Shock or Design: What Drives Fiscal De/Centralization? A Comparative Analysis of Twenty-Nine OECD countries, 1995–2017

Arnold, Tobias; Mueller, Sean; Vatter, Adrian (2021). Shock or Design: What Drives Fiscal De/Centralization? A Comparative Analysis of Twenty-Nine OECD countries, 1995–2017. Publius - the journal of federalism, 51(1), pp. 1-26. Oxford University Press 10.1093/publius/pjaa032

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Over the past decades, decentralization has become the new paradigm in how states should organize power territorially. Carefully planned institutional re-designs are the most visible expression thereof. Yet the Great Recession of 2007–2009 has pushed governments into the opposite direction, i.e., towards centralization, to better weather the fiscal drought. Given these contradictory developments, this article compares the effects of twenty-three separate state reforms with the impact of the Great Recession on fiscal centralization in twenty-nine countries over more than two decades. In the main, our analyses attribute a larger effect to design, i.e., pro-active policy making through reforms, than reactive crisis management after a great shock. However, this difference is only apparent once we consider a state’s institutional structure, that is whether a political system is unitary or federal. Our findings thus highlight the need for a multidimensional approach to better understand the drivers of fiscal de/centralization.

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