Emons, Winand (December 2001). A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders (Diskussionsschriften 01-04). Bern: Universität Bern Volkswirtschaftliches Institut
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Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents are to be deterred. The agents are wealth constrained so that increasing the fine for the first offense means a reduction in the sanction for the second offense and vice versa. The agents may follow history dependent strategies. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. The optimal sanction scheme is decreasing rather than increasing in the number of offenses. Indeed, the sanction for the first offense equals the entire wealth while the sanction for the second offense is zero.
Item Type: |
Working Paper |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics 03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics > Institute of Economics > Economic Theory |
UniBE Contributor: |
Emons, Winand |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
Series: |
Diskussionsschriften |
Publisher: |
Universität Bern Volkswirtschaftliches Institut |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Aline Lehnherr |
Date Deposited: |
15 Apr 2020 11:53 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 15:37 |
JEL Classification: |
D82, K41, K42 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.142429 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/142429 |
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