Werner, Jonas (2022). Solving a puzzle of definition. Inquiry - an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy, pp. 1-11. Routledge, Taylor & Francis 10.1080/0020174X.2022.2124543
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)This paper concerns the question of which logical principles hold for real definitions. Recently, Samuel Elgin has presented five principles concerning real definitions that seem initially plausible. He has shown them to be jointly
inconsistent. This gives rise to a puzzle that can only be solved by denying one of the principles. In this paper, I argue against Elgin’s principle of expansion, which concerns substituting a definiens for its definiendum within
the definiens of a further definition. I show that this principle fails for every irreflexive notion of definition and proposes a replacement that allows to restore consistency and solve the puzzle.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
|---|---|
Division/Institute: |
06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy |
UniBE Contributor: |
Werner, Jonas |
Subjects: |
100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy > 110 Metaphysics 100 Philosophy > 160 Logic |
ISSN: |
0020-174X |
Publisher: |
Routledge, Taylor & Francis |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Jonas Werner |
Date Deposited: |
27 Sep 2022 09:58 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 16:25 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1080/0020174X.2022.2124543 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/173285 |
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