The EU’s Choice of Regulatory Venues for Trade Negotiations: A Tale of Agency Power?

Elsig, Manfred (2007). The EU’s Choice of Regulatory Venues for Trade Negotiations: A Tale of Agency Power? Journal of common market studies JCMS, 45(4), pp. 927-948. Wiley-Blackwell

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This article focuses on the EU’s strategy for choosing regulatory venues to negotiate trade agreements. It analyses the existence of a clear venue hierarchy since the late 1990s and the recent change leading to a blurring of any clear preference for using bilateral, inter-regional or multilateral settings. The article challenges domestic explanations of the EU’s choice of venue, stressing the autonomy of the Commission as a major factor. Using a principal-agent framework, it shows that the Commission’s agenda-setting powers, the existence of interest divergence among principals (e.g. Member States, business groups) and the multi-level system facilitate agency.

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