Letina, Igor; Liu, Shuo; Netzer, Nick (May 2020). Optimal Contest Design: A General Approach (Discussion Papers 20-11). Bern: Departement of Economics
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We consider the design of contests for n agents when the principal can choose both the prize profile and the contest success function. Our framework includes Tullock contests, Lazear-Rosen tournaments and all-pay contests as special cases, among others. We show that the optimal contest has an intermediate degree of competitiveness in the contest success function, and a minimally competitive prize profile with n−1 identical prizes. The optimum can be achieved with a nested Tullock contest. We extend the model to allow for imperfect performance measurement and
for heterogeneous agents. We relate our results to a recent literature which has asked similar questions but has typically focused on the design of either the prize profile or the contest success function
Item Type: |
Working Paper |
|---|---|
Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics |
UniBE Contributor: |
Letina, Igor |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
Series: |
Discussion Papers |
Publisher: |
Departement of Economics |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Dino Collalti |
Date Deposited: |
13 Jan 2021 15:46 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 15:43 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.48350/150266 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/150266 |
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