Against Logically Possible World-Relativized Existence

Jacquette, Dale (2014). Against Logically Possible World-Relativized Existence. Metaphysica, 15(1), pp. 85-98. De Gruyter 10.1515/mp-2014-0006

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The thesis that entities exist in, at, or in relation to logically possible worlds is criticized. The suggestion that actually nonexistent fictional characters might nevertheless exist in nonactual merely logically possible worlds runs afoul of the most general transworld identity requirements. An influential philosophical argument for the concept of world-relativized existence is examined in Alvin Plantinga’s formal development and explanation of modal semantic relations. Despite proposing an attractive unified semantics of alethic modality, Plantinga’s argument is rejected on formal grounds as supporting materially false actual existence assertions in the case of actually nonexistent objects in the framework of Plantinga’s own underlying classical predicate-quantificational logic.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy
06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy > Theoretical Philosophy

UniBE Contributor:

Jacquette, Dale

Subjects:

100 Philosophy

ISSN:

1874-6373

Publisher:

De Gruyter

Language:

English

Submitter:

Caroline Bolz

Date Deposited:

26 Mar 2015 13:51

Last Modified:

27 Apr 2018 09:45

Publisher DOI:

10.1515/mp-2014-0006

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.65892

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/65892

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