Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue

Bochsler, Daniel; Bernauer, Julian (2014). Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue. Representation - the journal of representative democracy, 50(1), pp. 1-12. Routledge 10.1080/00344893.2014.902214

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The study of strategic behaviour and the impact of institutions on elections has mainly focused on simple and conventional electoral systems: list-proportional electoral systems (PR) and the plurality vote. Less conventional systems are not on the agenda of comparative studies, even though no less than 30% of countries use unconventional electoral systems for their national parliamentary elections, such as the Single Transferable Vote, PR with majority bonuses, or mixed electoral systems. Often, they provide for unusual combinations of different institutional incentives, and hence to particular actor strategies.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Institute of Political Science

UniBE Contributor:

Bernauer, Julian

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 320 Political science

ISSN:

0034-4893

Publisher:

Routledge

Language:

English

Submitter:

Julian Bernauer

Date Deposited:

29 Apr 2015 12:09

Last Modified:

30 Apr 2015 06:07

Publisher DOI:

10.1080/00344893.2014.902214

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.65421

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/65421

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