Letina, Igor; Schmutzler, Armin; Seibel, Regina (2024). KILLER ACQUISITIONS AND BEYOND: POLICY EFFECTS ON INNOVATION STRATEGIES. International economic review, 65(2), pp. 591-622. Wiley 10.1111/iere.12689
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Int_Economic_Review_-_2024_-_Letina_-_KILLER_ACQUISITIONS_AND_BEYOND__POLICY_EFFECTS_ON_INNOVATION_STRATEGIES.pdf - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works (CC-BY-NC-ND). Download (410kB) | Preview |
This article provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that, in spite of countervailing incentives on incumbents and entrants, prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative overall innovation effect. We provide conditions determining the size of the effect and conditions under which it is zero. We further analyze the effects of less restrictive policies, including merger remedies and the tax treatment of acquisitions and initial public offerings. Such interventions tend to prevent acquisitions only if the entrant has sufficiently high stand-alone profits.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
|---|---|
Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics |
UniBE Contributor: |
Letina, Igor |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
ISSN: |
1468-2354 |
Publisher: |
Wiley |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Julia Alexandra Schlosser |
Date Deposited: |
27 Mar 2024 09:22 |
Last Modified: |
27 Apr 2024 00:15 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1111/iere.12689 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.48350/194918 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/194918 |
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