Defending the status quo across venues and coalitions: evidence from California interest groups

Varone, Frédéric; Ingold, Karin; Jourdain, Charlotte (2017). Defending the status quo across venues and coalitions: evidence from California interest groups. Journal of public policy, 37(1), pp. 1-26. Cambridge University Press 10.1017/S0143814X16000179

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This study investigates the conditions under which pro-status quo groups increase their advocacy success during an entire policymaking process. It scrutinises whether pro-status quo defenders who are involved in multiple institutional venues and who join many coalitions of interest groups are able to achieve their policy preferences. A case study focussing on the regulation of stem cell research in California traces the policymaking process and the related advocacy activities of interest groups in legislative, administrative, judicial and direct democratic venues. The empirical results, which are based on a formal social network analysis, reveal that very few groups are multivenue players and members of several coalitions. In addition, occupying a central network position is insufficient for the pro-status quo groups to improve their advocacy success.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Institute of Political Science
10 Strategic Research Centers > Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research (OCCR)

UniBE Contributor:

Ingold, Karin Mirjam

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 320 Political science

ISSN:

0143-814X

Publisher:

Cambridge University Press

Language:

English

Submitter:

Monika Wälti-Stampfli

Date Deposited:

19 Dec 2016 10:23

Last Modified:

27 Mar 2017 11:19

Publisher DOI:

10.1017/S0143814X16000179

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.90530

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/90530

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