Essl, Andrea; Jaussi, Stefanie (2017). Choking under time pressure: The influence of deadline-dependent bonus and malus incentive schemes on performance. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 133, pp. 127-137. Elsevier 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.11.001
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Many economically relevant activities are executed under notable time pressures. Incentivized deadlines are often the reason people feel pressured. In such an environment, individual preferences can predict performance. Through a laboratory experiment, we xamine the predictive power of individual loss aversion on performance under deadline-dependent incentives. Participants worked on a real effort task under two payoff-equivalent contracts framed in bonus and malus terms. The results show lower performance for individuals with high loss aversion when working under a malus contract. These individuals needed more time to reply and were less able to avoid maluses than other individuals. Choking can explain this observed behavior.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
|---|---|
Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Organization and Human Resource Management > Organisation |
UniBE Contributor: |
Essl, Andrea, Schumacher, Stefanie |
Subjects: |
600 Technology > 650 Management & public relations 300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
ISSN: |
0167-2681 |
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Claudia Probst |
Date Deposited: |
20 Jul 2017 14:16 |
Last Modified: |
02 Mar 2023 23:28 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1016/j.jebo.2016.11.001 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
Deadline-dependent incentive schemes; Loss aversion; Choking under pressure; Laboratory experiment. |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.91153 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/91153 |
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