Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders when the Government Can and Cannot Commit to Sanctions

Emons, Winand (2006). Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders when the Government Can and Cannot Commit to Sanctions. In: Boyer, Marcel; Hiriart, Yolande; Martimort, David (eds.) Frontierts in the Economics of Environmental Regulation and Liability (pp. 155-171). Ashgate Publishing Limited

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Item Type:	Book Section (Book Chapter)
Division/Institute:	03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics
UniBE Contributor:	Emons, Winand
Publisher:	Ashgate Publishing Limited
Language:	English
Submitter:	Factscience Import
Date Deposited:	04 Oct 2013 15:07
Last Modified:	05 Dec 2022 14:20
URI:	https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/29515 (FactScience: 143457)