Signaling and stakeholder honesty: On the individual and combined effects of owner family membership and religious affiliation

von Bieberstein, Frauke; Crede, Ann-Kathrin; Essl, Andrea; Hack, Andreas (2020). Signaling and stakeholder honesty: On the individual and combined effects of owner family membership and religious affiliation. Family Business Review, 33(3), pp. 265-283. Sage 10.1177/0894486520924301

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Stakeholder honesty is highly important for managers, for instance, in decisions involving hiring. Due to reciprocity, stakeholders are more likely to be honest if the managers act honestly themselves. However, external stakeholders often cannot observe managers’ actions and instead have to rely on signals. This article examines the effects of two signals—a manager’s owner family membership and religious affiliation—on stakeholder honesty. By conducting an economic experiment and a survey, we find that stakeholders behave more honestly toward family managers compared to nonfamily managers. This effect is reinforced if the family manager is presented as religious.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Organization and Human Resource Management > Organisation
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Organization and Human Resource Management > Human Resource Management

UniBE Contributor:

von Bieberstein, Frauke; Crede, Ann-Kathrin; Essl, Andrea and Hack, Andreas

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

ISSN:

0894-4865

Publisher:

Sage

Language:

English

Submitter:

Andreas Hack

Date Deposited:

19 Jul 2021 10:37

Last Modified:

19 Jul 2021 10:37

Publisher DOI:

10.1177/0894486520924301

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/157219

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