoretical arguments for first positive and then negative conjectures.

On the one side, the \textit{allure-hypothesis} assumes that in a direct democratic context party identification increases as parties become more visible, decisive, and attractive. The reasoning regarding an \textit{indirect} effect is based on the view that political parties can benefit from direct democracy, which is supported by evidence that direct democracy adds to the repertoire of political parties (Budge 1996, 2001; Kriesi 2006; Smith and Tolbert 2001). Ladner and Brändle (1999, 287 et seq.) formulate four general arguments how parties benefit from direct democracy: First, a more open direct democratic system favors the entry of new and smaller parties. Second, direct democracy gives parties an opportunity to put forward and promote their ideas. Third, it fosters a high level of political activity. Fourth, it provides a pressure relief valve for parties bound in the consensus government of the Swiss political system. Consequently, more and smaller parties make it easier for voters to find a particular party that closely represents his or her interests. Existing parties can campaign constantly and promote their cause thus reaching more voters. And as they are stronger and decisively steering direct democratic processes, parties are more attractive to identify with. Altogether direct democracy increases the allure of political parties and indirectly raises the likelihood of feeling attached to a party.

Regarding a \textit{direct} effect we can argue that individuals use their party identification as information short-cut to orient themselves on issues and policies. By their very nature, matters in direct democratic processes (ranging from fiscal policy or infrastructure projects to moral and social issues or international treaties) are far more complex than voting for parties or candidates. Developing a personal preference regarding an issue is more demanding as it takes more information, resources and skills to figure out, which position serves one best. Thus, voters in direct democracy should be more likely to rely on the cost-saving cue of party identification so that they can simply adhere to the position of their party (Fiorina 1981, 1990).\(^3\) Moreover, direct democratic institutions are precisely said to “educate” citizens (Smith and Tolbert 2004). Given the opportunity and responsibility of direct democratic instruments, voters gain political efficacy and

\(^2\) Assuming that individual attitudes are affected by institutions, the latter argument takes on the theoretical approach of new institutionalism. Institutions in that sense provide certain incentives and shape the preference structure. Since individuals form attitudes within their contextual setting, direct democratic institutions can affect attitudes in the political realm and hence adopt the role of explanatory variables (March and Olsen 1989). With regard to the specific logic of new institutionalism, rational-choice perspective applies to the \textit{allure-hypothesis}, while historical or sociological perspectives rather apply to the \textit{alternative-hypothesis} (Hall and Taylor 1996).

\(^3\) Evidence in fact shows that Swiss voters do resort to partisan cues in popular votes (Kriesi 2006; Lutz 2007).
receive “an education in democratic citizenship” (Dyck 2009, 540). Besides, voters are constantly and immediately exposed to political information in ads, the media, official brochures, or in conversations if popular votes take place regularly. So in addition to the mere institutional opportunity, this positive relation should be even more apparent the more often popular votes actually occur. Since direct democracy that way indeed fosters political information and interest (Benz and Stutzer 2004; Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000), the argument speaks to a positive connotation of partisanship being virtuous and sophisticated, as opposed to uninterested and uninformed independent voters (Dalton 2007, 276; Dalton 2009). Taking together direct and indirect arguments of the allure of parties in direct democracy, we hypothesize:

\[ H_1 \] The more direct democratic a context, the more likely an individual will feel close to a political party. This effect becomes even stronger the more frequent popular votes actually take place in a canton.

On the other side, it is possible to formulate an at least as (if not more) convincing alternative-hypothesis arguing that direct democracy decreases party identification because it provides an alternative to the representational function of political parties. Regarding an indirect effect, it is indeed the traditional view that political parties become less important in direct democratic settings as their influence dwindles. And just like to the positive, there is also empirical evidence that direct democracy entails weaker, less autonomous parties and tougher legal controls on them (Bowler and Donovan 2006; Cain and Miller 2001; Haskell 2001; Kobach 1993; Matsusaka 2005). Lachner and Brändle (1999, 286), provide also four arguments why direct democracy should affect parties adversely: First, parties face stronger competition from interest groups who gain more influence thanks to direct democracy. Second, being forced to frequently position themselves on specific issues conflict between and within parties increases, thereby paralyzing ordinary party activity. Third, direct democratic campaigns demand extra work and resources from parties. Fourth, offering political means beyond and without representation by parties, direct democracy threatens to render them insignificant. Consequently, parties find it harder to compete successfully with other organizations for affection of voters. With concrete, tangible issues frequently on the ballot, individuals might disagree with the position of their party and feel alienated. After all, the alternative of direct democracy enables individuals to participate politically without relying on parties and indirectly reduces the likelihood of feeling attached to a party.\(^4\)

\(^4\) In a simpler way, these arguments could also be used to argue for a null effect of direct democracy on party identification. We would like to thank our anonymous reviewer for pointing that out.
5 Direct Democracy and Party Identification

Regarding the direct positive effect, we can argue that being socialized into a direct democratic context, individuals develop an anti-elitist disposition (Canovan 1999, 7; Feld and Kirchgässner 2000). They have experienced all along that the popular will remains above all and that it can (and will) be enforced through direct democracy. In an institutional context, where the direct democratic tradition is genuine and long-lasting, this attitude is passed on over generations. Eventually, direct democratic institutions foster an inherent predisposition to rely rather on such participatory means outside the representational realm than on political parties in order to carry out the popular will. Obviously, this negative relation should be even more pronounced if popular votes are indeed highly frequent. It does, however, not necessarily imply a less informed or sophisticated public. The reasoning by what party identification is affected is in fact not that different, only the normative connotation of being partisan or independent changes (Dalton 2007, 276; Dalton 2009). Positively connoting the latter, Shively (1979) points out that the need for partisan cues should decline as the political skills of the public increase and information costs decrease. So if we invoke again the educative effect of direct democratic institutions we can just as well argue that they make for a more informed, engaged, and thus more independent citizenry. Voters in direct democracy are, therefore, not dependent on partisan cues and ties to decide political issues. Taking again together direct and indirect arguments of direct democracy as alternative to party identification, we hypothesize:

\( \mathbf{H}_2 \) The more direct democratic a context, the less likely an individual will feel close to a political party. This effect becomes even stronger the more frequent popular votes actually take place in a canton.

5.3 Research Design

In this section, we describe the methodological approach of our analysis and explain how we operationalize dependent, independent and control variables. Appendix 5.1 summarizes operationalization and data sources, Appendix 5.2 descriptive statistics of all variables. Since we test how direct democratic institutions affect the individual propensity to identify with a political party, we analyze individual data from the Swiss cantons. Analytically speaking, these individuals are nested in the institutional context of cantons, and thus assumed to be more similar within than between contexts. To account for the hierarchical data structure we resort to multilevel modeling and estimate random-intercept models (Gelman and Hill 2007).
5 Direct Democracy and Party Identification

For data on the individual level we make use of the latest Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects) 2011. The Selects surveys are part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) network. They are conducted through computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI) after the Swiss National Elections. The data set consists of 4,391 respondents in 26 cantons (Lutz 2012 for details of the survey). Regarding the dependent variable of party identification, the Selects survey asks whether someone generally feels close to a political party. This measure differs from the usual 3 or 7-point measures in the USA. Because of the multi-party system it is not possible to conceive party identification on one dimension ranging from Democrat over Independent to Republican—which is anyhow questionable (Holmberg 2007). Since our interest here lies in attachment to parties at large, we find this general measure useful for our analysis. The dichotomous nature does, however, imply a logit transformation in our models.

Regarding the independent variable of direct democratic institutions, the hypotheses imply two distinct measures, which are commonly used in analyses of direct democracy. The first one concerns how permissive direct democratic institutions are in a canton. Unlike the states in the USA direct democracy in the Swiss cantons cannot simply be described as having an initiative process or not. Instead, Stutzer (1999) suggests coding cantonal hurdles to evoke the constitutional popular initiative, the legislative popular initiative, the legislative referendum, and the fiscal referendum into an index between one and six. These hurdles consist of number of signatures needed, time span to collect signatures, and in the case of the fiscal referendum the financial threshold. Schaub and Dlabac (2012) provide current numbers of the index of direct democracy. The second measure concerns how frequently direct democratic institutions actually result in popular votes. Although of course not entirely independent, permissiveness of direct democratic institutions and frequency of popular votes are not highly correlated in the Swiss case (Barankay, Sciarini and Trechsel 2003). With data again by Schaub and Dlabac (2012), we therefore include the average of yearly popular votes in each canton between 2005 and 2009 as independent variable, too. Particularly, we hypothesize that the effect of permissive direct democratic institutions becomes stronger if popular votes take place frequently. Since this implies a moderating effect, we introduce a multiplicative interaction term between the index of direct democracy and the frequency of popular votes.

---

5 The survey draws primarily on a nationally representative sample. In small cantons, it was attempted to raise the numbers of observations additionally to about 100, in the selected cantons Zurich, Ticino, and Geneva to about 600 (Lutz 2012, 81).

6 Values close to 1 indicate high, restrictive hurdles reflecting representative democracy; values close to 6 indicate low, permissive hurdles reflecting direct democracy.

7 Specifically, the logarithm of the frequency is used because the distribution is highly skewed and, in substantial terms, because we assume ceiling effects when the number of popular votes gets large.
votes. To judge the moderating effect we estimate and plot marginal effects according to Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006).

Party identification is commonly assumed to be influenced by a number of other individual as well as contextual factors. In order to rule out such alternative explanations and spurious relationships, we account for them by including several control variables long associated with research on partisan identification (Bowler, Nicholson and Segura 2006). On the individual level we control for age, level of education, gender, ideological position on the left-right scale, political knowledge, political interest, and post-materialistic values. The intuition is that individuals are either more or less likely to feel attached to a party, depending on different partisan connotations (Dalton 2007, 276; Dalton 2009), if they are more interested, engaged, willing, and capable to follow politics in general. As for ideology, Miller and Shanks (1996, 354) point out that it works as proxy for a variety of policy positions and we need to control for “all policy-related preferences when we assess the relevance of other explanatory themes.” Moreover, on the contextual level, we control for urbanization, number of inhabitants, change of unemployment rate, and share of Catholics in order to account for regional and cantonal idiosyncrasies. It seems plausible that in urban and bigger cantons party identification becomes more important whereas in rural and smaller cantons much of the political life is still based on personal contact. If the economic condition in a canton worsens, reflected by rising unemployment over the past years, so should the chance of identifying as partisan. A Catholic heritage, which is more at ease with the reliance on authorities, might be associated with higher partisan attachment whereas Protestantism emphasizes individualism and self-reliance. To be sure, the findings of our analysis are robust to both inclusion and exclusion of each control variable. Thus we consider including this comprehensive set of control variables a yet stricter test. Succeeding the empirical analysis, we nonetheless follow up on our results with some additional robustness checks.

5.4 Empirical Findings

In the following we present results of the analysis how direct democratic institutions influence the propensity to feel close to a political party. Corresponding to the research design detailed above, we estimate several random-intercept logit models, which are shown in Table 5.1. Model 1 includes only individual predictors of party identification, Model 2

---

We deliberately do not include income as the variable is abundant with missing values in the Selects 2011 data and including it would severely impair the quality of the model estimates. But since income is highly correlated with level of education we are confident to account for a potential bias while still keeping several hundred observations more in the model.
5 Direct Democracy and Party Identification

adds to that the variables of direct democratic institutions and frequency of popular votes, Model 3 represents the full configuration with contextual controls, and Model 4 includes the interaction term. By and large, most of the individual control variables in Model 1 perform in the expected direction. A higher likelihood of party identification is significantly associated with higher age and level of education, more political interest and knowledge as well as post-materialistic values. Gender and ideological position of respondents are not significantly associated with attachment to parties.

Adding direct democracy variables in Model 2 increases the goodness of fit and substantially reduces context variance from 0.20 to 0.08. As it seems direct democracy can indeed explain some of the variance of party identification between cantons. With regard to our research question, the results are unambiguous: The index of direct democracy is negatively related to the likelihood to feel close to a political party. This correlation is highly significant even holding contextual control variables constant in Model 3. If direct democratic institutions are available and permissive in a canton, party identification among individuals is less likely. The result gives strong support to the alternative-hypothesis \((H_2)\). Apparently, voters do not fall prey to the allure of political parties in direct democracy. Instead they perceive direct democratic institutions as alternative to the representational function of parties. However, results in Table 5.1 are difficult to interpret in terms of their substantiality. For that reason we calculate predicted probabilities to report party attachment given the permissiveness of direct democratic institutions. Figure 5.1 illustrates the size of the effect, with controlling covariates fixed at their means. As a matter of fact, the probability to report party identification drops from 52% in the least to 26% in the most direct democratic canton based on Model 3. There is a reduction of about 50%. Put differently, individuals in almost entirely representative cantons are twice as likely to be attached to a political party as individuals in almost entirely direct democratic cantons. So it is fair to say that the effect of direct democratic institutions is substantial in size.

In contrast to the clear result of direct democratic institutions, the frequency of popular votes, on the other hand, does not exhibit a significant effect. Although the coefficient is also negatively signed, it fails to reach conventional significance levels in any of the models in Table 5.1. Apparently, the likelihood to feel close to a party is not affected by how often popular votes usually take place in a canton.\(^9\) This result indicates that consequences of direct democracy are less instantaneous, but need some time to materialize. As Hug (2005) points out, formal rules of direct democracy can make for a stricter, more obedient

\(^9\) This is also true if we operationalize direct democratic practice in a canton alternatively by average turnout in popular votes.
## Direct Democracy and Party Identification

Table 5.1: Random-intercept logit models of party identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Individual controls</th>
<th>(2) Direct democracy</th>
<th>(3) Full controls</th>
<th>(4) Interaction term</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.474</td>
<td>1.086***</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>1.426</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
<td>(0.418)</td>
<td>(0.616)</td>
<td>(0.976)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of direct democracy</td>
<td>0.331***</td>
<td>-0.312***</td>
<td>0.480**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of popular votes</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>-0.408</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct democracy*</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular votes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.013***</td>
<td>0.013***</td>
<td>0.013***</td>
<td>0.013***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td>0.036***</td>
<td>0.035***</td>
<td>0.036***</td>
<td>0.036***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.107</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological position</td>
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<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
<td>0.116***</td>
<td>0.116***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>-0.816***</td>
<td>-0.818***</td>
<td>-0.820***</td>
<td>-0.821***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialistic values</td>
<td>0.064*</td>
<td>0.064*</td>
<td>0.064*</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.004</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Catholics</td>
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<td>0.108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.411)</td>
<td>(0.410)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (in 10,000)</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.246*</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 4,103 4,103 4,103 4,103
Number of groups: 26 26 26 26
Context variance: 0.197 0.079 0.051 0.048
Deviance: 4872 4854 4849 4848
AIC: 4890 4876 4879 4880
BIC: 4946 4946 4973 4981

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
relationship between political authorities and citizens by shifting the balance of power toward the people. Apparently, being socialized into such a context fosters a disposition that relies less on authorities in general and less on political parties in particular.

To be fair though, the hypotheses do not assume an immediate effect of popular votes, but rather suggest that the negative effect of permissive direct democratic institutions is conditional on how often direct democratic processes actually result in popular votes. In other words, individuals in direct democracy should identify even less with parties if they are constantly caught up in popular votes. To analyze this moderation, Figure 5.2 illustrates the marginal effect based on the multiplicative interaction term in Model 4. It allows us to track the marginal effect of the index of direct democratic institutions as the frequency of popular votes changes. Thus, the positive slope indicates that the (negative) effect of direct democratic institutions becomes in fact weaker, not stronger, as popular votes become more frequent. Eventually, if popular votes are highly frequent, the confidence interval includes zero. In that case, the effect of permissive direct democratic institutions is not significant anymore (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). Partly, this runs counter to the alternative-hypothesis (H₂) assuming an increasing moderation effect. While it is yet no redemption for the allure-hypothesis (H₁), it seems that if popular votes are highly frequent individuals do resort to cues of partisan attachment at least to the extent to counter the negative effect of direct democratic institutions. As for political
parties, the finding could imply that in a potentially detrimental environment of direct democratic institution the frequent use of direct democracy offers the opportunity to distinguish themselves and seek new partisans.

5.5 Robustness

The previous results of a negative influence of direct democratic institutions on party identification require, of course, further testing. We discuss three issues here in particular: influential cases, the influence of language regions, and causality. First, since the number of contextual units (cantsos) is limited, the peril of overly influential cases exists. It might be that the relationship is biased by idiosyncrasies of one extraordinary canton, thus casting doubt on the estimates. We therefore apply a manual jackknife procedure and re-estimate Model 3 26 times, each time excluding one canton and its respondents. As can be seen in Figure 5.3, the coefficient of direct democratic institutions remains significant in all 26 repetitions, whereas the coefficient of popular votes does not reach significance in any repetition. Based on these results, we are fairly confident about the present findings.

Second, cross-cantonal analyses of Switzerland often mention the caveat of different language regions. In fact, differences between German-speaking and Roman parts are relevant to aspects of political and societal life (Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010,
Moreover, language regions roughly coincide with cantonal institutions of direct democracy. This makes it somewhat difficult to disentangle the influence of direct democracy from the influence of language regions. Hardly surprising, the coefficient of direct democracy in our models is not significant anymore when controlling for language regions (not shown). But does the variable of language regions work as a proxy for direct democracy or vice versa? From a theoretical point of view, it seems at least less clear how identification with a political party should be affected by the prevalent language in a canton if not precisely by institutions such as direct democracy. It is for this theoretical reason that Freitag and Stadelmann-Steen (2010) for instance drop language regions altogether from their analysis of Swiss direct democracy. From an empirical perspective, we can test the influence of language, *ceteris paribus* direct democratic institutions, by looking closer at the three bilingual cantons. Figure 5.4 compares means and standard errors of party identification between language groups in Bern, Fribourg, and Valais. On average, more French-speaking respondents indicate party attachment than German-speaking respondents within the same canton. Looking closer at the standard errors, however, it becomes evident that confidence intervals overlap. Thus, differences in party identification between language groups are not statistically significant. Although this result is of course not sufficient to dismiss the influence of language regions, it does support the importance of direct democratic institutions in order to explain differences in partisan attachment.
Third, probably the most critical issue concerns causality.\textsuperscript{10}

Does direct democracy indeed influence attachment to parties, or is it rather a result of the level of party identification? Regarding the frequency of popular votes we have no reason to assume a causal relationship since it is not significantly related to party identification in our models. Neither do frequent popular votes weaken party identification, nor do cantons with low partisan attachment practice more direct democracy. But regarding the significant effect of the index of direct democracy, causality becomes an issue. After all, institutions originate from collective action of citizens and may therefore be endogenous to individual attitudes (Poweraker and Landman 1997). In the following, we address the causal direction in a historical as well as methodological way. Historically, direct democratic institutions in the Swiss cantons predate political parties. In fact, parties are considered to be “children of direct democratic rights” as they resulted from organizations, which formed around direct democratic processes (Gruner 1977, 25). From a logical point of view, it should be the stable, long-term condition that causally affects the volatile one, and not than vice versa (Davis 1985). Hence, Benz and Stutzer (2004, 50), faced with the same problem, argue that direct democratic institutions have been stable during past decades, which suggests they are rather the cause than the effect.

\textsuperscript{10} We would like thank our anonymous reviewers for pointing out this issue.
### Direct Democracy and Party Identification

#### Table 5.2: IV probit models of party identification with Index of direct democracy instrumented by Share of peasants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV Constant</td>
<td>0.730</td>
<td>(0.506)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of direct democracy</td>
<td>−0.206***</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of popular votes</td>
<td>−0.068</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td>0.022***</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological position</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>0.067***</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>−0.494***</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialistic values</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanisation</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Catholics</td>
<td>0.319*</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (in 10,000)</td>
<td>−0.001*</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First sector employees</td>
<td>−0.025</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations        | 4,103 |          |          |
| Wald chi-squared test of exogeneity | 0.330 |          |          |

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
of individual attitudes. Although such historical arguments are not sufficient to rule out endogeneity concerns entirely, they serve as useful hints that, in our case it might seem more plausible to assume stable, long-term direct democratic institutions affecting the extent of individual party identification (Johnston 2006; Vatter 2002).

Nonetheless, we pursue a second, methodological approach to examine the causal order. While our models so far do not allow for disentangling this puzzle empirically, one solution when only cross-sectional data is available is to resort to instrumental variables (IV). An instrument should on the one hand be related to the independent variable, and on the other, not to the dependent variable other than through the independent variable (Legewie 2012, 137). Generally, it is difficult to find instrumental variables that satisfy these conditions perfectly (Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995). With regard to the research question, the instrument should have influence on the configuration of direct democratic institutions, but not on the current state of party identification (other than through direct democracy). It is well known that historically the introduction of direct democratic rights in the Swiss cantons was pressed for by farmers and the agrarian population at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century (Vatter 2007, 74). Hence, we argue that the permissiveness of direct democratic institutions, which have not been subject to major changes after their introduction (Benz and Stutzer 2004), are related to the share of peasants in a canton back in the day when direct democracy was established. Thanks to careful effort by (Brugger 1978, 16), historical numbers of the agrarian population in the cantons are available.\(^\text{11}\) As it turns out, cantonal shares of peasants in the agrarian population in 1910 is indeed significantly \((p < 0.05)\) related to the index of direct democracy, and not significantly to cantonal levels of party identification.\(^\text{12}\) We therefore instrument the permissiveness of direct democracy with this variable and estimate IV probit regression models using Newey’s (1987) two-step estimator.\(^\text{13}\) In addition to previous controlling variables we also include the share of people currently employed in the first sector in order to rule out a spurious relationship between agrarian legacy or tradition and party identification in a canton. As can be seen in in Table 5.2, the instrumented coefficient of the index of direct democracy is still negative and highly significant. Bearing the limitations of any IV approach in mind, we carefully interpret this

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\(^{11}\) Since the canton Jura seceded from the canton Bern only in 1979, there is no separate data for Jura. In order to keep as many observations as possible, we assign the agrarian population of Bern to Jura, too. Dropping Jura from the analysis does not change the results in any way, though.

\(^{12}\) Also available numbers for 1870 are very similar and using them instead yields exactly the same results.

\(^{13}\) An additional specification using a maximum likelihood estimator and robust standard errors clustered by cantons (to account for the hierarchical data structure) yields the same results.
result as indication that the causal effect really is running from permissiveness of the configuration of direct democracy to individual party identification.

5.6 Conclusion

The concept of party identification plays a major role in the study of electoral research (Green, Palmaquist and Schickler 2002; Weisberg and Greene 2003). It is of central interest to political science to know why and to what extent individuals affiliate with political parties (Dalton 2007). But despite the phenomenon of declining party identification and increasing dealignment among voters (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000), little systematic evidence exists as to which factors influence individual party identification. Our paper contributes to improving on this lacuna by considering the educative effects of direct democracy (Smith and Tolbert 2004). Thereby, it represents the very first analysis of the influence that direct democratic institutions exert on party identification. Theoretically, two competing hypotheses sound plausible. On the one hand, direct democracy might strengthen political parties and promote the need for cues so that voters succumb to the allure of partisan attachment. On the other hand, direct democracy might provide an alternative to the representational function of political parties thus rendering party identification less essential. Our empirical analysis of individual data from the Swiss cantons gives clear support to the alternative-hypothesis. In Switzerland, individuals are significantly less likely to feel close to a political party if they have permissive direct democratic institutions at their disposal. Surprisingly, however, this effect diminishes if individuals are constantly exposed to popular votes.

What is the mechanism behind these results? In general, formal rules of direct democracy are known to be influential for citizens precisely without their actual exercise, which is well documented for the Swiss case (e.g. Benz and Stutzer 2004; Freitag 2006; Frey and Stutzer 2000). For instance by altering the number of veto players and the win-set for new policies, direct democratic institutions structure and incentivize political action (Hug and Tsebelis 2002). Our findings indicate the long-term nature of direct democratic consequences. It is not an instantaneous effect of current popular votes, but effects of formal rules need some time to materialize. This also underscores a historical or sociological understanding of institutions (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, 29). In that respect, permissive formal rules make for a stricter, more obedient relationship by shifting the balance of political power toward the people (Hug 2005). Being socialized into such a context fosters a disposition that relies less on authorities in general and less on political parties in particular. Citizens know they can keep parties on a short leash thanks to
directly available formal rules. Thereby, it becomes apparent that they rather adhere to
direct democratic institutions outside the representational realm than to political parties.

The finding that direct democracy evidently fosters the dealignment of voters raises ob-
viously further questions—three of which we would like to address briefly. First, increased
dealignment of the electorate might have alarming normative implications. Recalling the
connotation of dealigned, independent citizens being less sophisticated and disaffected
by politics, direct democratic institutions consequently should be opposed (Rosenblum
2008). It is, however, the more recent view that this negative connotation fails to do in-
dependent voters justice (Dalton 2007, 2009). Although we observe in our data the more
knowledgeable and interested being less likely to be independents, we have no evidence
whatever that direct democratic institutions affect political interest and knowledge
negatively. Existing evidence of the USA points rather to the contrary (Mendelsohn and
Cutler 2000; Smith and Tolbert 2004). Thus we see no concern to oppose for such reasons
the introduction and extension of direct democracy. Nonetheless more research on the
educative effects of direct democratic institutions is in any case desirable.

Second, the finding bears also substantial relevance to party politics. From the per-
pective of political parties loyal attachment of voters represents a valuable and desirable
resource. Permissive direct democratic institutions seem in this regard potentially detri-
mental. In an environment of extensive direct democracy, it gets harder for political
parties to attract partisans. On the other hand, parties can also seize direct democratic
instruments in order to counter the dealignment of voters in direct democracy. If par-
ties provoke popular votes often enough, they have opportunity to use direct democratic
campaigns to promote themselves, to provide cues to voters, and ultimately to seek new
partisans. And third, we should, after all, be cautious about the conclusions of course.
Although the results have shown to be fairly robust and the IV analysis gives support
to the causal order, they can only be considered to be preliminary. Specifically, more
comprehensive and detailed data would be desirable to investigate the causal mechanism
between direct democracy and party identification more thoroughly. Further analyses
could also take a longitudinal or qualitative approach in order to scrutinize the relation-
ship. In the same vein, replicating this study in different countries and contexts would
be helpful to validate the generalizability of the findings. In this regard, our paper can
be seen as point of departure for future research.
### Appendix 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Operationalization/Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual participation in demonstration</td>
<td>In addition to elections and popular votes, there are also other political activities. I read some of them to you. Please tell me if you participated in each of these activities in the past five years. <em>Attended a demonstration.</em> (0 = No; 1 = Yes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Independent variables: Individual level** | | |
| Age | Younger individuals are more likely to demonstrate than older ones. | Age (in years) of the respondent interviewed | |
| Sex | Men participate in demonstrations more frequently than women. | Dummy; 1 = man, 2 = woman | |
| Educational level | The higher an individual’s level of education, the more likely he/she is to participate in demonstrations. | Respondent’s highest completed level of education, ranging from 0 = no education to 12 = University degree | |
| Post-materialism | Individuals with more post-materialistic views are more likely to participate in demonstrations. | Post-materialism score, ranging from 1 = Materialist to 4 = Post-materialist | |
| Attachment to Green parties | Individuals who feel a strong attachment to one of the Green parties are more likely to participate in demonstrations. | Feeling close to any particular party. Dummy: 0 = other/no party; 1 = Green party | |
APPENDICES

Left-right placement  Individuals who place themselves further left are more likely to participate in demonstrations than individuals who are further right.

Union member  Union members are more likely to participate in demonstrations than non-union members.

Trust in others  Individuals who place trust in others are more likely to participate in demonstrations than individuals who do not.

Agricultural profession  Individuals employed in the agricultural sector are more likely to participate in demonstrations than those who are not.

Self-placement on ideological scale, ranging from 0 = left to 10 = right

Dummy: 0 = no member; 1 = member in union or workers’ organization

General trust question, ranging from 0 = Can’t be careful enough; 10 = Most people can be trusted

Current profession of respondent. Dummy: 0 = non-agricultural profession; 1 = agricultural profession

**Independent variables: Contextual level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Democracy presence</td>
<td>The higher the presence of direct democracy, the greater the likelihood that an individual will participate/abstain from participating in demonstrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Democracy use</td>
<td>The higher the use of direct democratic instruments, the greater the likelihood that an individual will participate/abstain from participating in demonstrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share German speaking</td>
<td>The likelihood of individual protest participation is higher in cantons with a high share of non-German speaking population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>The higher the degree of urbanization, the more likely an individual is to participate in demonstrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National income</td>
<td>The lower the national income, the more likely an individual is to participate in demonstrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of institutional openness of direct democracy, average 1999–2003 (Fischer 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of direct democratic votes (initiatives and referendums), average 1999–2003 (Année politique Suisse)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of German speaking population per canton in 2000 (<a href="http://www.bfs.admin.ch">www.bfs.admin.ch</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of urbanization in % in 2001 (<a href="http://www.badac.ch">www.badac.ch</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary national income of households per resident in SFr, average 1999–2003 (<a href="http://www.badac.ch">www.badac.ch</a>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Share of labor union members | The higher the share of labor union members in the work force, the more likely an individual is to participate in demonstrations.
---|---
Percentage of labor union members in the work force in 2000 ([www.sgb.ch](http://www.sgb.ch)) ([www.badac.ch](http://www.badac.ch))

Green party strength | The stronger the Green party in a canton, the more likely an individual is to participate in demonstrations.
---|---
Share of votes for the Green party in the 2003 cantonal elections ([www.badac.ch](http://www.badac.ch))

Distance to major protest city | The closer to a city where most major protest events take place, the more likely an individual is to participate in demonstrations.
---|---
Distance in (street) kilometers from respondent’s canton’s capital to the closest major protest city (Berne, Zurich, or Geneva) ([www.maps.google.com](http://www.maps.google.com))

*Note: Source is specified only for the contextual variables. All individual variables are taken from the 2003 Selects data.*
### Appendix 2.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
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<td><strong>Dependent variable</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest behavior</td>
<td>5883</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables: Individual level</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>5891</td>
<td>51.23</td>
<td>17.08</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>5891</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>6.04</td>
<td>3.38</td>
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<td>Post-materialism</td>
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<td>2.58</td>
<td>0.97</td>
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<td>Green party attachment</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in others</td>
<td>5836</td>
<td>5.64</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural profession</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables: Contextual level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct democracy presence</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct democracy use</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share German speaking</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>54.63</td>
<td>30.78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share union members</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>30.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green party strength</td>
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<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Distance to protest city</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>66.96</td>
<td>41.17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National income</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42690</td>
<td>6251</td>
<td>32688</td>
<td>59500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 3.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49.82</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ticino</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>42.06</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaud</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>48.53</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fribourg</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44.01</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bern</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>44.63</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuchâtel</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<td>St. Gallen</td>
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<td>4.02</td>
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<td>Thurgovia</td>
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<td>44.07</td>
<td>108</td>
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<td>Zurich</td>
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<td>46.65</td>
<td>663</td>
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<td>Schwyz</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>46.66</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Appenzell O.R.</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>47.7</td>
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<td>Nidwalden</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Basel, City</td>
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<td>2.75</td>
<td>49.78</td>
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<td>Graubünden</td>
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<td>Zug</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>50.98</td>
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<td>Glarus</td>
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<td>19.5</td>
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<td>Schaffhausen</td>
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<td>Uri</td>
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<td>Argovia</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43.22</td>
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<td>Solothurn</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45.94</td>
<td>104</td>
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<td>45.88</td>
<td>106</td>
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<td>Appenzell I.R.</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>39.17</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>5.32</td>
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<td>167</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>St. dev.</strong></td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>169</td>
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</table>

*Note:* Data sorted by Formal Rules. Formal Rules calculated according to Stutzer (1999); data of Formal Rules and Actual Use from Schaub and Dlabac (2012); data of turnout by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office ([www.bfs.admin.ch](http://www.bfs.admin.ch)).
## Variable Operationalization Source

### Dependent variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Participation rate in federal popular votes</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Independent variables

| SES: Education | Level of education: 1 = no education; 13 = University degree | Selects 2011 |
| SES: Income    | Gross monthly income of household: 1 = less than 2,000; 11 = more than 12,000 sFr | Selects 2011 |
| SES: Prestige  | Standard Index of Occupational Prestige according to Treiman (1977) | Selects 2011 |

### Moderating variables

| DD: Formal rules | Permissiveness of institutional barriers according to Stutzer (1999): 1 = low; 6 = high (Schaub and Dlabac 2012) |
| DD: Actual Use   | Average number of cantonal popular votes per year for 2006-2009 (Schaub and Dlabac 2012) |

### Control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Age in years</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Dummy: 1 = Male; 2 = Female</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
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### Variables in additional analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>Interest in politics: 1 = Very interested; 4 = not at all interested</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Evaluation of state of the economy: 1 = Very good; 5 = Very bad</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>Dummy: 1 = Not married; 2 = Married</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
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<td>Compulsory voting</td>
<td>Dummy variable for compulsory voting in the canton Schaffhausen</td>
<td>Constructed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>Inhabitants per km²</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Statistical Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>Participation in last national elections (dummy): 0 = No; 1 = Yes</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
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*Note: For the analysis, variables of Education, Income and Prestige are mean-centered and standardized. The logarithm of DD: Actual Use is used.*
Appendix 3.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. dev.</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
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<td>(3.1)</td>
<td>[0; 10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>SES: Education</td>
<td>4368</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>(3.5)</td>
<td>[1; 13]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES: Income</td>
<td>3780</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>(2.0)</td>
<td>[1; 11]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES: Prestige</td>
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<td>47.8</td>
<td>(15.6)</td>
<td>[16; 90]</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DD: Formal rules</td>
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<td>4.1</td>
<td>(1.0)</td>
<td>[1.75; 5.4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD: Actual Use</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>(4.4)</td>
<td>[1; 19.5]</td>
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<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Age</td>
<td>4391</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>(17.6)</td>
<td>[18; 94]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>4391</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td>[1; 2]</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Variables in additional analysis</strong></td>
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<td>(0.80)</td>
<td>[1; 4]</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.78)</td>
<td>[1; 5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
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<td>1.59</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>[1; 2]</td>
</tr>
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<td>26</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>[0; 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>4377</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>[0; 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>(992)</td>
<td>[27; 4999]</td>
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</table>

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## Appendix 4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Expected relationship</th>
<th>Operationalization/ Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political trust</td>
<td>Trust toward cantonal political authorities; $0 \Rightarrow \text{no trust, } 10 \Rightarrow \text{high trust}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables: Individual level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Elderly are less critical of political institutions resulting in higher trust.</td>
<td>Age in years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Men are less critical of political institution than women resulting in higher trust.</td>
<td>Dummy; $1 \Rightarrow \text{Male, } 2 \Rightarrow \text{Female}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>The higher the level of education, the higher political trust.</td>
<td>Level of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Catholics exhibit more trust toward authorities.</td>
<td>Dummy; $0 \Rightarrow \text{no Catholic, } 1 \Rightarrow \text{Catholic}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy worse</td>
<td>People who perceive that the economy got worse exhibit lower trust toward authorities.</td>
<td>Dummy; $0 \Rightarrow \text{stayed the same/got better, } 1 \Rightarrow \text{got worse}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Unemployed exhibit lower trust toward authorities.</td>
<td>Dummy; $0 \Rightarrow \text{not unemployed, } 1 \Rightarrow \text{unemployed}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables: Contextual level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct democracy: Availability of rights</td>
<td>The more extensive direct democratic rights in a canton, the higher political trust should be (H1).</td>
<td>Index by Fischer (2009) for 2003; $1 \Rightarrow \text{restrictive rights, } 6 \Rightarrow \text{permissive rights}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct democracy: Actual use</td>
<td>The more extensive the actual use of direct democratic instruments in a canton, the lower political trust should be (H2).</td>
<td>Frequency of initiatives and optional referendums per year averaged 2002-2006 according to Année Politique Suisse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDICES

Financial state  
The better the financial state of a canton, the higher political trust.  
Index of financial state in 2006 according to ID-HEAP; 1 = poor, 6 = excellent

National income  
The higher the national income of a canton, the higher political trust.  
Primary national income per capita in 2005 according to BADAC; in 100,000 SFR

Language region  
Political trust is higher in German speaking cantons.  
Dummy; 0 = Roman canton, 1 = German speaking canton

Independent variables: Instrumental regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>The higher the population density, the easier are initiatives and optional referendums, and thus the lower political trust.</td>
<td>Number of inhabitants per km² in 2000 according to BADAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban or rural area</td>
<td>Political trust should be higher in urban contexts.</td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = urban, 2 = rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of canton</td>
<td>Political trust should be higher in smaller cantons.</td>
<td>Surface according to Swiss Federal Statistical Office in km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td>Political trust should be higher cantons with fewer inhabitants.</td>
<td>Total number of inhabitants in 2007 according to BADAC</td>
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# Appendix 4.2

<table>
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<td>Political Trust in cantonal political authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>4392</td>
<td>51.94</td>
<td>17.67</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>4392</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4352</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>3.55</td>
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<td>Catholic</td>
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<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economy worse</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Direct democracy: Availability of rights</td>
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<td>1.75</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<td>Direct democracy: Actual use</td>
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<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.26</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>0.96</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>National income</td>
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<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<td>Language region</td>
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<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Instrumental regression</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>5083</td>
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<td>Urban or rural area</td>
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<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Size of canton</td>
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<td>164035</td>
<td>187715</td>
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<td>Inhabitants</td>
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## Variable Operationalization Source

### Dependent variable

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td>“Do you generally feel close to a political party?” / 0 = No; 1 = Yes</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
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### Independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index of direct democracy</td>
<td>Permissiveness of institutional hurdles according to Stutzer (1999) / 1 = low; 6 = high</td>
<td>(Schaub and Dlabac 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of popular votes</td>
<td>Average number of popular votes (on initiatives and referendums) over 2005-2009 / Log</td>
<td>(Schaub and Dlabac 2012)</td>
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### Individual control variables

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age in years</td>
<td>in years</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td>0 = no education; 12 = University degree</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1 = Male; 2 = Female</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Gross monthly income of respondent’s household / 1 = less than CHF 2,000; 11 = more than CHF 11,000</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological position</td>
<td>Self-placement on left-right scale / 0 = left; 10 = right</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>Factual knowledge questions regarding Swiss politics / 0 = low knowledge; 7 = high knowledge</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>“How interested are you in general in politics?” / 1 = very interested; 4 = not interested at all</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialism</td>
<td>Inglehart index / 1 = Materialist; 4 = Postmaterialist</td>
<td>Selects 2011</td>
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</table>
### Contextual control variables

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<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanisation</td>
<td>Degree of urbanization in 2001 / in %</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Statistical Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Catholics</td>
<td>Share of Catholics in population in 2010</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Statistical Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Number of inhabitants in 2010 / in 10,000</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Statistical Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Change of unemployment rate between 2004–2010</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Statistical Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First sector employees</td>
<td>Share of employees in the first sector in 2005 / in %</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Statistical Office</td>
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### Instrumental analysis

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<thead>
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<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>Share of peasants</td>
<td>Share of employees in the agrarian population in 1910 / in %</td>
<td>(Brugger 1978)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>First sector employees</td>
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<td><strong>Instrumental analysis</strong></td>
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<td>Share of peasants</td>
<td>25</td>
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