Pre-existing fairness concerns restrict the cultural evolution and generalization of inequitable norms in children

Berger, Joël; Vogt, Sonja; Efferson, Charles (2022). Pre-existing fairness concerns restrict the cultural evolution and generalization of inequitable norms in children. Evolution and human behavior, 43(1), pp. 1-15. Elsevier 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2021.07.001

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Many social exchanges produce benefits that would not exist otherwise, but anticipating conflicts about how to distribute these benefits can derail exchange and destroy the gains. Coordination norms can solve this problem by providing a shared understanding of how to distribute benefits, but such norms can also perpetuate group- level inequality. To examine how inequitable norms evolve culturally and whether they generalize from one setting to another, we conducted an incentivized lab-in-the-field experiment among kindergarten (5–6) and second-grade (8–9) children living in Switzerland (4′228 decisions collected from 326 children). In Part 1, we created two arbitrarily marked groups, triangles and circles. We randomly and repeatedly formed pairs with one triangle and one circle, and players in a pair played a simple bargaining game in which failure to agree destroyed the gains from social exchange. At the beginning of Part 1 we suggested a specific way to play the game. In symmetric treatments, this suggestion did not imply inequality between the groups, while in asymmetric treatments it did. Part 2 of the experiment addressed the generalization of norms. Retaining their group affili- ations from Part 1, each child had to distribute resources between an in-group member and an out-group member. Children of both age groups in symmetric treatments used our suggestions about how to play the game to coordinate in Part 1. In asymmetric treatments, children followed our suggestions less consistently, which reduced coordination but moderated inequality. In Part 2, older children did not generalize privilege from Part 1. Rather, they compensated the underprivileged. Younger children neither generalized privilege nor compensated the underprivileged.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Institute of Sociology

UniBE Contributor:

Berger, Joël, Vogt, Sonja Brigitte

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology

ISSN:

1090-5138

Publisher:

Elsevier

Funders:

[4] Swiss National Science Foundation

Language:

English

Submitter:

Joël Berger

Date Deposited:

06 Aug 2021 14:34

Last Modified:

05 Dec 2022 15:52

Publisher DOI:

10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2021.07.001

Uncontrolled Keywords:

coordination game, social norms, norm generalization, bargaining

BORIS DOI:

10.48350/157860

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/157860

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