The Effect of Environmental Risk on the Efficiency of Negotiated Transfer Prices

Arnold, Markus Christopher; Gillenkirch, Robert M.; Hannan, R. Lynn (March 2013). The Effect of Environmental Risk on the Efficiency of Negotiated Transfer Prices (Unpublished). In: Annual Conference for Management Accounting Research. Vallendar, Deutschland. 07.03. - 08.03.2013.

This study investigates whether and how environmental risk affects the efficiency (i.e., overall organizational profit) of negotiated transfer prices. We discuss three fairness-based sharing norms and the implications each would have for efficiency in our setting. We conduct an experiment in which a buying division and selling division negotiate over the transfer of a resource at six levels of environmental risk. Because the expected value of the transfer is positive, the transfer should be made from the risk neutral organization perspective. Results show that environmental risk decreases efficiency. That is, the frequency of agreement decreases as environmental risk increases. Supplemental analysis suggests that the cause of the decrease in agreements is differences in the focal points that buyers and sellers use for determining a fair transfer price. Specifically, buyers focus on the downside potential of the transfer and sellers focus on the expected value of the transfer. As environmental risk increases, the range between these focal points increases, resulting in failed negotiations (i.e., inefficiencies). Implications for practice and theory are discussed.

Item Type:

Conference or Workshop Item (Speech)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute for Accounting and Controlling > Controlling

UniBE Contributor:

Arnold, Markus Christopher

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics
600 Technology > 650 Management & public relations

Language:

English

Submitter:

Alexandra Neuenschwander

Date Deposited:

04 Jul 2018 15:10

Last Modified:

04 Jul 2018 15:10

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/107449

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