Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations

Emons, Winand; Lenhard, Severin (2023). Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations. American law and economic review, 24(2), pp. 589-613. Oxford University Press 10.1093/aler/ahac008

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To encourage private negotiations for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze the effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage settlement negotiations that would otherwise not occur. If, however,
the parties settle without the rebate, the introduction of the reduction may increase the settlement amount. Yet deterrence for those wrongdoers who are actually fined always goes down. Under a leniency program the rebate does not affect the leniency applicant: she doesn’t
pay a fine that can be reduced. The overall effect of a fine reduction on deterrence is, therefore, negative.

Item Type:	Journal Article (Original Article)
Division/Institute:	03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics
UniBE Contributor:	Emons, Winand, Lenhard, Severin Jean-Jacques
Subjects:	300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics
ISSN:	1465-7260
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Language:	English
Submitter:	Julia Alexandra Schlosser
Date Deposited:	10 Nov 2022 15:17
Last Modified:	20 Oct 2023 15:32
Publisher DOI:	10.1093/aler/ahac008
URI:	https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/174656