Sticher, Silvio (November 2013). Selection upon Wage Posting (Discussion Papers 13-11). Bern: Department of Economics
|
Text
dp1311.pdf - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons: Attribution (CC-BY). Download (610kB) | Preview |
We discuss a model of a job market where firms announce salaries. Thereupon, they decide through the evaluation of a productivity test whether to hire applicants. Candidates for a job are locked in once they have applied at a given employer. Hence, such a market exhibits a
specific form of the bargain-then-ripoff principle. With a single firm, the outcome is efficient. Under competition, what might be called “positive selection” leads to market failure. Thus our model provides a rationale for very small employment probabilities in some sectors.
Item Type: |
Working Paper |
|---|---|
Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics |
UniBE Contributor: |
Sticher, Silvio |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
Series: |
Discussion Papers |
Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Lars Tschannen |
Date Deposited: |
18 Dec 2020 15:04 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 15:40 |
JEL Classification: |
D83, J21, J31 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.145776 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145776 |
Actions (login required)
 |
Edit item |