Are We Sims? How Computer Simulations Represent and What this Means for the Simulation Argument

Beisbart, Claus (2014). Are We Sims? How Computer Simulations Represent and What this Means for the Simulation Argument. The Monist. an international quarterly journal of general philosophical inquiry, 97(3), pp. 399-417. The Edward C. Hegeler Foundation 10.5840/monist201497325

Preview

Text simarg_published.pdf - Published Version Available under License Publisher holds Copyright. Download (846kB) | Preview

N. Bostrom’s simulation argument and two additional assumptions imply that we are likely to live in a computer simulation. The argument is based upon the following assumption about the workings of realistic brain simulations: The hardware of a computer on which a brain simulation is run bears a close analogy to the brain itself. To inquire whether this is so, I analyze how computer simulations trace processes in their targets. I describe simulations as fictional, mathematical, pictorial, and material models. Even though the computer hardware does provide a material model of the target, this does not suffice to underwrite the simulation argument because the ways in which parts of the computer hardware interact during simulations do not resemble the ways in which neurons interact in the brain. Further, there are computer simulations of all kinds of systems, and it would be unreasonable to infer that some computers display consciousness just because they simulate brains rather than, say, galaxies.

Interest & Impact

Downloads

194 since deposited on 13 Mar 2015
40 in the past 12 months

Citations

5 Citations in Web of Science ®
6 Citations in Scopus

Search

in Google Scholar™

Services

Actions (login required)

Edit item

Actions (login required)

Edit item