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Emons, Winand; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Muehlheusser, Gerd (2024). Symposium on Credence Goods. Editorial Preface. Journal of institutional and theoretical economics, 180(1), p. 1. Mohr Siebeck 10.1628/jite-2023-0037
Feess, Eberhard; Gerfin, Michael; Muehlheusser, Gerd (2015). Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer. Economic inquiry, 53(1), pp. 714-730. Wiley 10.1111/ecin.12098
Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas (2008). Black sheep and walls of silence. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 65(3-4), pp. 387-408. Amsterdam: Elsevier 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.11.004
Loertscher, Simon; Muehlheusser, Gerd (2008). Global and local players in a model of spatial competition. Economics letters, 98(1), pp. 100-106. Amsterdam: Elsevier 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.04.013
Muehlheusser, Gerd (2007). Regulating damage clauses in (labor) contracts. Journal of institutional and theoretical economics / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 163(4), pp. 531-551. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 10.1628/093245607783242936
Muehlheusser, Gerd (2007). Implications from the theory of contests for modelling and designing sports competitions. In: Andreff, Wladimir; Szymanski, Stefan (eds.) Handbook On The Economics Of Sport (pp. 342-348). Cheltenham: Elgar
Feess, Eberhard; Gerfin, Michael; Muehlheusser, Gerd (November 2010). Contracts as Rent-Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer (Discussion Papers 10-15). Bern: Department of Economics
Loertscher, Simon; Muehlheusser, Gerd (September 2005). Global and local players in a model of spatial competition (Discussion Papers 05-11). Bern: Department of Economics
Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas (June 2005). Black Sheep and Walls of Silence (Discussion Papers 04-10). Bern: Department of Economics
Feess, Eberhard; Frick, Bernd; Muehlheusser, Gerd (June 2004). Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer (Discussion Papers 04-11). Bern: Department of Economics
Ichino, Andrea; Muehlheusser, Gerd (December 2003). How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents (Diskussionsschriften 03-19). Bern: Universität Bern Volkswirtschaftliches Institut
