Emons, Winand (December 2006). Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets (Discussion Papers 06-05). Bern: Department of Economics
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We consider successive generations of non-altruistic individuals carrying a good or bad gene. Daughters are more likely to carry their mother’s gene than the opposite one. Competitive insurers can perform a genetic test revealing an agent’s gene. They may condition their quotes on the agent’s or on her ancestors’ genetic status. In equilibrium generation one is bribed to take the test with an unconditional quote. The insurer uses this information to profitably screen a finite number of generations of their offspring. The offspring of good gene carriers subsidize the tested generation.
Item Type: |
Working Paper |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics |
UniBE Contributor: |
Emons, Winand |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
Series: |
Discussion Papers |
Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Lars Tschannen |
Date Deposited: |
02 Oct 2020 07:48 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 15:39 |
JEL Classification: |
D82, G22 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.145688 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145688 |
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