A test of the Bolton-Scheinkman-Xiong hypothesis of how speculation affects the vesting time of options granted to directors

Radulescu, Doina Maria; Egger, Peter (2014). A test of the Bolton-Scheinkman-Xiong hypothesis of how speculation affects the vesting time of options granted to directors. Journal of Corporate Finance, 29, pp. 511-519. Elsevier

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This paper investigates empirically the Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) hypothesis, according to which initial shareholders may provide incentives to managers to take actions that stimulate speculative bubbles. We test this hypothesis with data on up to 8,544 directors and up to 1,677 companies between 2004-2008. Using vesting time as a measure of the short-term performance weighting in CEO compensation and various alternative measures of the extent of speculation, the findings support the hypothesis: vesting time decreases with more intensive speculation. The results prove robust in various empirical model specifications.

Item Type:	Journal Article (Original Article)
Division/Institute:	11 Centers of Competence > KPM Center for Public Management
UniBE Contributor:	Radulescu, Doina Maria
Subjects:	300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 350 Public administration & military science
ISSN:	0929-1199
Publisher:	Elsevier
Language:	English
Submitter:	BORIS Import
Date Deposited:	25 Sep 2014 16:28
Last Modified:	05 Dec 2022 14:37
URI:	https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/58651