Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders when the Government Can and Cannot Commit to Sanctions

Emons, Winand (2006). Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders when the Government Can and Cannot Commit to Sanctions. In: Boyer, Marcel; Hiriart, Yolande; Martimort, David (eds.) Frontierts in the Economics of Environmental Regulation and Liability (pp. 155-171). Ashgate Publishing Limited

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Item Type:

Book Section (Book Chapter)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Emons, Winand

Publisher:

Ashgate Publishing Limited

Language:

English

Submitter:

Factscience Import

Date Deposited:

04 Oct 2013 15:07

Last Modified:

04 May 2014 23:21

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/29515 (FactScience: 143457)

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