Project Selection and Execution in Teams

Blanes, Jordi; Möller, Marc (2016). Project Selection and Execution in Teams. The RAND Journal of Economics, 47(1), pp. 166-185. Wiley 10.1111/1756-2171.12122

[img] Text
möller blanes project selection.pdf - Published Version
Restricted to registered users only
Available under License Publisher holds Copyright.

Download (320kB) | Request a copy

We use a mechanism-design approach to study a team whose members select a joint project and exert individual efforts to execute it. Members have private information about the qualities of alternative projects. Information sharing is obstructed by a trade-off between adaptation and motivation. We determine the conditions under which first-best project and effort choices are implementable and show that these conditions can become relaxed as the team grows in size. We also characterize the second-best mechanism and find that it may include a “motivational bias,” that is, a bias in favor of the team's initially preferred project, and higher-than-optimal effort by uninformed team members.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Möller, Marc

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

ISSN:

1756-2171

Publisher:

Wiley

Language:

English

Submitter:

Eva Marina Zuberbühler

Date Deposited:

11 Jul 2017 12:35

Last Modified:

11 Jul 2017 12:35

Publisher DOI:

10.1111/1756-2171.12122

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.93164

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/93164

Actions (login required)

Edit item Edit item
Provide Feedback