Institutions and coalitions in policy processes: a cross-sectoral comparison

Fischer, Manuel (2015). Institutions and coalitions in policy processes: a cross-sectoral comparison. Journal of public policy, 35(02), pp. 245-268. Cambridge University Press 10.1017/S0143814X14000166

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Actors with joint beliefs in a decision-making process form coalitions in order to translate their goals into policy. Yet, coalitions are not formed in an institutional void, but rather institutions confer opportunities and constraints to actors. This paper studies the institutional conditions under which either coalition structures with a dominant coalition or with competing coalitions emerge. It takes into account three conditions, i.e. the degree of federalism of a project, its degree of Europeanisation and the openness of the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making process. The cross-sectoral comparison includes the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006 with a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that Europeanisation or an open pre-parliamentary phase lead to a dominant coalition, whereas only a specific combination of all three conditions is able to explain a structure with competing coalitions.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Institute of Political Science

UniBE Contributor:

Fischer, Manuel (B)

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 320 Political science

ISSN:

0143-814X

Publisher:

Cambridge University Press

Language:

English

Submitter:

Manuel Fischer

Date Deposited:

25 Mar 2015 11:25

Last Modified:

29 Mar 2023 23:34

Publisher DOI:

10.1017/S0143814X14000166

Uncontrolled Keywords:

coalitions, institutions, policy process, QCA, SNA, Switzerland

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.65465

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/65465

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