Beccuti, Juan I. (April 2014). Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment (Discussion Papers 14-01). Bern: Department of Economics
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This paper studies the optimal mechanisms for a seller with imperfect commitment who puts up for sale one individual unit per period to a single buyer in a dynamic game. The buyerís willingness to pay remains constant over time and is his private information. In this setting, the seller cannot achieve greater payo§s than those obtained by posting a price in each period. However, price posting is not optimal if the buyer is su¢ ciently impatient relative to the seller. It is also proved that a mechanism ‡ la Goethe (see Moldovanu and Tieztel 1998) is almost optimal. Keywords: asymmetric information, imperfect commitment, dynamics, mechanism design, non-optimality of posting prices.
Item Type: |
Working Paper |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics |
UniBE Contributor: |
Beccuti Vazquez, Juan Ignacio |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
Series: |
Discussion Papers |
Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Lars Tschannen |
Date Deposited: |
18 Dec 2020 15:00 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 15:40 |
JEL Classification: |
D82 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.145800 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145800 |
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