Political influence on non-cooperative international climate policy

Habla, Wolfgang; Winkler, Ralph (August 2011). Political influence on non-cooperative international climate policy (Discussion Papers 11-06). Bern: Department of Economics

Preview

Text dp1106.pdf - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons: Attribution (CC-BY). Download (249kB) | Preview

We analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether to set up an international emission permits market, which only forms if it is supported by all countries. In the second stage, countries non-cooperatively decide on the number of tradable or non-tradable emission allowances, depending on the type of regime. In both stages, special interest groups try to sway the government in their favor. We find that (i) both the choice of regime and the level of aggregate emissions only depend on the aggregate levels of organized stakes in all countries and not on their distribution among individual interest groups, and (ii) an increase in lobbying influence by a particular lobby group may backfire by inducing a change towards the less preferred regime.

Interest & Impact

Downloads

271 since deposited on 15 Oct 2020
73 in the past 12 months

Citations

5 Citations in Web of Science ®
6 Citations in Scopus

Search

in Google Scholar™

Services

Actions (login required)

Edit item

Actions (login required)

Edit item