Rethinking Shared Rule as Intergovernmental Lobbying: A Framework for Analysis

Freiburghaus, Rahel (2024). Rethinking Shared Rule as Intergovernmental Lobbying: A Framework for Analysis. Regional and Federal Studies Taylor & Francis 10.1080/13597566.2023.2252343

Text Rethinking_shared_rule_as_intergovernmental_lobbying__a_framework_for_analysis.pdf - Published Version Restricted to registered users only Available under License Publisher holds Copyright. Download (2MB)

The recent literature has witnessed a booming scholarly interest in shared rule, a defining aspect of federalism. As a result, scholars have converged on an understanding that equates shared rule with intergovernmental lobbying: the attempt of subnational governments to influence upper-level decision-making. However, such a ‘stipulative definition’ is not directly applicable, leaving the empirical manifestations of shared rule contested. To address these conceptual and measurement shortcomings, this paper presents a comprehensive framework for analysis. Its four dimensions help to categorize different shared rule mechanisms; guided by straightforward ‘w’-questions. Furthermore, the framework incorporates empirical questions and measurement approaches borrowed from interest group and lobbying research—a major political science mainstream strand that also originates in the Federalist Papers. The article concludes with a research agenda outlining how the framework may inspire future investigations into the practice and effects of intergovernmental lobbying across time and space.

Interest & Impact

Downloads

2 since deposited on 03 Jun 2024
2 in the past 12 months

Citations

5 Citations in Web of Science ®
6 Citations in Scopus

Search

in Google Scholar™

Services

Actions (login required)

Edit item

Actions (login required)

Edit item