Signaling and stakeholder honesty: On the individual and combined effects of owner family membership and religious affiliation

von Bieberstein, Frauke; Crede, Ann-Kathrin; Essl, Andrea; Hack, Andreas (2020). Signaling and stakeholder honesty: On the individual and combined effects of owner family membership and religious affiliation. Family Business Review, 33(3), pp. 265-283. Sage 10.1177/0894486520924301

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Stakeholder honesty is highly important for managers, for instance, in decisions involving hiring. Due to reciprocity, stakeholders are more likely to be honest if the managers act honestly themselves. However, external stakeholders often cannot observe managers’ actions and instead have to rely on signals. This article examines the effects of two signals—a manager’s owner family membership and religious affiliation—on stakeholder honesty. By conducting an economic experiment and a survey, we find that stakeholders behave more honestly toward family managers compared to nonfamily managers. This effect is reinforced if the family manager is presented as religious.

Item Type:	Journal Article (Original Article)
Division/Institute:	03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Organization and Human Resource Management > Organisation 03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Organization and Human Resource Management > Human Resource Management
UniBE Contributor:	von Bieberstein, Frauke, Crede, Ann-Kathrin, Essl, Andrea, Hack, Andreas
Subjects:	300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics
ISSN:	0894-4865
Publisher:	Sage
Language:	English
Submitter:	Andreas Hack
Date Deposited:	19 Jul 2021 10:37
Last Modified:	05 Dec 2022 15:51
Publisher DOI:	10.1177/0894486520924301
URI:	https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/157219