Principal-Agent Theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex Agency and ‘Missing Delegation’

Elsig, Manfred (2011). Principal-Agent Theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex Agency and ‘Missing Delegation’. European journal of international relations, 17(3), pp. 495-517. Sage 10.1177/1354066109351078

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This paper analyses the World Trade Organization within a principal-agent framework. The concept of complex agency is introduced to focus on the variety of actors that comprise an international organization. Special attention is paid to the relationship between contracting parties’ representatives and the Secretariat. In the empirical part, the paper analyses the role of the Secretariat in assisting negotiations and presents evidence of declining influence. It is shown how principal-agent theory can contribute to addressing this ‘puzzle of missing delegation’. The paper concludes with a cautionary note as to the ‘location’ of international organizations’ emerging pathologies and calls for additional research to address the relationship between material and social sources to explain behaviour of the key actors within the complex agency.

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