Conditional versus Contingent Fees

Emons, Winand (May 2004). Conditional versus Contingent Fees (Discussion Papers 04-09). Bern: Department of Economics

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Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgement; under conditional fees the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers are uninformed about the clients’ cases. If there is asymmetric information about the merits of cases, in equilibrium attorneys will offer only conditional fees. If there is asymmetric information about the risk of cases, only contingent fee contracts are offered in equilibrium.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Emons, Winand

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Discussion Papers

Publisher:

Department of Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Lars Tschannen

Date Deposited:

14 Sep 2020 10:07

Last Modified:

14 Sep 2020 10:07

JEL Classification:

D82, K1

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.145641

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145641

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