The EU’s Choice of Regulatory Venues for Trade Negotiations: A Tale of Agency Power?

Elsig, Manfred (2007). The EU’s Choice of Regulatory Venues for Trade Negotiations: A Tale of Agency Power? Journal of common market studies JCMS, 45(4), pp. 927-948. Wiley-Blackwell

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This article focuses on the EU’s strategy for choosing regulatory venues to negotiate trade agreements. It analyses the existence of a clear venue hierarchy since the late 1990s and the recent change leading to a blurring of any clear preference for using bilateral, inter-regional or multilateral settings. The article challenges domestic explanations of the EU’s choice of venue, stressing the autonomy of the Commission as a major factor. Using a principal-agent framework, it shows that the Commission’s agenda-setting powers, the existence of interest divergence among principals (e.g. Member States, business groups) and the multi-level system facilitate agency.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Institute of Political Science
02 Faculty of Law > Department of Economic Law > World Trade Institute
10 Strategic Research Centers > World Trade Institute

02 Faculty of Law > Department of Economic Law > NCCR International Trade Regulation

UniBE Contributor:

Elsig, Manfred

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 320 Political science

ISSN:

0021-9886

Publisher:

Wiley-Blackwell

Language:

English

Submitter:

Manfred Elsig

Date Deposited:

09 Sep 2014 15:53

Last Modified:

31 May 2017 12:50

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.49429

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/49429

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