Beccuti, Juan; Möller, Marc (2021). Screening by Mode of Trade. Games and economic behavior, 129, pp. 400-420. Elsevier 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.010
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This paper endogenizes a monopolist's choice between selling and renting in a non-anonymous durable goods setting with short-term commitment, by allowing for contracts that determine the good's allocation not only at the beginning but also at the end of a given period. We show that the revenue-maximizing menu of contracts features screening by mode of trade when future trade is subject to frictions and the monopolist is more patient than consumers. Selling to high types while renting to low types, allows the monopolist to defer part of his compensation in form of a reduction of consumers' future information rents while lowering the allocational costs of ordinary, intertemporal screening.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics |
UniBE Contributor: |
Beccuti Vazquez, Juan Ignacio, Möller, Marc |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
ISSN: |
0899-8256 |
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Dino Collalti |
Date Deposited: |
27 Jan 2022 15:24 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 16:00 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.010 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.48350/163397 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/163397 |
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