Principals, agents, and the European Union’s foreign economic policies

Dür, Andreas; Elsig, Manfred (2011). Principals, agents, and the European Union’s foreign economic policies. Journal of European public policy, 18(3), pp. 323-338. Taylor & Francis 10.1080/13501763.2011.551066

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In the introduction to this collection on the principal–agent approach and the European Union’s (EU) foreign economic policies we briefly present the EU’s institutional structure for policy-making in trade, monetary, development and international competition and financial policy. We also offer some data on the extent of the EU’s involvement in the international economy. Our discussion of the principal–agent approach and how it can be applied to an analysis of the EU’s foreign economic policies forms the basis of the following contributions. It allows us to formulate three questions that are of particular interest for applications of the principal–agent approach to the EU. Finally, we summarize the various studies included in this collection.

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