Emons, Winand (May 2004). Conditional versus Contingent Fees (Discussion Papers 04-09). Bern: Department of Economics
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Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgement; under conditional fees the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers are uninformed about the clients’ cases. If there is asymmetric information about the merits of cases, in equilibrium attorneys will offer only conditional fees. If there is asymmetric information about the risk of cases, only contingent fee contracts are offered in equilibrium.
Item Type: |
Working Paper |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics |
UniBE Contributor: |
Emons, Winand |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
Series: |
Discussion Papers |
Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Lars Tschannen |
Date Deposited: |
14 Sep 2020 10:07 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 15:39 |
JEL Classification: |
D82, K1 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.145641 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145641 |
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