Improvisation and Action Theory

Beisbart, Claus (2021). Improvisation and Action Theory. In: Bertinetto, Alessandro; Ruta, Marcello (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Improvisation in the Arts (pp. 100-113). London: Routledge

Text published_beisbart_impro2021.pdf - Published Version Restricted to registered users only Available under License Publisher holds Copyright. Download (190kB) | Request a copy

This chapter discusses improvisation from an action-theoretic perspective. It also discusses improvisation in a broad sense. An artistic improvisation is a performance that qualifies as improvisation in the broad sense. To clarify in which sense improvisation is intentional, we first need to understand intentional action. The role of intentions is very similar to that of plans. So the relationship between intentional action and intention is more indirect. The main difficulty is thus that action theory does not have any conceptual ways or means of identifying or explaining the overall structure of extended activity that it is not specified in advance in a plan. Recourse to the philosophy of action seems appropriate too in this context because improvising is not just a sort of artistic performance, but also a general mode of doing things.

Interest & Impact

Downloads

1 since deposited on 22 Apr 2022
1 in the past 12 months

Citations

5 Citations in Web of Science ®
6 Citations in Scopus

Search

in Google Scholar™

Services

Actions (login required)

Edit item

Actions (login required)

Edit item