Selection upon Wage Posting

Sticher, Silvio (November 2013). Selection upon Wage Posting (Discussion Papers 13-11). Bern: Department of Economics

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We discuss a model of a job market where firms announce salaries. Thereupon, they decide through the evaluation of a productivity test whether to hire applicants. Candidates for a job are locked in once they have applied at a given employer. Hence, such a market exhibits a
specific form of the bargain-then-ripoff principle. With a single firm, the outcome is efficient. Under competition, what might be called “positive selection” leads to market failure. Thus our model provides a rationale for very small employment probabilities in some sectors.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Sticher, Silvio

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Discussion Papers

Publisher:

Department of Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Lars Tschannen

Date Deposited:

18 Dec 2020 15:04

Last Modified:

18 Dec 2020 15:04

JEL Classification:

D83, J21, J31

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.145776

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145776

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