

compel our agreement. The text seems more clearly to support the claim that powers provide the metaphysical basis for the distinction, not that they exemplify the distinction.

Secondly, there are some troubling issues about the consistency of what being potentially and being actually mean. In her discussion of ways of being powers (inactive or active) and ways of being substances (incomplete or complete), the distinction between being X potentially and being X actually implies that a single X is now potentially X and may, at another time, be actually X, and that what is X potentially is for the sake of being X actually. In *Metaph.* 9.8, however, Aristotle claims that perishable things are potentially and eternal things are actually and, according to W., this is another instance of the relationship between being X potentially and being X actually (p. 92). Again, in the discussion of gender in Chapter 5, W. takes the different values associated with men and with women to be best understood in terms of the potentially/actually distinction. In these two instances, unlike in the case of powers and substances, there is no one X that is now potentially but may be actually, and W. downplays the teleological relationship between perishable and eternal things. What it means to be potentially and actually differs depending on the objects under consideration. W. needs to convince us that this difference does not compromise the coherence of her interpretation or the coherence of *Metaph.* 9.

University of Toronto

REBEKAH JOHNSTON  
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### DE PARTIBUS ANIMALIUM

J. G. LENNOX: *Aristotle: On the Parts of Animals I–IV*. Translated with an Introduction and Commentary. (Clarendon Aristotle Series.) Pp. xv + 404. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. Cased, £52.50 (Paper, £25). ISBN: 0-19-875109-5 (0-19-875110-9 pbk).

Lennox's 'On the Parts of Animals' (*Part. An.*) represents the culmination of more than a quarter-century's work on Aristotle's 'biology', as well as being the longest Aristotelian text translated and commented on in the Clarendon Series. He presents a readable translation of Bekker's text, with neither the barbarity of the word-for-word fanatics nor the vague prolixity of the older translations. Here he follows Balme's aim (in the volume which is to some extent replaced by this one) to be 'semantically faithful' to Aristotle. Thus he avoids Latinate terms ('oviparous') for the extensive groups, and hence the impression that Aristotle had a fixed taxonomic vocabulary.

The generous commentary is largely taken up with four areas, concentrated on by recent research: (i) the relation between Book 1 and the rest. Here L.'s 'default hypothesis' is that the norms of Book 1 are reflected in the rest, while admitting that he does not know how they came to be joined together. (ii) The relation between the *Posterior Analytics* (*An. Post.*) and *Part. An.* Here scholars will be familiar with the line presented, namely that *Part. An.* 1 has the function of 'enriching and supplementing' *An. Post.*, especially with the conception of conditional necessity. (iii) The account of uniform bodies from *Meteorologica* 4 is shown to mesh closely with that in *Part. An.* (iv) The 'Balme hypothesis', namely that *Historia animalium* (*Hist. An.*) 'knows more than' *Part. An.*, but that, conversely, much in *Hist. An.* 1–4 is borrowed from *Part. An.*

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2–4. These four topics explain why the commentary is fuller than normal in the series, and why it is almost entirely restricted to ‘philosophical issues’ rather than biological ones. This is only to be expected: the Clarendon Aristotle is a philosophers’ show. But the really remarkable thing about *Part. An.* is that it is biology. And its friends, such as L., are not shy of puffing it: ‘the heart and soul’ of Aristotle’s ‘philosophical, that is to say causal, investigation of animals’. This claim is supported by the relations to *On the Generation of Animals (Gen. An.)*: *Part. An.* 2–4 gives a functional explanation of living animals, which is (explanatorily) prior to the developmental account in *Gen. An.*; and as to *Hist. An.*, *Part. An.* (and *Gen. An.*) represent the aim of the enquiries in *Hist. An.*, namely explanatory understanding of animal parts. And finally *Part. An.* 1 gives the philosophical foundation of the entire biological enterprise.

This version seems to short-change central concepts, above all soul and substance (*ousia*), but L.’s commentary pays a good deal of attention to these, and the most important texts bearing on them, *De anima (An.)* and *Metaphysics (Metaph.)*. This goes for the *Parva naturalia (PN)* as well, which he rightly cites frequently, for parallels to the treatment in *Part. An.*, of cetaceans, gills, lungs, and the heart in particular. The point can be made that *Part. An.* does not have the massive task of explaining everything about living things, merely their parts, *qua* differentiating animals from one another, while *PN* builds on both *Part. An.* and *An.*, taking the general concept of nested living activities from the one and the detailed consideration of parts from the other to explain functions common to body and soul. A similar point holds for *ousia*: L. claims that *Part. An.* 1 esp. 641a25–32 is one of the most interesting passages for investigating its meaning; but the concept of form has to be discussed with reference both to *Metaph.* and *An.* Despite the amount of attention that has been spent fitting *Part. An.* to the Procrustean bed of *An. Post.*, there are works closer to *Part. An.*, as L.’s notes show (e.g. on 641a14–32 for *An.*). And L. himself sees the connection with *An. Post.* to be fairly loose, which is all to the good, if *Part. An.* 1 is to have the task of adapting it to dealing with the material world of living things.

Despite the exemplary presentation, some familiar doubts remained in this reviewer’s mind. In *Part. An.*, we often have talk of nature doing things, and L. sees this (cf. his 1997) as the actions of formal natures, and not as the actions of ‘Dame nature’ (p. 260). Thus he often talks of nature doing things: ‘formal nature . . . arranges the body in the best way possible for the animal’s life’ (p. 321). Two questions may be asked here. First, does Aristotle think that formal natures, rather than concrete living things are subject of actions? Surely the answer is no (cf. *An.* 408b13–15), which of course would not preclude the structure of the action, or of the body, being determined by the formal nature. And secondly, how is one to understand ‘the best way possible’ in these contexts? Given Aristotle’s views on plenitude, are there really such possibilities? Could fishes have necks? L. appears to vacillate between seeing such talk as representing thought experiments (p. 316), and locating the possibility in the kind the animal belongs to. The first reading makes the possibility very weak, and the second requires reconciling with the possibility belonging to the essence of the thing (cf. 260).

At a more general level, I missed a table of the contents of *Part. An.* In the scattered notes on the structure of the work, L. repeatedly notes that there is no justification for the order that A. chooses. But the structure of Books 2–4 would seem to be dictated by the need to cover the ground: uniform parts, then the internal and external organs of his extensive kinds. The non-uniform parts of bloodless animals, external and internal, are treated together, so that A. can return to a longer treatment of the external parts of the more perfect, blooded ones, as he notes (682a32–34). This justifies his procedure,

even if merely pragmatically. These are minor quibbles about a volume that all students of A. will con and ponder for long to come.

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

R. A. H. KING  
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## THE TEXT OF ARISTOTLE'S *DE GEN. ET CORR.*

M. RASHED: *Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der aristotelischen Schrift De generatione et corruptione*. (Serta Graeca: Beiträge zur Erforschung griechischer Texte 12.) Pp. xiii + 386, pls. Wiesbaden, Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 2001. Cased, €82. ISBN: 3-89500-212-7.

In some quarters—I paraphrase the opening sentence of Marwan Rashed's learned and engrossing volume—in some quarters, the history of textual transmission is deemed to be as mouth-watering as a dinner of chopped hay. And in those quarters the thing seems none the more appetizing when it is served up under a sesquipedalian German name. But in such quarters, R. argues in his fighting preface, they have got things badly awry: *Überlieferungsgeschichte* is not only a necessary ingredient of *Altertumswissenschaft*—it is a nourishing and a piquant ingredient.

If R.'s argument may not persuade every reader, then the substance of his book ought to do so. True, he spends many pages on that puritan activity, the listing of shared faults. True, his chief business is to trek through the desert of dusty manuscripts. But it is a blooming desert: there are flowers in every acre, many of them exotic. For quite apart from the numerous asides on scholarship and its history, both medieval and modern, which might be expected to illustrate and enliven the discussion, there are many unforeseeable delights: historians of Aristotelian metaphysics will find a new text on pp. 300–2; aficionados of Empedocles' cosmic cycle should not miss pp. 141–5; if you have a soft spot for Burgundio of Pisa, then turn to pp. 132–6.

The book begins with a brief chapter on the history of the *GC* in antiquity. Then there are some general remarks on the Byzantine tradition and a detailed catalogue of the sixty-seven surviving MSS. The following seven chapters are the meat of the book: they discuss, in turn and according to their family relationships, each of the Greek MSS and also the Arabic and the Latin translations. The discussion is grounded upon fresh collations, complete in the case of some forty MSS and selective in the case of the others. It is primarily concerned to set out the premisses from which stemmatic relationships may be inferred—and to draw the appropriate conclusions. But in addition, most of the chapters contain lengthy remarks about the cultural background against which the various copies were produced; and many of the chapters offer first editions of scholia and other short pieces.

R. presents a complete stemma. It is complex, with numerous lines of contamination. But the fundamental fact about it is simple: the surviving witnesses to Aristotle's text divide, without remainder, into two families; and the division goes back to antiquity—certainly beyond Philoponus and perhaps beyond Alexander. R.'s investigations thus confirm the thesis which Diels advanced in his magisterial essay in the Berlin *Abhandlungen* for 1882.

What do R.'s results mean for an editor of the *GC*? (What have they meant for R., whose Budé is in press?) Joachim's edition, which was published in 1922, was founded on six Greek MSS, together with the commentary of Philoponus and a Latin