**From Personal Network to Institution Building:**

**The Lifanyuan, Gift Exchange and the Formalization of Manchu-Mongol Relations**

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**Introduction**

The Qing emperors (1636-1911) during the 17th and 18th century centuries expanded the boundaries of China into Inner Asia to an unprecedented degree. Substantial parts of Mongol and Tibetan territories, as well as today’s Xinjiang were brought under the rule of the dynasty. As a result, the Qing government faced the challenge of integrating the administration of newly acquired territories and peoples into the structures of their state. The question of how the Qing managed to affiliate various Inner Asian peoples with an administrative system, which was largely inherited from the previous Chinese Ming dynasty (1368-1644) has been at the center of scholarly discussions for many years. This paper will focus on the Lifanyuan,[[1]](#endnote-1) an office created by the Qing in order to maintain and monitor their relations with the Mongol nobility. With the expansion of the empire the duties of the Lifanyuan were extended to some other Inner Asian domains, and it came to promote and control the territorial integration of frontier peoples within in the Qing empire.

The Lifanyuan represented an important interface, interlinking the coordination of Inner Asian, namely Mongol, issues, with other central government authorities. However, the multiple administrative arrangements reached in the frontier regions of the Qing empire did not constitute a steady condition. Johan Elverskog (2006: 7) reminded us that Qing rule was an ongoing process, which implied that the relationship between the imperial center and local authorities had to be constantly redefined.[[2]](#endnote-2) Policies of domination caused reactions and counterstrategies among their Inner Asian subjects and political partners. The modalities of their integration and the status specific communities had within the Qing state reflected the conditions under which they, at different times, had acknowledged Qing overlordship. Likewise, after formal recognition of Qing overlordship, elites in their interaction with the throne participated in shaping the nature of their relationship with the court.

When looking at the fields of responsibility of the Lifanyuan, many had their roots in early 17th century Manchu-Mongol diplomatic relations. The recently published routine memorials of the Lifanyuan reveal that this office – besides legal issues – was largely concerned with personnel matters, such as staging the Inner Asian nobility’s regular visits to the court,[[3]](#endnote-3) bestowal of ranks and titles, rewards and obituaries.[[4]](#endnote-4) For this reason, the interaction of the Qing court with Mongol authorities can be interpreted within the framework of the political culture of patronage. However, the fact that practices, which during the period of state formation had been of a flexible and accommodative nature, were formalized and their observance supervised by a central government agency according to clearly defined rules brought about significant changes. Based on Manchu and Mongol recently published primary sources, this paper argues that the Qing reinterpreted their relationship with Inner Asian leaders fundamentally and gift exchange acquired new meanings. The emphasis shifted from recording what was “received” to recording what was “given”, thereby focusing on the generosity of the emperor. This adds another facet to the observation of Pamely Crossley that the Qing emperors, by re-evaluating the past, cultivated the image of morally absolute, “internally satisfied and externally omnicompetent” rule (1999: 224). Moreover, looking at the way how Mongol leaders reacted to the changes in Manchu self-conception will contribute to our understanding of the contested nature of Qing rule in the outer regions.

As has been stressed by a number of scholars, Qing administration in the frontier regions was marked by a high degree of flexibility. By adapting to local conditions, the Qing allowed a variety of administrative systems to coexist in Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. According to Peter Perdue “Flexible, negotiated local administration, a feature of imperial rule everywhere, revealed itself more openly on the frontier than elsewhere” (2005: 558). Mark Elliott underlines “the diversity of this system, the lack of consistency across regions, and the fact that it differed so utterly from the administrative system used in the interior provinces” (2011: 406). The different ways of integrating Mongol confederations into the Qing state in the 17th and 18th centuries provide a vivid example for the fact that the dynasty had no overall master plan for the integration of Inner Asian peoples into their realm, but had a wide range of models at its command when meeting with the specific demands and expectations of native leaders.

The Mongols settling south of the Gobi in a territory corresponding roughly with today’s Inner Mongolia, had been in close political contact with the Manchus long before the founding of the Qing dynasty. After formally acknowledging Hong Taiji (reigned 1627–1643) as the first emperor of the Qing dynasty in 1636, they experienced the fundamental change of Manchu-Mongol relationship from – more or less – equal partnership to outright subordination (Di Cosmo 2012). Over the course of the 17th century they were reorganized in territorial-administrative units, banners, under the rulership (in Mongol *jasaγ*) of a hereditary prince.

When the Qalqa Mongols, formally under Qing rule since 1691, entered their political sphere of influence, the Manchus were already emperors of China. Under heavy pressure from the Oirat Mongols, who had their pasture grounds in the northern parts of today’s Xinjiang, the Qalqa nobility opted for allying with the Qing. As regards territorial integration of the Qalqa nobility, the Qing built on practices which had been successfully implemented among the Southern Mongols: Established political formations were left intact, and their leaders, if they were considered to be loyal and trustworthy, were granted ranks and titles and were acknowledged as “ruling” (*jasaγ*).[[5]](#endnote-5) Their position was backed up by certain material benefits and securities, but, of course, in the long run this secure status came at the price of their political autonomy. After 1911, the Qalqa Mongols regained independence and their territory makes up today’s Republic of Mongolia. Early 20th century debates over Mongol independence focused on the character of the Manchu-Mongol relationship, which, in the eyes of Qalqa Mongol representatives, was founded on alliance rather than conquest (Bulag 2012).

The Oirats, who after a series of vigorous campaigns were integrated between 1691 and 1771, were treated differently.[[6]](#endnote-6) After paying a heavy price in blood, only few of them were resettled along the lines of the pattern tested among Eastern Mongol confederations. Most were intermingled and reorganized in newly created administrative units and were resettled in the Khovd and Amur regions, others were integrated into the Eight Banner system (Elliott 2001) or, as prisoners of war, degraded to the status of slaves (Oyunjargal 2011: 5-20; Perdue 2009b: 31/32).

**The Concept of Patronage and Trends towards Formalization of Language and Behaviour**

This paper argues that political patronage and its potential to make individuals part of groups and hierarchies is a useful concept for explaining the successful politics of the Qing in Inner Asia and especially their strategies of integrating Eastern Mongol confederations in the 17th century. This is an important aspect, because for the Qing emperor the role of a patron granting protection and support was in accordance with the image of a patron of Tibetan Buddhism and sponsorship of Buddhist art, translations and printings. Likewise, the logic of patronage with its emphasis on gifts and donations blended together well with representations of the emperor as Cakravartin, as “wheel-turning king”, who was incumbent on establishing both religious and secular rule. Many scholars have stressed the importance of Buddhism as a cornerstone of Qing political strategy in Inner Asia, and most recently Johan Elverskog investigated the role of Buddhism in redefining Mongol identity in relation to the Qing and in shaping Mongol discourses of self-representation and communal boundaries. He showed that “Mongol Buddhist identity” was not static, but developed in a process of establishing Mongol history in the context of universal Buddhist history (Elverskog 2006: 109-116; Kollmar-Paulenz 2005: 210-216). The technique of patronage was developed and employed in the interaction with Mongol authorities in the early 17th century, at a time, when Buddhist notions of rulership were not a decisive factor in Manchu-Mongol political relations (Di Cosmo 2006: 262). However, by qualifying the Manchu ruler as protecting, beneficent, kind and forgiving, it provided an interpretative framework for future representations of the position of the emperor vis-à-vis his Mongol subjects. The fact that worship of the emperor was not only rooted in Buddhism has also been noticed by Atwood, who concludes: “To speak then of religion in Mongolia, and the sacredness of the emperor, is not necessarily to speak only of Buddhism and the emperor as an incarnation of Ma[ñjušrī](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma%C3%B1ju%C5%9Br%C4%AB-m%C5%ABla-kalpa). Thus his hold upon the loyalties of his Mongolian subjects, while not of course absolute, was to a large degree independent of any other competing political or religious system of legitimation” (2000: 129/130).

It should be made very clear that this does not mean that the Qing emperors governed their Inner Asian dependencies solely by means of patronage. On top of the local network formed by secular and religious authorities, the Qing over the course of the 18th century overlaid a further system of imperial representatives, who exercised control more directly and were backed up by military garrisons (Millward 2004: 101). The conventions and formalized mechanisms of political patronage, however, were retained and mirrored in the organisation of the Lifanyuan and its routine procedures: This office was responsible for staging the elaborate ceremonies, which were designed to demonstrate the bond between Inner Asian political leaders and the emperor. Its duties included supervision of practices like the Imperial Hunt, scheduled visits to the court and tribute missions. All these performances were outward signs of the loyalty of Inner Asian followers of the Qing, and, at the same time, demonstrated that the emperor was going to take his part as the one who offered status and support (Rowe 2009: 39). Another important task field of the Lifanyuan was the administration of justice over Mongols (Heuschert: 1998). However, as has been argued by Heuschert-Laage, dispensation of justice was another means for the Manchu ruler to display his ability to protect people and property (2012: 5/6), and thus contributed to his image as a patron. It is true that the Lifanyuan also assumed responsibilities, which went beyond the concept of patronage, as, for example, it collected the maps each banner had to hand in in regular intervals. These, however, were tasks it took over in the later part of the dynasty, as banner boundaries were not strictly defined before the 19th century (Bawden 1968: 90; Kamimura 2005: 14).

The concept of patronage as a model for understanding Qing rule in Inner Asia so far has been mainly applied to the Qing emperor’s efforts vis-à-vis religious authorities (Farquhar 1978; Köhle 2008). In this paper I will discuss the patronage relationship the Qing emperors had developed with worldly authorities, and will point out that this concept – or rather the façade of it - had repercussions on Qing institution building. This is in accordance with the findings of Nicola Di Cosmo, who pointed out that “the later development of the Qing frontier organization was based on principles and practices that pre-dated 1644, even though they were not initially designed specifically as frontier policies” (2012: 177).

Let me briefly outline what I mean by the concept of patronage. Patronage as a means for supporting territorial integration is not only known in the context of Asian history, but the obligatory reciprocity of this kind of relationship was a constitutive element of political culture in early modern Europe too. According to Sharon Kettering, who conducted research on the role of patronage relationships in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France, patronage “meant, historically, a system of personal ties and networks that was pervasive politically and socially in early modern Europe. Used in that sense here, the English word ‘patronage’ denotes an individual relationship, multiple relationships organized into networks, and an overall system based on these ties and networks” (1992: 839). Kettering’s research was the basis for a range of studies in this field, focussing on diverse topics such as the implications of gift exchange and the specific language of patronage with its verbal formulas emphasizing loyalty, gratitude and respect (Emich et al.: 2005). Expressions of courtesy were essential for maintaining patronage relationships and their absence usually indicated the termination of the relationship (Kettering 2002: vii). This was by no means a unilateral process as clients benefitted from this relationship and tried to manipulate their patrons (Newbury 2003: 16).

The patronage relationship between the Manchu ruler and members of the Mongol nobility owes its origin to the historical circumstances of the early 17th century.[[7]](#endnote-7) The shift in power, which characterizes the relationship between Manchus and Mongol confederations from the 1630s onwards appears to be puzzling: What prompted the Mongol nobles, who in the late 1620s had concluded treaties with the Manchus on eye-level, to integrate into the evolving Manchu state? They surely had to recognize Manchu military superiority, but the Manchus were engaged in a war with Ming China and had to pool their forces to this effort (Di Cosmo 2012: 181).

In order to understand the political rationalities behind Mongol politics at that time, it is important to keep in mind that “the Mongols” were not a homogeneous group and did not follow a coherent policy. Nicola Di Cosmo uses the term “tutelage” in order to denote the specific role of Mongols within the Qing empire, who were granted protection and guidance, and, in return, had to accept a loss of a certain degree of independence and autonomy (2012: 189-191). I prefer the term “patronage”, because it refers to a relationship, which is not concluded with a “political entity” or “country or people” (190), but between individuals. The Manchus held up political contacts with numerous members of the Mongol elite, and Mongols did not form a political entity. In the early 17th century, Mongol confederations had been wedged between two Inner Asian centres of gravity, which were the Mongol Čaqar and the rising political power of the Manchus. After 1632, when the Čaqar khanate disintegrated, many Čaqar defected to the side of the Manchus (Weiers 1975: 448-450, 1989/91: 256).[[8]](#endnote-8) These refugees often had to leave all their herds and belongings behind and empty handedly entered pasture grounds claimed by other Mongol confederations, who had allied themselves with the Manchus long before. In the social and economic conflicts, deriving from these population movements, the Manchu leader was appealed to as a superordinate authority. He was regarded as a power providing protection for displaced populations, and the sources provide plenty of evidence that the integration of refugees was an urgent issue of concern for the Manchu state in the early 1630s (Weiers 1998). Even though Hong Taiji at that point in time was cautious not to interfere too much with intra-Mongol affairs, his willingness and ability to respond satisfactorily to the concerns of individuals or groups requiring his help consolidated his position among the Mongols settling south of the Gobi (Di Cosmo 2006: 255; Heuschert-Laage 2012: 5-6).

From the early 1630s onwards Manchu correspondence with Mongol leaders remarkably often refers to the ability of the Manchu ruler to grant protection. Nicola Di Cosmo has drawn our attention to the fact that it was at that time the Manchu ruler adopted a “terminology that refers to caring, protecting, nurturing and cherishing” and pointed out that the Mongol term *ömögle-* (to protect) was frequently used in Manchu-Mongol correspondence (2012: 191).[[9]](#endnote-9) In addition, Mongol words like *örösiye-* (to be gracious to, to show mercy) and *qayirala-* (to love, to take care of) became increasingly common when referring to the nature of the relationship of the Manchu ruler to individual Mongol nobleman(*Arban doloduγar jaγun-u* 1997: vol. 1, 29 (9), vol. 2, 9 (14+27), vol. 2, 10 (9+19); Weiers 1983: 420/421). This choice of words suggests that Hong Taiji made use of the language of patronage, which according to Sharon Kettering is characterized by “verbal formulas emphasizing loyalty, affection, gratitude, respect, honor, and trust” (Kettering 2002: vii).

The political rhetoric was further developed and became a means to stress the hierarchical structuring of the evolving Manchu state. In 1636, the requirements for Manchu-Mongol correspondence were redefined and Mongols communicating with the throne were provided with a set of terminological rules which they had to follow.[[10]](#endnote-10) We may assume that formalized language and behaviour helped to forge a corporate identity of loyal adherents of the Manchu ruler, who, by complying with a special code of conduct, distinguished themselves from both commoners and rival Mongol leaders. As will be shown below, with the Lifanyuan taking up its business the trend towards formalization was reinforced.

**Formalizing Gift Exchange and Visits to the Court**

Chia Ning has drawn our attention to the importance of rituals in the interaction of the Qing with Inner Asia and has done research on the different tasks of the Lifanyuan, which was responsible for their correct performance. Concentrating on three different aspects, that is visits to the court, the Imperial Hunt and Tribute, Chia Ning argues that these practices were part of Manchu Mongol political interaction as early as the 1630s (1993: 64-70). In order to better understand the transformation these symbolic actions underwent over the course of time – and especially with the imperial court moving to Beijing in 1644 -, it is instructive to take a closer look at archival material. To appear at the court at New Year and express one’s good wishes by bowing down and presenting gifts to the ruler was common practice long before the establishment of the Qing dynasty and is frequently mentioned in the *Jiu Manzhou Dang*, the Old Manchu Archives, the earliest extant source on the historical events, which led to the founding of the Qing dynasty. From the 8th day of the first lunar month of the fifth year of Sure Khan (February 8th, 1631), for example, the *Jiu Manzhou Dang* report:[[11]](#endnote-11)

On the 8th day Šamba Tabunang[[12]](#endnote-12) and Sirantu of the Qaračin came in order to make kowtow in front of the Khan. What they brought [as presents]: Šamba hold ready one horse and meat of five sheep, Sirantu one horse, one falcon and one tiger skin. [The Khan] took the sheepmeat and the falcon. He did not take anything else [but] returned it.

Five days later, the Qaračin delegation left and the *Jiu Manzhou Dang* record the following:[[13]](#endnote-13)

On that same day Šamba Tabunang, Sirantu and Wang Lama of the Qaračin left. What was given to them on the occasion of their departure: We handed over one sword and ten bushels of grain to Šamba Tabunang, one quiver and ten bushels of grain to Sirantu and one scale armor, one harness and one helmet to Wang Lama.

From the *Jiu Manzhou Dang* we learn that, when a Mongol delegation came to the Manchu court, its members would bring presents, usually horses, but also camels, furs, saddles, bridle parts, armament and other goods. It needs to be stressed that these gifts were recorded in detail by stating who had presented what, giving the personal names and titles of the donors and stating the political entity (in Mongol *ulus*) they belonged to or the name of the personality they were affiliated with.[[14]](#endnote-14) Interestingly, usually not all gifts were accepted, but some were immediately returned (Weiers 1979: 138, 1987: 110/111; *Arban doloduγar jaγun-u* 1997:vol. 2, 350/351; Di Cosmo/Bao 2003: 173). When a Mongol delegation left the Manchu court, its members were likewise presented with gifts (*Jiu Manzhou Dang* 1969: fol. 3373-3469; Gruber 2006: 39-105). These gifts were often handed over on the occasion of a banquet, which was given by the Manchu ruler for the departing guests (Gruber 2006: 112-117; Weiers 1979: 138, 1983: 414/415).

The exchange of gifts was a way to express one’s appreciation and respect. The facts that the sources meticulously record who had given what may indicate the economic value of the presents. At the same time, it shows that it was the origin of the object and the identity of the donor, which were important: The purpose of record keeping was not to summarize the amount of “profit” (cattle, food and drink, furs or precious stones) made upon the visit of a Mongol delegation, but it was important to state in writing the name and identity of every person, who had presented something to the court. We may thus conclude that, by offering gifts to him, members of the Mongol elite established a personal bond to the Manchu ruler.

We may assume that for the persons concerned this gift exchange was by no means arbitrary and they were well aware of certain rules for this kind of interaction. Visits to the court, mutual presents and festive meals were part of a social and cultural practice. A first attempt to formalize the modalities of gift exchange dates from 1637, when upon the request of the emperor, the Lifanyuan established guidelines for the number and value of presents offered by members of the Mongol elite on occasions such as the emperor’s birthday, the New Year celebration and imperial weddings.[[15]](#endnote-15)

Order of the Holy Qaγan, who brings peace and is the one, who shows great mercy. We specified the amount of presents to be delivered on occasions such as the birthday of the long-living Holy Qaγan, the New Year celebration and in cases of great happiness and [the following] has been established by the Lifanyuan. The number of presents to be delivered by Wang, Noyan and Taiji[[16]](#endnote-16) of the polities on the outside on the occasion of the birthday of the long-living Holy Qaγan for each banner [amounts to] four horses to the Holy Qaγan, two horses to the empress and – as food – one cow and eight sheep; on the occasion of great happiness the Wang, Noyan and Taiji of the polities on the outside each will deliver two horses to the Holy Qaγan and one horse to the empress as presents and – as food – one cow and eight sheep; on the occasion of the New Year celebration four horses to the Holy Qaγan, two horses to the empress and – as food – one cow and eight sheep. On the 30th day of the first winter month of the second year of Degedü Erdemtü (December 15, 1637).

Archival material shows that this trend towards standardization was reinforced during the Shunzhi period (1644-1661), when the Lifanyuan issued regulations regarding the frequency of visits to the court. Moreover, at that time strict guidelines were given what sort of gifts individual Mongol noblemen would *receive* on these occasions(*Qing chao qianqi Lifanyuan* 2010: vol. 1, nos. 50, 80, 92 and 105; Song forthcoming). In parallel with standardizing the modalities of the visits their political significance was also re-evaluated. From that time on, return presents given to Mongols were denoted as “rewards”. I will take this shift of emphasis as a reason to take a closer look at the character of these transactions and their political implications.

The concept of patronage is closely related to the obligatory nature of gift exchange. Sharon Kettering, when developing her model of political patronage acknowledges that she is indebted to Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-Strauss (Kettering 1992: 844). Marcel Mauss analyzed the obligatory reciprocity of gifts, that is to say the obligation to give, to receive and to reciprocate (Mauss 2002: 16/17; Fournier 2006: 40). Even though Mauss’s work was published ninety years ago, his insights into the important role of gift exchange in establishing and sustaining bonds between individuals and groups are still central in anthropological debates to the present day (Sykes 2005) and have also been a source of inspiration for other disciplines (Komter 1996). Gift giving has been seen as a way of expressing social solidarity (Komter 2005), and, because it implies obligations which are not necessarily reciprocated immediately, it is a way of creating long term network relationships based on mutual trust (Caillé 2010: 183). According to Mauss, the obligation to give and receive cannot only be explained by utilitarian concerns and is not a purely economic relationship (Sykes 2005: 2/3). As it stands in stark contrast with market modes of transaction, it may not be surprising that in historical research the importance of gift giving in human interaction has been particularly emphasized for earlier periods, while there are few studies for the modern period (Krausman Ben-Amos 2008: 7/8). In the political environment of the pre-modern period, gift exchange was a way to create a personal bond between two persons and “to refuse to give or receive a gift is to refuse a personal relationship, which may be interpreted as a hostile act” (Kettering 1988: 131/132). Moreover, the obligation to reciprocate was not openly expressed but rather masked by a language of courtesy (1988: 133/134). According to Sharon Kettering, “polite references to the gracious, voluntary bestowal of patronage by a benevolent superior upon a worthy inferior for his valuable service were more complimentary and a more flattering portrayal of the giver and a greater honor for the recipient than the reality of an obligatory relationship” (1992: 844). As Krausman Ben-Amos has shown, relations based on gift giving could become enmeshed in the administrative structures of the state apparatus (2008: 9). This process can also be observed in the case of the Manchus and was related to a re-interpretation of the character of gift exchange.

It is notable that the emphasis of the Manchu side shifted from recording what was *received* to recording what was *given*. As stated above, during the time of Hong Taiji it was meticulously written down, which Mongol leader had presented what. The agency responsible for this kind of record-keeping was the Lifanyuan, which - at least from 1639 onwards - also sealed these records (*Arban doloduγar jaγun-u* 1997:vol. 2). In 1646, however, the practice of recording details of these transactions changed. The gifts of the Mongol side were still recorded, but, additionally, a list of return presents was added indicating which member of a Mongol delegation had received what(*Arban doloduγar jaγun-u* 1997:vol. 2, nos. 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49). Moreover, while the neutral Mongol term *beleg*, “present”, was used for gifts of Mongols given to the Manchu ruler on the occasion of their ennoblement, other gifts, given for example on the occasion of the New Year festival, were designated by the Lifanyuan as *alba*, “duties” (*Arban doloduγar jaγun-u* 1997: vol. 2, nos. 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49). It is difficult to assess under which political circumstances the gifts/duties were exchanged, because, in most cases, only names, titles and the amount of gifts is documented. The return presents given by the Manchu side, however, were called *öglige*, “donations, alms”, which denotes a present for a superior to an inferior (Doerfer 1963b: 140).[[17]](#endnote-17)

While in 1646 presents and return-presents (labeled as “donations”) had been recorded equally, Lifanyuan memorials drafted a decade later reveal that the gift exchange with Mongol leaders had been further re-interpreted. The Lifanyuan in 1654, 1655, 1656 presented the emperor with five memorials discussing gifts for members of the Mongol nobility who had come to the court(*Qing chao qianqi Lifanyuan* 2010: vol. 1, nos. 50, 80, 84, 92, 105). Significantly, it did not make any mention of presents the emperor may have received or expected from the guests. Apparently, the issue, which called for a debate and new regulations, was the quality and amount of gifts *given* by the court. This is an important point because, as James Hevia has shown, for the Qing court the rituals performed in connection with gift exchange were a means for constructing power relations. Being closely connected to the “lesser lord’s” act of offering, according to Hevia “the importance of bestowal lies in the fact that by flowing down, it completes the hierarchical relationship of superior and inferior” (1995: 129) and thus allowed the inclusion of the “lesser lord’s” powers into the universal rule of the emperor (123). There is widespread agreement that gift-exchange and tribute should not be seen as formalized “systems”, but rather as flexible practices able to embrace a variety of meanings and connotations (Perdue 2009a: 86/87). Even though the formal language of gift-exchange was accepted by all sides, the parties concerned could place different value on certain aspects of this interaction.

Concurrently with the re-evaluation of gifts *given*, the terminology used at the court also changed. The Manchu expression used for imperial gifts was no longer neutral (*būhengge* - “that what is given”) (*Jiu Manzhou Dang* 1969: fol. 3378), but was now *šangnara*, which means “reward”.[[18]](#endnote-18) This term over the Qing period was commonly used in the official correspondence of the Lifanyuan giving the impression that the issue was not a mutual gift-exchange. The presents were no longer a means to express mutual respect, but were given in return for an open acknowledgment of Qing superiority and acceptance of a new hierarchical order. This is in accordance with the analysis of Chia Ning, who points out: “These gifts were granted in return for the pilgrims’ ritual performance to the emperor, rather than their gifts’ presented to the emperor, as in the Tribute” (1993: 66). The fact that the emperor likewise had received gifts, and, in this sense, was under the obligation to reciprocate was downplayed. In the *Jiu Manzhou Dang*, the records made before the conquest of China, the Manchu term *šangnambi* “to reward” was also used but it seems to have been reserved for objects given to envoys commuting between the Manchu court and Mongol rulers. For gifts bestowed on representatives from Mongol confederations, who had come to the court in person, the more neutral term *bumbi* “to give, to hand over” was used.[[19]](#endnote-19)

From this we may conclude that in the Shunzhi period, that is the years after the Qing emperors had taken residence in Beijing, the emperor aimed at setting out his position as the one who gives, not as the one who receives. To be clear, this was a matter of self-conception and does not mean that gift transactions had indeed become unidirectional. It would be a mistake to assume that there were no regulations or conventions regarding the gifts Mongols were expected to bring to the capital when they came for the New Year’s ceremony or, even less, that Mongols came to the court empty-handedly. Moreover, in addition to the gift exchange performed on the occasion of Mongol noble’s visit to the court, there were also other transactions, which are usually classified as tribute (Bao 2006). Tribute could be presented at the court by envoys, but it did also have a frontier dimension, which was less subjected to clear rules (Di Cosmo 2003: 355). The “Internal Copy of the Lifanyuan Zeli”, for example, includes some quotas for horses and azurite the Tümed of Hohhot were supposed to supply dating from 1645 and 1657. Another regulation concerning tribute to be paid from the Qorčin and other Mongol banners dates from 1674(*Qianlong chao neifu chaoben* 2006: 70) - and also shows that in the decades after the conquest of Beijing provisions were made for tribute relations, which did have commercial significance. According to the findings of Chia Ning, however, there is plenty of evidence that the Kangxi- (1662–1722) and Qianlong- (1736-1795) emperors did not try to increase but rather tried to limit the amount of tribute goods presented by Mongols (Chia 1993: 73-75).

When looking at the way how the Qing court tried to present itself we notice that the emphasis was on stating the generosity of the emperor. This becomes even more apparent when we look at the *Huang Qing Kaiguo Fanglüe*, a compilation commissioned in 1786 to glorify the history of the Manchu royal house before 1644. Its authors on many occasions elaborate on the lavish gifts granted by the Manchu ruler to his Mongol political partners. Gifts presented by Mongols, however, are usually only mentioned in passing and their value is made to appear insignificant. To draw an example, according to the *Huang Qing Kaiguo Fanglüe*, members of the Sönid Mongols, among them the influential leader Tenggis,[[20]](#endnote-20) in January 1640 came to the court in order to pay respect to Hong Taiji and brought “horses and camels” as presents. In return, the Manchu ruler gave them valuable presents such as suits of armour, helmets, bows, arrows, clothes embroidered with sable fur, clothes embroidered with dragons, caps, boots, belts, furs and silver (Hauer 1926: 495/496). The 18th century source is very brief on the presents received by the court, but, instead, elaborates on the return presents.

A document from January 20th, 1640, however, relates a somewhat different story of the same event. At the time, all presents received from Sönid Mongol leaders in January 1640 were listed in detail. We learn that most of them came with one or two horses or camels. Tenggis, however, presented forty horses, which at the time was a valuable gift(*Arban doloduγar jaγun-u* 1997: vol. 2, 260-262). Even though no list of return presents has been recorded, it is hard to imagine that the Manchu ruler had seen off the Sönid delegation empty handedly. Nevertheless, one may wonder from where the compilers of the *Huang Qing Kaiguo Fanglüe* in the late 18th century had the information on their exact quality and amount of the return gifts. Irrespective of what was actually given and received by both sides, it is noteworthy that in 1640 it was important to acknowledge the amount of gifts *received* while, from the viewpoint of 18th century Qing historiographers, what had to be stressed and needed to be recorded for posterity was the generosity of the Manchu ruler. As Oyunbilig (1999) and Weiers (1987) have shown, Qing court historians interpreted historical events of the 17th century in the light of the 18th century political situation. This trend was also confirmed by Pamela Crossley, who observed that “the Qianlong court obscured much of what it inherited from the ideologies of the Qing courts that preceded it” (1999: 20). Relations with Mongol political partners were redefined putting emphasis on imperial generosity and superiority.

When analysing the changing roles in Manchu-Mongol gift exchange we may come back to the obligation, which, according to Marcel Mauss, is inherent in every exchange of objects. As Mauss argued, gifts are never “free”, but the act of giving creates a bond between the one who gives and the one who receives (2002: 3). In the late 18th century, the fact that the Manchu emperor had received valuable gifts presented by the Mongol side was downplayed, and, by all appearances, he was not under the obligation to reciprocate. The Mongol nobles, however, who received favours from the Manchu ruler had to show themselves worthy and strive to requite imperial grace (Atwood: 2000). This shift of emphasis is important because it has implications for the notion of reciprocity. While the emperor acknowledged the position of Mongols by graciously conferring gifts to them, public recognition of imperial superiority was achieved by the Mongol side accepting the gifts. In the representation of the court, the active participation of Mongols in gift exchange and, associated therewith, their political agency was downplayed.

When we look at the objects, which were given to Mongol authorities on the occasion of their visit to the court, the quality of the goods changed. In the late Shunzhi period the court presented Mongols with gifts, which no longer emphasized martial arts or promoted their strength for defending as it had been usual during the conquest period. Objects symbolizing wealth, luxury and refinement like articles of clothing, jewellery etc. had been given to Mongols under the father of the Shunzhi emperor too (Gruber 2006: 116) – but usually in combination with armament. In the 1650s, however, Mongol leaders, who had come to the court, were presented with luxury goods, like satin, tea, silver bowls etc. (*Qing chao qianqi Lifanyuan* 2010: vol. 1, nos. 50, 80, 92, 105; Song forthcoming). According to Mauss’s model of gift exchange, gifts bear a general cultural meaning, but are also associated with the specific personal relationship in which they are transacted (Carrier 1991: 132/133). For Mongols, the objects bearing the meaning of their personal bond with the emperor were luxury items. They were given as external signs of wealth, and for their Mongol recipients visualized the prosperity, elegance and grandeur of the Qing dynasty. Even though we do not know whether the gifts were regarded as inalienable,[[21]](#endnote-21) these objects were certainly regarded as been directly linked to the person of the emperor and his generosity.

**Non-compliance with Rules of Behaviour as a Political Statement**

When the subject of Mongol opposition to Manchu rule comes up, historians usually put their attention on cases of armed resistance. When looking at the 17th century, the most prominent examples of Mongols denouncing their bond with the Manchus and resorting to force are the conflicts with the Sönid Mongols under their leader Tenggis in the years 1646-1648 and the military actions of the Čaqar Mongols, who in 1675 launched an attack on Mukden (Fang 1943/44b: 304–305). Archival material, however, proves that in the 17th century members of the Mongol nobility also used non-violent methods of passive resistance. In the same way as conforming to the requirements of formalized behaviour was a way of clearly affirming one’s position within the hierarchical structures of the Qing state, non-compliance with the newly established rules of conduct was more than misbehaviour – it was a political statement.

From the Shunzhi period onwards, there was a stricter regulatory framework for festive dinners held at the court for Mongol dignitaries (Song forthcoming). As we learn from the recently published archival material, not to appear at the court was understood as a form of protest. In 1659 the Lifanyuan reported to the emperor that two prominent rulers of the Qorčin Mongols had declined his invitation to come to the capital. The manner in which they had rejected the imperial request was deemed to be greatly disrespectful, and the Lifanyuan summarized their insolent remarks with these words:[[22]](#endnote-22)

When the emperor said “I want to get along well with you like a close relative, come!”, the Joriktu Cin Wang[[23]](#endnote-23) and the Darhan Baturu Giyūn Wang[[24]](#endnote-24) of the Qorčin did not happily come. Instead, the Joriktu Cin Wang did not ask for an imperial order, but, on his initiative, said “Because of the illness of the imperial princess I will postpone my arrival.” The Darhan Baturu Giyūn Wang brought forward all sorts of things like “I caught a cold” and “Moreover, my wife suffers from diarrhoea.[[25]](#endnote-25) Two [of your] grandchildren[[26]](#endnote-26) have [already] died.” and acted contrary to the imperial order and what he handed in as a memorial was greatly disrespectful.

Both Qorčin princes, who had received an invitation of the emperor to appear at the court together with their wives, were married to imperial princesses.[[27]](#endnote-27) As is well known, marital alliances were of great political significance and had been at the core of Manchu diplomacy towards the Mongols (Di Cosmo 2007; Jagchid 1986). Political relations were concluded and consolidated by strengthening family ties. Despite the fact that they were relatives by marriage, the two did not want to accept the invitation to the capital. The answer of the first, the Joriktu Cin Wang, was considered rude, because he simply declined the invitation and did not, as it would have been appropriate, ask for imperial permission not to appear. The case of the second, the Darhan Baturu Giyūn Wang, was different. His reply seemed to be evasive and he adopted a tone, which may have been considered too familiar in a correspondence with the emperor. Even though the emperor had alluded to the family ties between the two houses, to be too explicit about his and his wife’s health condition was possibly tantamount to transgressing the social boundaries, which separated the emperor from local Mongol power figures.

It is not clear, what prompted the two Qorčin noblemen to turn down the imperial request to come to the capital in this rather provocative manner. Five years earlier, in August 1654, both, the Joriktu Cin Wang and the Darhan Baturu Giyūn Wang had attended a banquet at the capital together with their wives and, in return, had received lavish gifts (*Qing chao qianqi Lifanyuan* 2010, vol. 1, 71/72). We cannot rule out the possibility that their dismissiveness was part of a strategy, which aimed at gaining more personal appreciation of their services to the dynasty. They may not have wanted to break with past policies of close cooperation but rather were negotiating for a better position and more privileges. This interpretation seems to be convincing at least in the case of the Darhan Baturu Giyūn Wang: Less than two months after the aforementioned memorial was made by the Lifanyuan, he was elevated from Giyūn Wang (prince of the second degree) to Cin Wang (prince of the first degree) (*Qing chao qianqi Lifanyuan* 2010: vol. 1, 222/223).

For the two Qorčin leaders, however, it was a risky game, and it is not likely that they were just trying to draw attention to themselves. The Lifanyuan officials were very much annoyed with their behaviour. They continued the memorial suggesting that – in return for their disrespectfulness – the two Qorčin princes should be brought to the capital and blamed there. The emperor, however, disapproved of this idea and requested the Lifanyuan to discuss the matter again with officials of the “Upper Three Banners”.[[28]](#endnote-28) His answer to the memorial of the Lifanyuan goes as follows:[[29]](#endnote-29)

When I said “come” and „let us reconcile with the Joriktu Wang and the Baturu Wang like close relatives” they didn’t listen to my order and did not come. Obviously prevaricating is against the law and their excuses were greatly disrespectful. Your ministry should get together with the officials of the three banners, discuss the matter and make a memorial! Drop [the idea] of bringing the princes here!

Even though the emperor stressed his family ties with the Qorčin nobility, this could not conceal the obligatory character of his invitation. Non-compliance was a clear breach of the principles relevant in this kind of personal but also political relationship. By refusing to accept the invitation, the Qorčin sent out a signal and their failure to answer the letters of the emperor with adequate courtesy and affection was interpreted as hostile behaviour.

Even though we do not know the concrete reasons for the evasive answers of the two princes, their reaction can be comprehended within the historical context. Among the Mongol groups, which had joined the Manchu project by 1659, the Qorčin can be said to been the most influential confederation. The memorial bringing to light the differences their leaders had with the Shunzhi emperor may be regarded as one of the few documents revealing that – apart from open rebellion – there was dissatisfaction on the part of the Mongol nobility about their growing marginalization. Court publications[[30]](#endnote-30) represent arrangements for audiences with the emperor as an accomplished fact, thus concealing that they were the result of a long process of debate. It was not a matter of course that Mongol nobles appeared at the court in regular intervals. The modalities of their visits were specified by the Lifanyuan in the Shunzhi period, in the years immediately preceding the memorial under discussion (*Qing chao qianqi Lifanyuan* 2010: vol. 1, nos. 92, 105; Song forthcoming). For this reason, the Qorčin rejection of the imperial invitation was probably not coincidental, but rather a reaction to attempts of the court to establish a standardized procedure for visits to the court. Qorčin princes as the most influential among the Qing Mongol nobility may have thought it beneath their dignity to be summoned to Beijing and to be treated according to a protocol, which was more or less equally applied to all Mongol princes.

**Conclusion**

The affiliation of Mongols to the Qing court was rooted in a network of personal relations, which had been built up between the Manchu ruler and members of the Mongol nobility. Personal bonds, however, need to be reinforced and consolidated permanently. This task was taken over by the Lifanyuan. Its officials provided the court with the necessary expertise to deal with the complicated network of relationships. They were informed about the genealogy of each Mongol noble house, kept up regular correspondence, and, of course, were responsible for the staging of the nobilities’ visits to the court and the gift exchange, which it involved. Gift-exchange was an element of diplomatic activity Mongols were well acquainted with before the rise of the Manchus. By re-interpreting these practices and putting a new emphasis on the generosity and grace of the emperor, the Qing filled existing forms of interaction with a new meaning. A key trend in the representation of gift-exchange seems to be a re-evaluation of what was donated by the court, which implied that the Mongol nobility was placed under the obligation to requite (Atwood 2000).

With regard to the Manchu heritage, Pamela Crossley has drawn our attention to formalizing tendencies in the administrative, political, cultural and spiritual life of the Qing (1987: 779). She contends: “In its political aspects this meant the progressive bureaucratization, regulation, and depersonalization of the state in displacement of the personal, diffused authority that had once been vested by tradition in the clans and confederations” (761). As I would like to argue, a similar trend towards streamlining, standardizing and formalizing can be observed in respect of the interaction of the Qing court with the Mongol nobility. The network of personal relationships, which had developed during the time of Hong Taiji, was maintained by exchange of gifts and courtesies, regular correspondence and visits to the court. During Hong Taiji’s rule these contacts were by no means informal, but there were certain standards pertaining for example to the procedures upon the arrival and departure of a Mongol mission at the court, festive meals and the nature of mutual presents (Gruber 2006: 111-117). There was, however, still some room for flexibility and a range of variation in the handling of these personal relationships. With the Lifanyuan taking over responsibility and drafting rules concerning the frequency, composition and modalities of Mongol visits to the Manchu court, the framework became much more rigid. Likewise, rules for the form of official correspondence were issued, and, by grading all members of the Mongols nobility, each person was positioned according to his relation with the Qing imperial house. The Lifanyuan seems to epitomize the wish for formalized processes, which determined the political role of the Mongol elite within the state.

Exploring law and citizenship in the Russian empire, Jane Burbank pointed out: “The connections that bound elite servitors into the skein of rule and service were personal, but their ultimate reference was always to the state and its unmatchable ability to reward and punish” (2007: 93). Linking the Mongol nobility to the state, the Lifanyuan established rules, which more or less equally pertained to all noble houses regardless of their standing prior to their affiliation with the Qing. There is indication that this policy was also met with opposition and ceremonial instructions were not always put into practice as smoothly as might appear from the perusal of court publications. Participating in festive ceremonies at the capital was a way of confirming the bond between the emperor and the Mongol nobility (Heuschert-Laage 2011: 56/57), and, likewise, declining the invitation of the emperor by a provocative answer was a political statement and was interpreted as disobedience.

In this paper the establishment of Qing rule over the Mongols has been explained with the model of political patronage. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the limitations of this practice as to efficiency became apparent to the Qing court. On top of the structures developed in the 17th century, the Qing at various places in the Mongol territories placed imperial representatives, who were in direct contact with the court.[[31]](#endnote-31) Regardless of the fact that patronage relationships no longer provided the channels for information and implementation of imperial policies, their symbolic representation was retained until the end of the dynasty and, as Uradyn Bulag has shown, this heritage was turned to even after the fall of the Qing and served as a model for the political interaction with Inner Asian leaders (Bulag 2010:71). This can be seen in the larger context of ethnohistory and supports the assumption that images of past inter-ethnic cooperation are used by multi-ethnic states as a resource for social cohesion (Schorkowitz 2012: 45).

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1. There can be no single accurate translation for this office, because its Chinese, Manchu and Mongol names are not equivalents, but convey different interpretations of this office’s responsibilities. For two recent discussions of the difficulties to find an English translation for this office see Di Cosmo (2012: 182-184) and Chia (2012: 2). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Stoler (2009: 41/42) sees this as a characteristic of imperial formations. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Later Chinese sources refer to these visits as *chaojin,* which can be translated as “pilgrimage to the emperor” (Chia 1993: 64). Manchu sources of the Shunzhi period refer to these visits as *aniya doroi jimbi* “come for the New Years’s ceremonies” (*Qing chao qianqi Lifanyuan* 2010: vol. 1, 141). For Chinese sources concerning Mongols visiting the court see Zhang (2010: 33-108). [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. See *Qing chao qianqi Lifanyuan* 2010. On the amount of legal material in this collection see Heuschert-Laage (2012). [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. If the court, as in the case of the Tümed and the Čaqar Mongols, had reservations about the loyalty of a confederation’s leadership, it would not acknowledge members of its elite as *jasaγ*, but designate imperial appointees (Tighe 2005: 39-41). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. For the Oirat campaigns see Perdue (2005: 133-299). In 1771, the Torγot Mongols, who in the 1630s had moved to the lower Volga region, returned and were integrated into the Qing state. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Nicola Di Cosmo argues that “the once allied southern Mongols were turned into ‘vassals’ or ‘surrendered people’” (2012: 180). The concepts of lord/vassal versus patron/client relationships are very close and developed in the different contexts of medieval European and Roman society. Both are based on obligatory reciprocity and describe patterns of unequal power relations. However, because patronage has been identified as an instrument used in processes of state building and territorial integration in early modern time (Asch et al. 2011; Emich et al. 2005; Kettering 2002), I will stick to this term. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. At that time, Manchus still referred to themselves as Jusen. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. In a letter to the Urad Mongols from February 1632, Hong Taiji asks “who will be the one to protect you so that you can move on without hurry and go your own way without being taken [by force]?” (Weiers 1989/91: 270/271). [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. For Hong Taiji’s efforts towards standardization, which were in parallel with introducing the new name “Daicing” for the Manchu state and adopting a new title of reign, see Heuschert-Laage 2011. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Manchu text in *Jiu Manzhou Dang* (1969): fol.3377. *(6) o ice jakūn de karacin i šamba tabunang . sirantu : - han de hengkileme jihe : (7) han de gajihangge šamba emu morin . sunja honin yali : sirantu emu morin : emu giyahūn : tasha (8) suku emke jafaha bihe : honin yali : giyahūn be gaiha : jai gaihakū bederebuhe* : *Jiu Manzhou Dang* quoted after Gruber (2006: 40). [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Title of nobility. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Manchu text in *Jiu Manzhou Dang* (1969): fol.3378/3379. *(9) o ineku tere inenggi karacin i šamba tabunang : sirantu : wang lama genehe : genere doroi būhengge : šamba tabunang (10) de loho emke : jeku juwan hūle sirantu de jebele emke + jeku : juwan hūle : wang lama de hilteri ūksin saca (3319) (1) būhe :* *Jiu Manzhou Dang* quoted after Gruber (2006: 40). [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. An example for this kind of record keeping can also be found in the *Jiu Manzhou Dang* (1969): fol. 4554-4555, where the gifts of the Mongol delegation under the aegis of the Sečen Qan Šoloi of the Qalqa are listed, which reached the Manchu court in January 1636. A translation of this passage is given by Weiers (1987: 110). [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Mongol text in *Mongγol dangse* (2003: vol. 1, 202/203). 202 (1) o *aγuda örösiyegči nayiramdaqu . (2) + boγda qaγan-u jarlaγ : tümen nasutu (3) + boγda qaγan-i törögsen edür kiged : sin-e jil orobasu ba : yeke bayasqulang-un (4) učir-a : ergükü beleg-i yeke gejü törö-yin yabudal-un (5) yamun-dur toγtaγabai : γadaγ-a-du ayimaγ-un vang-ud . noyad . (6) tayiji-nar-un ergükü beleg-ün toγ-a : qosiγun büri : tümen nasutu (7) + boγda qaγan-u törögsen edür . --- boγda qaγan-du dörbeged morin : 203 (1) ulus-un ejen qatun-dur . qosiyaγad morin : sigüsü nijeged üker . (2) naimaγad qoni :: yeke bayasqulang bolbasu . γadaγ-a-du ayimaγ-un vang-ud (3) noyad . tayiji-nar . --- boγda qaγan-dur . qosiyaγad morin : ulus-un (4) ejen qatun-dur . nijeged morin . beleg ergükü : sigüsü nijeged üker (5) naimaγad qoni bui : sin-e jil orobasu . boγda qaγan-du dörbeged morin . ulus-un (6) ejen qatun-dur . qosiyaγad morin . sigüsü nijeged üker naimaγad qoni : (7) degedü erdem-tü nögöge on : ebül-ün ekin sara-yin γučin-a :* Amendments to the text made by a different hand at an unknown date. For the meaning of the term *ayimaγ* (polity) Atwood (2004: 5). [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Titles of nobility. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. The term did not yet have a religious connotation, in the sense of an *öglige-yin ejen*, a donor, who gives alms to a monk. For the use of the term *öglige soyurqal* in 1636, see Heuschert-Laage (2011: 57). [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. The Mongol equivalent is *šangnaqu*. For parallel use of these terms see *Qing chao qianqi Lifanyuan* (2010:vol. 13, 1 & 4). The Mongol term *öglige*, which had been employed in 1646 (see above) was no longer used. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. An example for the use of *šangnaha* with regard to envoys (in Manchu *elcin*) and *būhe* with regard to members of the nobility can be found in the *Jiu Manzhou Dang* (1969): fol. 3373. *Jiu Manzhou Dang* quoted after Gruber (2006: 39). [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Tenggis in 1646 rejected Manchu overlordship and, in his armed conflict with the Qing, accepted military support from the Northern Qalqa (Veit 1986: 406; Fang 1943/44a: 215; *Čing ulus-un* 1984: 108-110). [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. For the Maussian distinction between commodity relationships and gift relationships, in which the object was directly linked to the person of the giver see Carrier 1991: 126-128. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Manchu language memorial of the Lifanyuan of Shunzhi 16/intercalary3/24 (May 14th, 1659) in *Qing chao qianqi Lifanyuan* (2010: vol. 1, 217): (top 8) *horcin i joriktu cin wang* . (9) *darhan baturu giyūn wang .* (10) *++ dergici cohome niyamarame acaki jio sehede . uthai urgunjehei jiderakū* (11) *elemangga joriktu cin wang oci* . (12) ++ *hese be bairakū . ini cisui gungju nimere be dahame jidere be tookaha* (bottom 1) *sehebi : darhan baturu giyūn wang geli beye edun dekdehebi : gege geli* (2) *hefeli aššahabi : juwe omolo akū oho seme hacilame baita* (3) *tucibume .* (4) ++ *hese be jurceme wesimbuhengge ambula giyan de acahakūbi :* [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Died in 1666 and was succeeded by his younger brother Biltagar (*Qing chao qianqi Lifanyuan* 2010: vol. 1, 401/402).According to *Čing ulus-un* (1984: 31) the line of the Joriktu Cin Wang was not acknowledged as *ruling* and, in administrative terms, was part of the middle banner of the Qorčin of the left wing. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Title of Manjusiri (died 1665), who was acknowledged to rule the middle banner of the Qorčin of the left wing. For this person see *Čing ulus-un* (1984: 31/32)*.* According to Jagchid (1986: 77) Manjusiri in 1628 had married a daughter of Yoto (died 1638), who was a grandson of Nurhaci. The girl was later adopted by the emperor as his daughter. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. The expression *hefeli aššambi* is documented in *Xin Manhan da cidian* (1994: 395). [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Contrary to what one would expect, *omolo* is not used with a plural suffix (Doerfer 1963a: 38-41). [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. This follows from the plural *gungju se* used earlier in the document. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Plain Yellow, Bordered Yellow and Plain White banner, which were the personal property of the emperor (Elliott 2001: 79, 404n147). [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Imperial rescript in Manchu language to the memorial of the Lifanyuan of Shunzhi 16/intercalary3/24 (May 14th, 1659) in *Qing chao qianqi Lifanyuan* (2010: vol. 1, 217): (1) *joriktu wang baturu wang be niyamarame acaki* (2) *seme jio seci hese be donjihai uthai jiderakū* (3) *yasa de fafun akū adali bulcame siltahangge* (4) *ambula giyan de acahakūbi : suweni jurgan . ilan* (5) *gūsai hebei ambasai emgi acafi gisurefi wesimbu :* (6) *wang sa be ubade gajira be naka :* [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. For example the Mongol Code (in Chinese *Menggu Lüli*) and compendia of institutional practice such as the *Lifanyuan zeli* and the *Da Qing Huidian.* [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. In case of the Qalqa Mongols, these were the Military Governor in Uliasutai and the Governors stationed in Ikh Khuree (Urga) and in Khovd. Among the Southern Mongols, the Governor General of Suiyuan (Hohhot) and the Čaqar and Jehol commanders-in-chief in addition to military duties were also entrusted with legal affairs. (Zhao 2002: 291-316; Brunnert/Hagelstrom 1911: 452-462). [↑](#endnote-ref-31)