

virtuous and the class of the many become one large middle class of many virtuous citizens' (p. 175) will be much harder than F. allows. This difficulty may, in turn, limit the conceptual resources that Aristotle can provide to contemporary democratic theory. None the less, in handling these intricate and difficult questions, F. offers novel and rigorous arguments that draw thoughtfully on diverse but interconnected sub-fields. F. has advanced the discussion in a way that will interest all those who, as F. has put it elsewhere, view Aristotle as our contemporary.

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THE SOUL IN ARISTOTLE

Bos (A.P.) *The Soul and its Instrumental Body. A Reinterpretation of Aristotle's Philosophy of Living Nature.* (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 112.) Pp. x + 429. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003. Cased, €155, US\$209. ISBN: 978-90-04-13016-6.

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The central thesis of this ambitious book is a new interpretation of Aristotle's official definition of the soul in *De Anima* II 1: the soul is the entelechy of a natural 'instrumental' body. This body is not the 'visible body', but rather *pneuma*, with which soul can survive death (for a while), before returning to the celestial regions. The claims for this interpretation are grandiose: it is meant to provide a unitary theory encompassing not only *De An.* and the biology, but also the early, lost works (*Eudemus*, *De Philosophia*). Leaving aside for a moment the question how one is to read *De An.* II 1, the benefit of this reading lies in its being able to accommodate with apparent ease those passages (notably *Gen. an.* II 3 736b29, p. 91) where, at first blush, a special body is called upon to act as the 'vehicle' of the soul, and also those fragments from the *Eudemus* in which survival after death is talked about.

The crucial point is the interpretation of *De An.* II 1. The stalking horse that B. uses is the old contrast between an instrumentalist view of the body-soul relationship (the body serves the soul as an instrument) and the hylomorphist one (soul is form of the body). The main problem was perceived to be that the hylomorphist account in *De An.* II 1 was incompatible with the many passages in the *Parva Naturalia* and the biology where the relation between body and soul is clearly instrumental. This problem, however, is specious, for the simple reason that *De An.* itself uses the concept of an instrument in the (hylomorphist) definition of the soul. But the further step of insisting on the presence of *pneuma* in *De An.* as the body informed by the soul, B.'s solution, is one many readers will be reluctant to take.

So why *pneuma*, not the obvious body, comprising the organs and tissues that are the subject of Aristotle's research in the biology? B. bases his argument to begin with on Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Pythagoreans in *De An.* I: he is insisting there must be a suitable body to receive the soul, 'an instrumental body of which the soul is the *eidos*' (p. 60). Another main argument for *pneuma* is derived from *De Motu Animalium* 10 (pp. 31–46) where it serves the "mediation" of psychic movement to the visible body' (p. 65). Most important perhaps is the text in *Gen. an.*, already mentioned, where 'another element' which is in some way analogous to the element of the stars is brought into play; finally, and more generally, the role *pneuma* plays in the account of *sperma* gives B. reason to privilege this stuff above others.

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Rightly, B. (pp. 85ff) insists that *organikos* does not mean *equipped with organs* (as though there were a body besides the organs and the parts constituting them), but *instrumental*. However, one can admit that the body acts as instrument without being compelled to insert *pneuma* between the body and the soul. His attempts (pp. 96ff.) to explain away those texts (esp. 412b1ff) in which reference is clearly made to common-or-garden organs are hardly compelling. The argument in 412a6–12 moves down a chain of genera, from substance to natural bodies, to living bodies, as those whose form is the soul. B.'s reading takes the natural bodies (412a12) to be the elements, rather than natural bodies including animals and plants, and so thinks that one of the elements has to be taken as an ensouled body.

Now, there is hardly a whiff of *pneuma* in *De An.*, so B. has to place great weight on III 10 433b18–21, a reference to *De motu an.*, which presupposes a *sôma organikon* for the soul; and also on II 8 420b20–1. The latter text is taken (p. 93 n. 109) as presupposing *pneuma* as a *source* for vital heat, whereas it in fact refers forward to the treatment of breath as necessary for heat in *De Juventute*. And as to *De motu an.*, the reference is hardly evidence for B.'s reading of the *sôma organikon*: there nothing is said about the possibility of *pneuma* being attached to the soul even in the absence of the rest of the body. A stuff is merely needed to be operated on by the heatings and coolings incident on desire, so moving the animal with a sort of pneumatic hydraulics.

Let us concentrate on the basic function of the soul, nutrition. B. allows that there is no *pneuma* in plants, rather they have 'natural heat', which serves nutritive activity. One deficiency in B.'s account of the body necessary for the soul is that he does not pay enough attention to *Juv.*: this work attempts to give an explanation of life and death, and since B.'s aim is, in part, to integrate *De An.* with *Parv. nat.* (Chapter 9 on *De Longitudine* 2–3), he has to show how this *pneuma*-based account can cope with this text. As I have shown elsewhere (2001, not cited in his extensive bibliography), the central conception is that living things maintain themselves by consuming nutrition, using their natural heat. *Pneuma*, i.e. breath, has a crucial place in this work, namely in those parts (sometimes known as *De Respiratione*) dealing with breathing as the mechanism for cooling and so preserving the heat of the hotter animals. But nowhere is there a suggestion that innate breath is the 'vehicle' of soul: rather heat is necessary for life because it performs concoction. This is quite clear from *Juv.* 14 which B. cites as support for his view (p. 80), but we find there no mention of a body possessing life within the organism (a view which anyway attributes the homunculus fallacy to Aristotle of all people; see *De An.* 408b12ff.).

If one ignores B.'s claims for *pneuma*, this picture is similar to B.'s in that a coherent story can be told integrating *De An.* and *Juv.* As he sees (p. 112), the first lines of the work refer back to *De An.* The concentration on nutrition in *De An.* II 1 (412a14), as the basic living function common to all (mortal) living things, is easily integrated into *Juv.*'s treatment of life and death. So the soul is the form or actuality of the whole living body, as the traditional account of hylomorphism holds, and not of a special subtle body: for the functions of living things to be exercised heat needs to be present in that body, especially in the heart or its analogue.

There is much to argue with (such as the liberal use of *De Mundo* and *De Spiritu* as presenting Aristotelian thought), but the work offers interesting readings of a large range of Aristotelian texts.

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