Fischer, Manuel; Sciarini, Pascal; Traber, Denise (2010). The Silent Reform of Swiss Federalism: The New Constitutional Articles on Education. Swiss political science review / Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 16(4), pp. 747-771. Wiley 10.1002/j.1662-6370.2010.tb00447.x
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This article examines the decision-making process leading to the new constitutional articles on education in Switzerland. It analyzes how actors from both state levels (Confederation and cantons) could reach consensus in a process that was prone to a "joint-decision trap". To that end, we hypothesize which factors may be conducive to a "problem-solving" style of policy-making in a compulsory negotiation system. Rich empirical material from various sources supports our theoretical arguments: We show that shared beliefs and a common frame of reference, the procedural separation between constitutional and distributional issues, neutral brokers, and informal structures were all beneficial to the success of the reform project.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Institute of Political Science |
UniBE Contributor: |
Fischer, Manuel (B) |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 320 Political science |
ISSN: |
1424-7755 |
Publisher: |
Wiley |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Jeremy Simeon Trottmann |
Date Deposited: |
04 Jul 2016 10:40 |
Last Modified: |
29 Mar 2023 23:34 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1002/j.1662-6370.2010.tb00447.x |
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
Compulsory Negotiation System, Education Policy, Federalism, Joint-decision Trap, Problem-solving |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.82816 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/82816 |