Second-Personal Reasons and Special Obligations

Löschke, Jörg (2014). Second-Personal Reasons and Special Obligations. Croatian Journal of Philosophy(14), pp. 293-308. Kruzak

[img]
Preview
Text
Second-personal%20Reasons%20and%20Special%20Obligations.pdf - Submitted Version
Available under License Publisher holds Copyright.

Download (111kB) | Preview

The paper discusses the second-personal account of moral obligation as put forward by Stephen Darwall. It argues that on such an account, an important part of our moral practice cannot be explained, namely special obligations that are grounded in special relationships between persons. After highlighting the problem, the paper discusses several strategies to accommodate such special obligations that are implicit in some of Darwall’s texts, most importantly a disentanglement strategy and a reductionist strategy. It argues that neither one of these strategies is entirely convincing. The last part of the papers sketches a novel account of how to accommodate special obligations in a second-personal framework: According to this suggestion, special obligations might be due to the fact that relationships change the normative authority that persons have over each other.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy
06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy > Practical Philosophy

UniBE Contributor:

Löschke, Jörg

Subjects:

100 Philosophy
100 Philosophy > 170 Ethics

ISSN:

1333-1108 ; 1847-6139

Publisher:

Kruzak

Funders:

[4] Swiss National Science Foundation

Projects:

[UNSPECIFIED] Der normative Stellenwert akteur-relativer Gründe

Language:

English

Submitter:

Jörg Löschke

Date Deposited:

16 Apr 2015 14:32

Last Modified:

19 Apr 2015 15:14

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.67184

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/67184

Actions (login required)

Edit item Edit item
Provide Feedback