Conflict among member states and the influence of the Commission in EMU politics

Kudrna, Zdenek; Wasserfallen, Fabio (2020). Conflict among member states and the influence of the Commission in EMU politics. Journal of European public policy, 28(6), pp. 902-913. Taylor & Francis 10.1080/13501763.2020.1751681

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The recent reforms of the euro zone are best explained in three steps: (a) member states’ preferences were determined by national governments on the basis of their economic interests, which are interpreted through a distinct set of ideas, (b) the diverging preferences among member states translated into a straightforward intergovernmental bargaining setting, and (c) the European Commission maintained a leading role throughout the process of negotiating policy outcomes. On the interstate bargaining level, all major reform proposals were negotiated between two opposing groups of member states: one advocating for fiscal discipline and the other asking for more burden sharing and transfers. In this intergovernmental bargaining setting, the Commission was influential in policy negotiations and in turning the political compromises into reform outcomes. Taken together, the politics of euro zone reform were shaped by the conflict among two opposing coalitions of member states and the influential role of the Commission.

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