Loyal to the Game? Strategic Policy Representation in Mixed Electoral Systems

Bernauer, Julian; Munzert, Simon (2014). Loyal to the Game? Strategic Policy Representation in Mixed Electoral Systems. Representation - the journal of representative democracy, 50(1), pp. 83-97. Routledge 10.1080/00344893.2014.902221

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In Germany's compensatory mixed electoral system, alternative electoral routes lead into parliament. We study the relationship between candidates' electoral situations across both tiers and policy representation, fully accounting for candidate, party and district preferences in a multi-actor constellation and the exact electoral incentives for candidates to represent either the party or the district. The results (2009 Bundestag election data) yield evidence of an interactive effect of closeness of the district race and list safety on candidates' positioning between their party and constituency.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Institute of Political Science

UniBE Contributor:

Bernauer, Julian

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 320 Political science

ISSN:

0034-4893

Publisher:

Routledge

Language:

English

Submitter:

Julian Bernauer

Date Deposited:

25 Mar 2015 09:20

Last Modified:

25 Mar 2015 09:20

Publisher DOI:

10.1080/00344893.2014.902221

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/65394

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